NATIONAL DEFENCE MEASURES.
THE country, the Parliament, and the Government seem at length to be agreed on the necessity of providing adequate means of defence for these islands. Our system of defence naturally divides itself into two branches—our first line is on the sea ; our second line is on the land. Steps have been taken by the Admiralty, animated by its energetic Secretary, to provide as rapidly as possible for the augmentation of our naval forces to a point which will enable us to maintain our old position on the sea, and secure should the occasion ever arise, the command of the Channel. With the second branch, our land, force we are not so forward, yet something has been done in this direction, and more has been begun. The increase in the Army, the atten- tion paid to the Militia, the encouragement—small as it is—given to volunteering; the armament of parts of the coast, and the adoption of the Armstrong gun, are all measures, not only ren- dered necessary by the peculiar circumstances of the time, but are measures which' for a country like England, are suitable to all time within the foresight of man. What is most manifest in the treatment of the question of National Defence in the hands of our present Ministers is, the comprehensive grasp which Mr. Sidney Herbert and his colleagues seem disposed to take of the whole business.
One essential point is the question of fortification. England is not a country in which it would be judicious to erect fortresses of a character corresponding to those we find on the open frontiers of continental countries. Our great fortress is our rocky coast and its wind-swept sea. Nevertheless a wise Government will always take care to cover its ports and arsenals with efficient de- fensive works, to protect its shipping and its stores. Now' the question of fortification is a very large and very complicated one. The introduction of the rifled cannon has made serious inroads upon the old system of defence, and works will now be required adapted to resist the fire which may be brought against them. Extensive plans of fortification have been laid before the Govern- ment, prepared, as we are assured by the Secretary for War, with "skill and ability." The Government has no distrust of these plans, but in order that they may be perfectly well considered, and may command the confidence of the country, Ministers have resolved to appoint a Commission of Military and Naval men and avilians, to reconsider and report upon these plans. This is a wise measure ; and it answers to a demand made by Sir De Lacy Evans for some Commission of the kind.
The next question turns upon the time in which these works should be executed. Some think that for any effectual purpose of W
defence they ought to be finished as rapidly as possible. e con- cur in this opinion. On the other hand, as the execution of such large works will cost a great deal of money, it is objected that it would be wiser to spread the amount required over a given num- ber of years, rather than raise it at once, and finish the work out of hand. Were we in a time of settled peace, when no elements beyond the control of Governments were in existence such an ob-
jection would be valid, but, under present circumstances, without implying any distrust of any Government whatever, in the presence of such complicated questions as exist in Europe, and which may explode at any moment, we conceive that the ob- jection is not valid. Then, how should money be raised for this service ? Mr. Horsman has made an excellent suggestion. He proposes that a special fund should be raised for the purpose of defraying the expenses. We have some reason to believe that the elovernment is inclined to favour the view taken by Mr. Horsman, and instead of spending the money in driblets, to raise it and spend it at once. This might very easily be done, not only
without disturbing the Money Market, but even by adding strength to it. Government might raise the amount on long and short annuities, or by some similar method; and although the Money Market, as it often does, might feel bound to exhibit the routine signs of depression, yet, as the loan would afford a means of investment, and would also enhance the general confidence of the country in its own security, the stability of the Money Market would be speedily restored and its tone improved. It is probable that if Mr. Horsman's plan be adopted, the whole of the works required for the defence of our ports and arsenals—and these are all that are required—could be finished in a couple of years. This would be far more satisfactory than the dilatory plan., in executing which we might some day be caught with unfinished works, and in many cases these would be worse than no works at all.
It is lamentable, but it is the fact that we live in an age of huge standing armies. They are the worst legacy left us by the first French revolution. General Bonaparte won some of his most brilliant victories with a mere handful of men ; but the Emperor Napoleon marched with armed nations behind him and set the fashion of campaigning with hosts that almost rivalled those of the Persian. The mode was necessarily followed. After the peace of 1815, the Napoleonic fashion, still adhered to in principle, fell short of its former dimensions in practice. In 1830, however, and still more in 1848, the fashion revived, and vast armies became once more the rage with the military mo- narchies.
England resisted the evil practice. She cut down her army and everything belonging to it after the peace. One consequence was that when in 1827 the Emperor Nicholas chose to make a dash upon Constantinople, English statesmen, although aware of the European interests assailed by Russia, could not aid the Sultan, because they had not the means. Still we were slow to arm. It was not until nearly twenty years afterwards that the inquiries of Burgoyne and the gloomy remonstrances of Welling- ton, and still more the Crimean war, rudely roused us from our dreams of peace and led us to think of our defences on sea and land.
We are now inheriting our share of the fatal legacy of the revolutionary war. That is the whole case. The Mon iteur, contrasting the expenditure of the two countries, asserts that it cannot be French armaments that induce English armaments, yet it is demonstrable that the augmentation of the French fleet has made it impossible for us to stand upon the ancient ways of 1835 or even 1853. Steam has laid us open to attack, and with the firmest trust in the sagacity and good intentions of the rulers of other states, we dare not rely upon their forbearance, especially when a day may bring new rulers, new schemes, new ambitions -on the scene. It is not to be prepared against special dangers that our fleet is augmented and our military means rendered more efficient. Still less is it for offensive purposes. England has no warlike designs against, any power. She is only determined to hold her own.
The remarks in the Mon iteur, therefore, do not apply to our case. Hour Army and Navy cost more than the Army and Navy of Franco, it is because the voluntary soldier is paid more and fed better than the conscript ; because our empire is not compact but • spread over the globe from pole to pole ; because our system is to o in haste what other countries do with a prolonged and sus- tained effort, and hence we seem at times to spend money as if we were doing something extraordinary, when we are only, by an ex- traordinary effort, attempting to make up for the ladies of pre- ceding years. That we have made great efforts recently is cer- tainly due to the fact that France has made a prolonged series of great efforts to make good her old maritime position. And in addition to keeping up with her, we have to bear in mind other powers and the interests of our colonies ; so that our augmen- tations are for purely defensive purposes, those of our marine strikingly so, since our ships can invade no territory, but they can preserve the key of our imperial life, the dominion of the sea. The Moniteur may, therefore, rest assured that our national burdens are due to that fashion for large armaments which we never set, but which, unhappily, we are bound to follow.
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