DUE LATITUDE OF PUBLIC SPEECH.
A PRINCIPLE of considerable public importance was involved in a hostile correspondence published in the papers the other day,* which gives new interest to a trite theme, and a practical aspect to one in a general way too unprofitable for discussion ; and this not the less for its having a comic side to it—which all varieties of the same subject necessarily present. The question which suggests itself here is not— whether duelling ought to be permitted, whether it is a practice
repugnant to common sense, whether it is at variance with human laws or divine precepts : these are doubtless, points which ought to be mooted by the moralist, and the agitation of which may have a distant bearing on society ; but, in a practical point of view, ex- perience has proved that the most promising arguments on the subject are fruitless—or at least so slow to ripen as not to repay the cost of' elaboration. The question now suggested is, what lati- tude of animadversion on public conduct ought to be judged to come within the mark of inoffensive speech, according to a liberal inter-
pretation of time doctrines of flishionable endurance ? how many, and what hard words are "gentlemen" to put up with in public life, before they are to be permitted to " go out ? " Where is time lama nuile.,itos of conventional honour to date from—from " you're a scoundrel," or from " you're another ?" In fact, at what point is abuse to merge into folly, and a contumelious speech to be set right by an absurd proceeding ? That is the question. The right to be pistolled is not here in dispute—" sit jus, liceatque perire' (gentle- men may be shot on these grounds.) But, the privilege being granted, required the point at which honourable men may begin to be ridiculous ?
As public opinion is not strong enough to put down time practice of duelling, the next best thing it can do, perhaps, is to subject it in some measure to regulation. It is indeed altogether in a public point of view—that is to say, it is with reference to the questions of public convenience and public interest—that we wish to regard the subject on this occasion. That which the state chiefly cares for in the matter of duelling is, that its best and most useful citizens may not be unnecessarily lost to it—that, in the full career of their utility, they may not be liable to be picked off like pigeons by any passing sportsman that takes a limey to have a " shy' at them; but more, or rather most especially, that they may not be sacrificed in consequence of that utility. Now, amongst meritorious public acts, there are few more meritorious ;hail those which result in the ex- posure of political villany. If we consider the useful, working por- tion of the actors on the political stage' (what a dividend !) we shall find that they are to be distinguished principally into two sorts,— those who devise good, and those who war with erd—the labourers and the soldiers of the hive. If the former require encouragement, the latter demand protection. We ought to derive the utmost possible profit from their services, and, for that reason, to render the performance of them easy, and at least tolerably secure. Where the conflict lies with things, and not persons, no shield is required to
* This paper has been in type since the 9th instant.
be interposed to give it effectual assistance ; or where persons are at- tacked in their corporate capacity and in indiscriminate numbers : but when it is necessary for the public good that individuals should be taxed with exactly as much rascality as they may have been guilty of, it is highly important that those who, from disposition or particular circumstances, may be best fitted to support the charge, should be encouraged to bring it, and should be protected in the execution of so important a duty by all the authority which public opinion can bring to bear on the transaction. But can gross acts of corruption, can enormous dishonesty, can revolting hypocrisy or barefaced lying—be mildly suggested ? Can a proceeding—itself, perhaps, incompatible with all the conditions of honour—be de- scribed in such terms as shall not wound honour ? When honour, in fact, is past wounding—when it is dead—is it to be endured that its bare carcase should be respected ? that we should be called Upon to do ridiculous genuflexions before a stuffed skin, and con- tinue the same homage to the mummy which we paid to time fair reality ? Then what is time language in which inoffensive charges of dishonesty, lying, &e. can be brought ? What is the milk-and- hone!, for " scoundrel ?"
Several things appear to result from these reflections. First, that persons moving in a sphere of life which invests them with the name and privileges of " gentlemen," may pursue courses of' con- duct which, if honestly described, can hardly fail to give occasion to those words and expressions which their said privileges enable them to resent with duel, and that, in this manner, " honour" may become its own most fatal opposite ; second, that it may naturally fall within the province of other persons, whose privileges and re- sponsibilities are equal while their honesty is greater, to bear wit- ness against these " honourables," and that to do so may be to serve the state in the most essential respect ; third, that such other persons may be, and are likely to be, amongst the state's most valued subjects, and that it is exceedingly inconvenient and expen- sive to the state, that its most valued subjects, for their most essen- tial services, should be picked off with bullets. Another fact is not less obvious--we mean, that the "laws of honour," as they are called, cannot be enforced with the same strictness in public as in private life. This principle is acted upon to a certain extent, though with out being acknowledged, in political society : and hence, partly, the litreical exhibitions so frequent in the I loll se of Commons, where every abusive epithet has two senses—a Parliamentary one and a com- mon one; an absurdity that has often been satirized—never so happily as by Boz, in a mock debate which will occur to most of our readers. It should be observed, however, that, in a majority of cases, the feuds of this kind which occur in Parliament arise, not from offence given in the honest but unsparing discharge of a public duty, but from a vulgar spirit of squabble, or froin selfish individual animosities. The principle, DO less, is there tacitly re- cognized; and it has been found impossible to discourse freely on all the subjects which come under notice in political society, with- out often overstepping the line chalked out for the regulation of private conversation. If this principle were publicly recognized, it would prevent much that is at present both ludicrous and disas- trous; it would save trouble to the subtle logicians who now rise to explain the " Parliatnentary senses" of the English lan- guage; and it would render us less liable to the loss by duel of those honester men, who, unfortunately, finding but one sense to a word, can only, when called upon to explain, repeat what they said before.