ENGLISH POLICY OF THE SUEZ CANAL.
Belfast, 26111 May 1857. Sie—We have heard but little lately about the Suez Canal ; but the impression remains that the British Government is disposed to discourage it. I fear that this is true, and that it arises out of an unworthy jealousy of the other maritime powers. Not that our Asiatic policy is so far behind the age as to be actuated in this matter by any dread of losing a commercial monopoly ; but I apprehend that it is governed by political considerations of the same kind—that the rulers of India fear the political consequences of admitting the flags of all the Mediterranean states into the Indian Ocean.
In reasoning on this subject, we must remember that the Turkish Government will certainly insist on the neutrality of the canal, as it does at present on that of the Bosphorus,—in other words, that the canal will not-be. free to vessels of war. This, of course, would not avail in the case of Turkey being leagued with some European Power against us in actual war; but it will prevent any Mediterranean power from being able to make low of the canal in order to form a permanent naval station in the Indian Ocean. And besides, our newly-acquired island of Perim commands the entrance to the Red Sea.
There is therefore no direct danger : is there any indirect ? I do not see what there can be to apprehend, except the growth of European interests other than ours, in the Indian Ocean, to interfere with our present undisputed supremacy there.
Now this, I believe, would be no source of danger, if it arose in the natural and peaceful growth of commerce but rather of safety. We are not the only power on the continent of Asia: Russia is our rival, and cannot be kept out. If the making of the Suez Canal should lead to such an extension of French commerce in the Indian Ocean as to make France an Asiatic power, and cause Austria and Sardinia to follow in the same track, alarming as this may sound at first, it could have no effect in weakening our hold on our present Indian possessions; and its only effect on ourfuture career in India could be by introducing a second rival to us on the field of Asiatic politics. But it is much safer to have two rivals to deal with than only one. There are at present only two Asiatic Powers, and two are not enough to form a balance of power ; but three or more might do so. Such a result might no doubt cheek our career of conquest and annexation : but this would be no disadvantage, for our Indian empire is quite large enough already ; and our safety would be greatly increased by introducing into Asia the European system of giving the guarantee of the larger states to the smaller ones. Were Persia, for instance, placed under the joint guarantee of England, Russia, and France, our chief danger in Asia would be averted. I do not mean that we ought to recede one step from our present position. We must adhere to our present policy of keeping the foreign relations of the native Indian states entirely in our own hands ; and we must maintain a commanding position in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. But at the seine time, we ought, by permitting the formation of the Suez Canal, frankly and unreservedly to open to European enterprise all the shores and islands of the Indian Ocean which have not come under our rule.
Respectfully yours, I. J. M.
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