THE MEANING OF SEA. POWER.
IT is curious to see what difficulty even very able men find in understanding the meaning of sea power. Especially is this true of Continental publicists and states- men. Their eyes are so constantly fixed upon their armies, and upon the plainer aspects of military strategy, that they are always forgetting how great a part the command of the sea plays even in land warfare. A remarkable example of this is to be found in the two articles which have appeared during the present week in the Temps newspaper,— articles calculated to raise doubts in the minds of French- men as to whether France can safely trust to a close understanding with Britain as long as Britain is not possessed of an army on the Continental scale. Before we examine the criticisms contained in the Temps, let us say that we do not resent but welcome them. Freuchmen have the clearest and most obvious right to discuss their relations with this country in all their bearings, and we should be the last to condemn anything in the nature of plain speaking. Any matter which affects the peace of Europe, and consequently the future happiness of mankind, must be treated, not in a vein of sentiment or enthusiasm, but with the utmost care and seriousness. But though we welcome the determination of the Temps to consider all the facts of the situation, we are bound to point out its curious blindness to the strategic aspects of the command of the sea.
With regard to the possibilities of the Entente ripening into an Alliance," the Temps in effect tells us that such an arrangement would be one-sided unless Britain is able to bring far more military power than she now possesses into the common stock. France, that is, would suffer from the Alliance unless she could look to Britain for substantial military aid. But according to the Temps no such military aid could now be given to France by this country. Here is a capital example of thinking that strength in war rests only upon soldiers. For ourselves, we believe that even without any increase of our present Army we could, should it be necessary to go to the aid of 'France, do a very great deal more on land than the critic of the Temps assumes to be possible. A hundred and fifty thousand men acting upon the flank of an v attacking France from the east might be quite enough to turn the scale. When two forces are evenly balanced the determining factor need not necessarily be large. Putting that aside, however, and assuming for the purpose of argument that the military aid we could bring to France would be a negligible quantity, we hold, nevertheless, that the fact of our command of the sea would enable us to bestow on France at the moment of crisis aid that might be of incalculable benefit to her. This can easily be realised by supposing France at war with Germany in the course of, say, three years' time, and considering the situation. It is no secret that at that time the German Fleet will be so greatly superior in numbers, power, and efficiency to the French Fleet that it is as certain as anything human can be that, in spite of the unquestioned gallantry of the French Navy, it would be overcome, and Germany would very soon after the declaration of war possess the command of the sea —in the relative sense ; that is, as far as France was concerned.
What must be the consequences? In the first lam a terrific injury would be done to French com- merce. The French mercantile marine would be swept from the sea, and French foreign trade would be paralysed. Next, the whole of the great oversea Empire of France in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific would be at the mercy of Germany. Still mere serious, the Germans by the possession of the command of the sea, coupled with their enormous resources in the matter of sea-transport, would be able to deal France a blow which would counter- act any successes French troops might achieve on the frontier. We are by no means to be counted among those who believe that in the case of war with Germany the French armies would be unable to give a good account of themselves. We believe, rather, that France would be able to hold her own on the frontier, if not indeed somewhat more than her. own. The notion of the Germans being able to make a rapid invasion of France is, in our opinion, quite untenable. No doubt France would have a very severe struggle, and would have to place almost the whole of her military forces on her Eastern frontier ; but when she had done that the Germans would find themselves opposite an insurmountable obstacle. Faced with such a situation, the Germans would bring their sea power to help their land forces. What they would do would be to lit out an armada of trans- ports, put some two hundred thousand men on board, and convey them to some place upon that vast stretch of coast which runs from Dunkirk to Biarritz, and from Cette to Mentone. It will perhaps be said that the French Army would be able to resist such a landing ; but remember that no man in France could say where the blow would fall. In order to guard her thousands of miles of coast efficiently, France would be obliged to withdraw from the Eastern frontier a large number of troops who would be urgently needed in the firing-line there. In the case of land invasions it is easy enough to tell within a hundred miles or so where the attack is coming, and to make ready to meet it. It is the nature of invasion by sea that the enemy can conceal their place of attack, and that it is impossible to know where to look for them. That is the reason why sea power can alone give complete protection from invasion, and why islands which do not possess sea power are always invaded with special ease. The silver streak does not give protection, but only the long black or grey things which float upon the silver streak. We do not wish to be pessimists, but we say without fear of contradiction that the position of France, face to face with Germany, unless she possesses the com- mand of the sea either in her own person or through our help, is one which no true friend of France can contemplate without very grave misgiving.
There is yet another point of view from which it is essential that France should be able to feel secure as regards sea power. It is of the greatest importance that Italy should not join in any attack upon France. That Italy is most anxious to refrain from joining in such an attack, and to remain on good terms with France, is what we may call a commonplace of diplomacy. But if France were without sea power herself, and without an ally possessed of sea power, Italy might be constrained by the nation which did possess sea power into taking up arms against France. Italy is so terribly vulnerable to the attack of those who possess the command of the sea that she is almost bound to do the bidding of the Power which controls the Mediterranean. If Britain were neutral and Germany had obtained the command of the sea, Italy could hardly refuse to do the bidding of Germany. The same considerations apply to Spain. She might easily be bullied into hostility to France by the possessor of • sea power.
We have dwelt above upon the perilous position which France would be in if the command of the sea had passed to her enemy. Compare this for a moment with the position of strength which she would obtain had she on her side a Power which possessed the command of the sea, even although that Power brought her no military aid. In the first plate, she need have no fear of Italy or Spain. Neither Power could possibly be coerced into attacking her even if it wanted to do so—which it would not—for the game would be too dangerous. Next, she would be able to feel absolutely secure as to her coasts and her commerce, and could put every single man into the fighting- line. Again, she would be able to feel safe in regard to her colonial and oversea possessions, and could draw from them a considerable portion of their garrisons. On the • other hand, Germany would have a good deal to fear for her own coasts. It is true those coasts are not very long, but still to guard them effectually a large number of troops must be kept back from the frontier. It would never do for Germany to risk the possibility of some point on her coast being seized and a mixed force of a quarter of a million Frenchmen and Englishmen being landed for the immediate attack of, say, Hamburg or Bremen, with the further possibility that if the first landing were successful another half-a-million men would be brought round to attack the German armies in the rear.
There is no need to emphasise further the vital import- ance to France of the command of the sea not being in hostile hands, and therefore the vital importance of a good understanding with the Power which commands the sea. We feel sure that our contemporaries in the French Press will acknowledge the significance of the considerations we have set forth as soon as they are pointed out to them. Meantime we desire to express a hope that our words will not be misunderstood in Germany. Nobody here has any wish to use our sea power against Germany, unless she should attack a Power with which we have an understanding, such as we have at present with France. Should France—which is absolutely unthink- able—perpetrate a wanton and unprovoked attack upon Germany, no one in Britain would hear of backing her up: If, however, Germany were to force war upon France, then unquestionably opinion here would be unanimous in sup- porting France to the very utmost of our ability, unless; of course—which, again, is absolutely inconceivable — France had in previous years told us that our help was not required by her, and that she did not want or desire an understanding with us in the matter of foreign relations.
France will, as we have said, never perpetrate a wanton attack on Germany. She is, we believe, the most peace- able and the most peace-loving of all the Continental • Powers, and therefore she is essentially the Power with which we, who also desire peace above all things, ought to arrive at an understanding. Whether this under- • standing should be called an alliance or not seems to us rather a matter of names than of things. For our- selves, however, we are inclined to think that " under- standing " or entente is a much better name than "alliance." " Alliance " has a somewhat aggressive air about it. But the object of both France and Britain is to show the world that when acting together they are thinking of nothing so much as of peace, and that they have no desire to injure, or even to isolate, any other Power. Peace is the principle upon which the understanding rests. We hold that both nations may rely upon their common determina- tion to prevent any Power from disturbing the peace of the world, or from taking aggressive or oppressive action, as the best possible form of alliance. The fact that Russia is also the friend of peace and of France and Britain is a further security. While these three Powers hold together, the risk of Europe being plunged into war is reduced to a minimum. Their rulers know this, and therefore are not likely to allow interests so vast and so beneficial to be jeopardised by a punctilio, or by any injudicious and mis- informed computation of the exact amount contributed by each nation to the common insurance fund against war.
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