British For eign Policy
Speeches on Foreign Affairs. By Sir Edward Grey (the Viscount Grey of Fallodon). Selected with an introduction by Paul Knaplund, Ph.D. London. (Allen and Unwin. 10s. 6d.) Jr is a little surprising that we should have had to wait until 1931 for an adequate collection of Lord Grey's speeches on foreign affairs, and it is, perhaps, rather a humiliating thought that we should have left it to an American scholar to take the necessary initiative. Perhaps the fault lies, in the last instance, with-- Loid Grey himself, for he was sever the man to court publicity or to attach great importance to his personal achievements. 'It is rather noticeable how little there is of Sir Edward prey in these speeches, although practically all of thernwere delivered by him in his capacity of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. They are rarely more than state- ments, careful, moderate and a trifle dry, of Government policy, as explained to the House by the Government's mouthpiece. It is seldom possible to detect even a striving after elegance of form. On one single occasion—the famous evening of August 3rd, 1914, which determined Great Britain's entry into the World War, Grey is obviously speaking under extreme emotional stress ; but even- here he eschews all rhetoric, and when making what is, after all, essentially a sentimental appeal to British friendship- for France—a friend- ship which was the fruit of his life's work—he will say no more than this : " How far that friendship entails obligation—it has been., a friendship between the nations and ratified by the nations—how far that friendship entails an obligation, let every man look into his own heart, and his own feelings, and construe the extent of the obligation for himself. I construe it myself as I feel it, but I do not wish to urge upon anyone else more than their feelings dictate as to what they should feel about the obligation. The. House, individually and collectively, may judge for itself. I speak my personal view, and I have given the House my own feeling in the matter."
This extract alone will show that these speeches, unlike those of Asquith, are not likely, to be widely read for their literary qualities, the more so as most of them were never even corrected. Their value is entirely historical, but as such, it is, of course, very large. In the recent spate of archival publications, in which our own country has joined late, but with the solid effectiveness which characterises all productions of His Majesty's Stationery Office, it is rather easy to forget that world history was not altogether shaped in Embassies and Foreign Offices. In Western Europe the last word in policy still rested with Parliament, and the presentation to Parliament of a Government's point of view is of hardly less importance than the confidential record of that Government's inner workings. Professor Knaplund has, indeed, definitely got together this material to serve as a companion to the series of " British Documents," and it is obvious that the task needed to be done, if only for the use of students. It must be added that its usefulness would have been enhanced if the cross-references to the documents had been less scanty, and the introduction, which is good as far as it goes, had been less
austere in its brevity. The selection is, however, good ; no speech of the first importance has been omitted.
The volume covers the whole field of British foreign policy during the ten years immediately preceding the World War. The Hague Conference, Persia, Morocco, Macedonia and many other subjects are touched upon, but the connecting thread running through the whole is the development of the Entente with France, and the effect of that development upon Ger- many. In the light of after events, when the wisdom of grouping Powers in understandings or alliances seems so questionable, the whole tale of this diplomacy is not without irony. It does, however, appear entirely clear that Grey himself was sincerely convinced that the Entente with France made altogether for peace, and in no way involved hostility towards Germany. As late as March, 1914, he defended his system in these remarkable terms :
" What was essential, I think, and has proved to be essential to the peace of Europe during the troublous times of the last two years has been the existing grouping of the Powers, and the part which in those groups was played by the different Powers to preserve the peace, and which they could not have played so successfully if they had not belonged to those particular groups."
The passage in which he most decisively repudiates the intention which had been, and still is, attributed to him, of seeking to " encircle " Germany occurs in 1909, when he declares that of the two " extreme things " which might provoke a conflict, one would be
" an attempt by us to isolate Germany. No nation of her standing and her position would stand a policy of isolation assumed by neighbouring Powers."
The second would be an attempt by any Power to isolate Britain and dominate the Continent.
The British documents show that the repudiation, which Grey goes on to make, of any attempt to detach Austria from Germany, was completely sincere. Probably few Foreign Ministers could indeed find their reputations so little damaged by the simultaneous republication of their public speeches and their secret decisions. The sad thing is that it was a very excess of innocence that led Grey into confusion at last. One cannot help, feeling that the rule enjoining registration and publication of all treaties, and depriving those not registered of legal validity, is not only a deterrent to the guileful, but also a great protection for the honest.
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