TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE DISPUTE WITH FRANCE.
"TT would be an everlasting disgrace if France and England should go to war for some African rivulet." So said Lord Dufferin during one of our periodic squabbles with France in regard to African boundaries. The sentiment is one which we share to the full, and so, we believe, does not only the present Cabinet, but the whole British public. But though we feel most strongly that it would be a disgrace to civilisation to plunge France and England into war over a quarrel about the Niger Hinter- land, we cannot ignore, and cannot ask our readers to ignore, the fact that the obligation to be reasonable and con- ciliatory is quite as strong on France as upon us. There must be concessions to avoid war, but the concessions must not all be made by England. We cannot, while we insist that our " forward " men shall moderate their demands and control their desire to grab, help insisting that the French "forwards" must also be kept well in hand. It is impossible in a matter like the present for one country to do all the giving way. We say this not so much because we believe in the intrinsic value of the woods, waters, and wastes of the Niger Hinterland, as because we realise that if we are to keep on good terms with France, France must respect us, and France never will respect us if we are perpetually showing her that we will do anything for a quiet life. If the present transaction could close on its apparent completion and have no after-consequences, we should not be greatly troubled at the prospect of letting this or that black town go to France though it was ours by right. But all political experience shows that in dealings between nations such transactions can- not be closed and leave no consequences. If we let the French Government, at the bidding of the Jingo Colonial group, take what belongs to us and encroach upon rights which, if there is any such thing as international comity, ought to be considered as ours beyond all question, we shall not be ending an unpleasant situation, but only preparing for ourselves a whole crop of fresh difficulties. The French, like most other Governments, carries on a perpetual struggle with its Jingoes. The Jingoes, in effect, are always urging some " firm " or " strong " or " decisive " action, and the Government which has a sense of responsi- bility and of proportion is always "fighting off" the Jingo pressure by declarations that such and such things are impossible, or are not worth the sacrifices demanded, or would create international difficulties and so end in war. The country, though anxious to have successes which do not cost too much, is usually inclined to side with the Government. This, however, is not the case if the Chauvinists can say : Pish ! there is no danger ; you have only to keep up a really firm tone and the other side is certain to give way ; ' and then can add, 'Did we not at last induce you to take a high line a year ago, and was it not quite successful? All your fears about war ended in smoke. The firm tone won at once and there was no more trouble.' When the Chauvinists can take that line and can point to plain facts in corroboration, the pressure on the Government becomes almost irresistille. ' A little bluff did the trick last time, why not again ?' is an argu- ment which is naturally most attractive. But it is one which may be fraught with most terrible consequences in international intercourse, for in the end it is almost sure to bring nations to war. At last the Chauvinists go too far, and then nothing but luck such as no one has any right to expect can prevent war. Our Government, then, if only to avoid future troubles, dare not buy a quiet life by simply giving in to France on the Niger. At this very moment, indeed, we are reaping the results of concessions made without a proper quid pro quo,—concessions made, that is, merely in order to secure a quiet life. In the case of Tunis we made every sort of concession to France, and it now appears that we did so simply because France worried us and was very firm, and because her Jingoes clamoured and talked of the awful consequences of not giving way. Now this past willingness to give way is, we fear, getting us into trouble in regard to the Niger. The French Chauvinists cry to their Government, ' Take a firm line and they will yield now as they did a month or two ago about Tunis,' and their advice is so strongly backed up by facts that it is very difficult for the French Government not to follow it. If they make concessions to England, they know they will have to face the outcry that if they had only stood firmer they would have carried their own way as usual. We have thus by our policy of conceding everything to France which we did not think worth fighting about, as it were, demoralised the French Government and raised up obstacles against our- selves. They would not be human if they did not argue Of course we don't want war with England, but is it likely that England, after conceding so much in the case of Siam, of Madagascar, of Tunis, is going to make a last stand over a petty matter in West Africa? Assuredly not. We have only, then, got to stand firm and let it be understood that no power on earth will move us, and we are sure to win.' We do not, of course, blame the French Government for taking up that attitude. Under the circumstances it is a very natural, though a very dangerous one.
In our opinion, then, it is necessary for our Govern- ment to insist upon the maintenance of our rights and the due observance of all agreements and undertakings. We do not, of course,mean by this that they should shut the door on all bargaining as to these rights. If France likes to offer us something in consideration for the abro- gation of this or that right, we should consider the offer, and consider it in a friendly and liberal spirit. What we must not do is to give away what is our own merely because France says " very firmly " that be our claims what they may, she means to have it. That is an attitude which must never be allowed to win a concession, even if the con- cession can be regarded as quite unimportant. The only exception to that rule is when you are quite sure that you will never see the bullying negotiator again. Then, and then only, you may for a quiet life allow yourself to be bluffed out of something you do not want. But while our negotiators must not make concessions in considera- tion of bullying, but only for value received, they must also be careful that they do not themselves fall into the French habit of trying to make doubtful claims good by backing them strongly. We have got quite enough of the world already, and it would be peculiarly odious for us to try this form of grab, however great the temptation. We fear we have let a good many things slip in West Africa through our carelessness, but where they have slipped let us recognise the fact, and not attempt to recover lost ground by straining international agreements, or by other acts which will not bear a. full examination. We do not suppose we are doing this, for it is not an English habit, but there is always a danger of such things happening when bargaining is going on. In this case, however, we ought to- keep specially free from it. What we must enforce are our just rights, but nothing more. Though we have written somewhat pessimistically on the whole subject of the West African dispute, we do not believe that there is any actual danger of hostilities breaking out over the matter. One does not like to use the word " war" when one is speaking of France, for, with all our mutual wranglings and jealousies, the two nations really like and respect each other. Still, sometimes it is better to look things in the face and speak out. We do not believe there is any real chance of war, because France would like nothing less than going to war with us. She does not seriously believe that she could destroy our sea-power, and without beating us at sea she could not really injure us. On the other hand, even if we did not manage to entirely destroy her fleet, we should knock her Colonial Empire to pieces. No doubt we should also be greatly injured by a war with France, but that would be a poor consolation to the French. Let us run over some of the consequences of war to France. To begin with, our ports would be closed to France, and therefore all French sugar, French wines and French brandy, and French goods generally, must seek our ports by indirect means, and so at a great disadvantage. But the competition for the English market is so keen just now that this would simply mean giving an advantage to the commercial rivals of France. Take it as a whole, unless we lost command of the sea, which is hardly conceivable, and so risked invasion, France would suffer very much more than we should by war. We dismiss the idea of France obtaining allies to fight us. Germany would prefer to see France weakened by a war with England, and Russia did not make the alliance with the idea of being drawn into war on account of the Niger. Russia would no doubt say : 'If Germany attacks von we will of course join you, but not otherwise.' Remember, too, that if Germany and the Triple Alliance attacked France while at war with England, the Triple would have become a Quadruple Alliance,—the very thing which Germany has been longing for since she lost Russia's friendship. Depend upon it, if France wants to bring on the great war, she will try to fight without having England on the side of Germany. That is, she will not make war on England, and give Germany the chance of getting over the inevitable struggle on specially advantageous terms. We do not believe, then, that France will make war about the Niger Hinterland, for French statesmen are excellent at estimating chances. But though our Government are, of course, well aware of this, we trust that they will not let it influence them in their negotiations. We want our rights, but we do not want to get an inch of territory out of France, because in the long-run we may depend upon France refusing to fight us. There is room for France in the world as well as for us, and we want to see the French in secure possession of a great African Empire. It is in the interests of civilisation, and also of England, that France should be a world-Power. As long as we keep command of the sea—and when we do not we have ceased to exist— the Colonial Empires of other Powers are simply bonds given to us for good behaviour. France is bound over in the sum of Indo-China, Madagascar, and her African Empire to keep the peace. The greater the value of the bond, the greater the security against it being broken.
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