A SOUTHERN VIEW OF THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN.
IT bas been truly said that, "If Truth hides at the bottom of a well, she never does so more completely than on the morrow of a great battle." This is true of the fight at Bull Run as of other more con- spicuous examples. We do not suppose for one moment that even in this age of publicity the truth has yet been fished up, but we have obtained some of her garments by diligent dragging, and may perhaps obtain still more. The new contribution to the truth is supplied by the Manassas correspondent of the Morning Herald, who has been drawing from the very bottom of the well with the drag- nets of General Beauregard himself. In other words, the corre- spondent draws his information direct from the Southern head- quarters. Out of his report and that of General M`Dowell we may construct something approaching to a true account of the battle. Upon the hills behind the Bull Run, General Beauregard, well in- formed of the Federal movements, was waiting to receive them, and revolving in his own mind whether he should not attack in- stead of waiting to be attacked. But McDowell, delayed as lie was by the defective organization of his army, was at Centreville before Beauregard had determined the knotty question,—Could he trust his troops in an offensive action? And thus Beauregard was compelled—a lucky thing for him—to defer his ambitious design of committing his army in offensive operations. The Southerners occupied a range of hills and woods above the stream. Their right, supported by a second position at Manassas, was very strong. Their left rested upon ridges touching the road from Centreville to Warrenton. They had, according to the correspondent of the Herald, 40,000 men in position, and, as we shall see, received at a critical moment a reinforcement of 4000 to 5000 more. The centre stood upon the ridge running from left to right. General McDowell had intended to surprise the enemy in this position, but instead of leaving Washington on the 8th, he did not march until the 16th, his troops, his train, not being ready. When Ile marched, some of his regiments broke down, after going six miles, and thus he did not reach Centreville until the 18th. On that day General Johnston, coining from Winchester, joined General Beauregard with 4000 men.
Inspecting the enemy's position General McDowell found that he could not hope for success by attacking the right because the ground 'was so difficult. He therefore determined to make a flank move- ment by the Warrenton road and turn the enemy's left. But in order to do this he was obliged to march south-west from Centre- ville, obliquely to his proper front, and in order not to expose his left to a disaster, he was obliged to leave a large force there, and large re- serves at Centreville. McDowell's left covered his line of retreat, and if it had been forced, he must have been destroyed. Why he was not attacked there has caused much surtrise. We now learn from the Herald correspondent that it was intended to fall upon McDowell's left while he was in the act of marching to attack the left of the Con- federates. But the order never reached the Confederate officer in charge of the right, and Beauregard, who had intended to make a flank movement, was himself outflanked. McDowell's brigades, pass- ing to the right, crossed the river above the stone bridge and ford guarded by the Confederates. "The fact is," says the Southern writer in the Herald, "that the enemy, taking advantage of the woody country, had outflanked our left without being perceived,"—a confession which shows how nearly the Federal troops were to success. General Beauregard, attacked in his centre, outflanked on his left, found it extremely difficult to keep his men in line. That they were rarely seen by the Federalists is proved from the report of Colonel Heintzelman. That they were held in band only by great efforts is proved by the Herald correspondent. "About two rat.," he writes, "the fortune of the day appeared to tremble in the balance." Several leading officers had fallen, and numbers of exhausted soldiers were leaving the field. "Our volunteers are described as gloomy in spirit, fairly worn out from fatigue, and positively sinking from ex- haustion." But Beauregard proved himself a good soldier by forcing the regiments to keep their ground. Then came the turn in the battle. General Kirby Smith, with the remainder of General John- ston's division, coming by rail from Winchester, suddenly appeared on the verge of the Confederate left, and, falling at once upon the right of the Federalists, fighting unsupported in the woods, sent them flying down the hill-side. This it was that gave the South the victory at Manassas. With regular troops, an unexpected assault on an exposed flank would have probably led to defeat. Bonaparte at Arcola drove off a whole brigade of Austrians with a few trumpets sounding a cavalry charge in their rear. But the Austrians drew off in order. Not so the American volunteers. Undrilled, undisciplined, with them to retreat was to fly, to retire was to run away. How well they had fought while they stood is shown by the fact that the killed and wounded on the side of the Confederates is now admitted to be no less than 2000 men.
Up to the moment when General Kirby Smith appeared the Federalists had, as they report, really gained the command of the field of battle. Had this officer been delayed another day, the probability is that the Confederates would have been defeated, and they, instead of their enemies, would have exhibited for our edification the worst defects of undisciplined armies, which always show themselves in retrograde movements. There is no reason to believe from this Southern description of the battle that the Confederate troops are one whit better than the Federalists. That they are as unmanage- able is shown by the fact that General Beauregard did not venture to pursue his flying foes, but followed them at a leisurely pace, gathenng up the spoils.
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