TOPICS OF THE D.A.Y.
AN UNDERSTANDING WITH RUSSIA. THE news from Constantinople shows that Russia is working harmoniously with England in the matter of Armenia, and the fear that she would break away from the scheme of joint action, and, instead of putting pressure on the Sultan, encourage his resistance, is apparently without foundation. The fact that we have been able to maintain this joint action with Russia, and, of all places in the world, at Constantinople, is a good omen of no little significance. It is an outward and visible sign of how little reality there is in the declaration that England and Russia are natural and inevitable enemies, and that the notion of their drawing together is a possibility not even worth considering. This exhibition of a better feeling between Russia and England is, indeed, causing Englishmen of the thoughtful kind to ask whether it would not be worth while to go beyond joint action as regards Armenia, and to try to come to a general under- standing with Russia as to the aims and objects of our and her foreign policy. At present the two countries stand, or are supposed to stand, towards each other in a veiled hostility, because their interests and aims are regarded as essentially conflicting. But is this really the case ? Is not the mutual antagonism so often dwelt on conventional and factitious, rather than real ? 'What are the interests of England which conflict with those of Russia, and where does our power and theirs come into rivalry? We believe that if these questions are fairly stated and fairly answered, it will be impossible to show that there is any necessary enmity between Russia and England, or that there are any points in regard to which both Powers must say,—To give up this is more than we can endure. But if that is the case, and if there is no substantial ground of quarrel between the two nations, then most assuredly there is no reason why our diplomatists should not be able to arrive at a general and amicable understanding with Russia, and to clear up and put on a satisfactory basis the relations of the greatest land-Power and the greatest sea-Power of the world. The hour is propitious, and also the man. Lord Salisbury as a Foreign Minister no doubt has his faults ; but he is a man of large and clear ideas, and is not haunted by those petty and conventional ways of looking at things which infect diplomatists of the inferior type. He is not possessed by any stereotyped hatred or fear of Russia, and, should circumstances prove favourable, would, we believe, be quite willing to arrive at an understanding with Russia, and to base our foreign policy on such an agreement. That in the attempt to come to an arrangement he would have the support of the country, we do not doubt for a moment. A few belated Jingoes might oppose him, but not the mass either of his party or of the people as a whole.
Let us for a moment look at the facts and see what basis there is for the plea that Russia and England are natural enemies. Their enmity, if it exists, is certainly not based on trade rivalry. Russia buys greatly from us and we from her, but neither in the carrying trade nor in produc- tion are we rivals. Again, we never hear of Russian com- petition in the neutral markets. It would, indeed, be impossible to point to any other great Power with whom we are so little antagonistic, from the commercial point of view. If, then, we are to find a ground for enmity it must be in politics rather than in commerce. In the political sphere the three supposed grounds for quarrel with Russia are Constantinople, India, and the Far East. Let us ask whether in each of these cases Russia and England could not be brought into line. The present situation as regards Constantinople is not a little curious, and also not a little unsatisfactory as regards England. We do not think that we are exaggerating when we say that the people of the United Kingdom have abandoned the idea of keeping Russia from an open port on the Mediterranean. If Russia were to take Con- stantinople by sea or by marching round through Asia Minor, and so were to avoid trampling on Roumania, and Bulgaria—and that would probably be the way in which she would take it—we may, with certainty, say that England would not go to war to prevent her. We have abandoned the idea of keeping Russia out of Constantinople by war, though as yet the abandonment is rather what Goethe called one of the secrets that is known to everybody, than a declared national policy. But though we have in reality given up the idea of keeping Russia, from the open water by force—and force is the only method —we have been foolish enough not to assure the Russians of the fact. We have kept up an irritating diplomatic pretence that we are still guided by the notions that guided us during the Crimean War, and later under Lord Beaconsfield. Hence the Russians are obliged to regard us as the Power which keeps them out of the Mediterranean, and do so regard us. The great Russian diplomatists may in the abstract believe that we do not intend to fight about Constantinople, but they have no assurance, while, to the ordinary Russian, England still figures as the armed man who guards the gate of the Mediterranean against Russian access. We have in fact abandoned the sub- stantial part of our policy, and yet managed to retain all the odium attaching to it. We have carefully emptied our revolver, and yet still persist in fitfully waving it in the face of the Russians. Surely that is not business or common sense or common prudence. Under the circum- stances it would obviously be much better to make Russia, understand that we have dropped our policy of preventing her from obtaining an open port in Europe, and that all we now insist on is that if Constantinople is taken by Russia it must be by way of Asia, and must not involve the destruction of the Balkan States. If that were frankly done, the question of India would settle itself. While so, many parts of Asia are open at a much smaller cost, Russia will not attack India on grounds of general expansion. If she enters the plain of the Indus in the course of the next fifty years—and one cannot look further than that— it will be solely with the idea of conquering in India an outlet into the Mediterranean. The threats against India are only counter-strokes to England's action on the Bosphorus. But to obtain a complete understanding with Russia, it will be necessary not merely to come to terms in regard to Constantinople and India, but also as regards the Far East. Here again it is a case of Russia's desire for an open port. Russia wants a port or ports in the North Pacific which shall not be closed by ice during several months of the year. It is a most legitimate and most natural wish. Unfortunately, it has been our short- sighted policy to oppose it, with the result that we have again earned the enmity of Russia from a most insufficient cause. Why we should desire to prevent Russia having free access to the sea in the Pacific, it is exceedingly difficult to discover. As long as we maintain our naval strength—and if we do not do that we are altogether lost —the possession by Russia of open ports is in no sort of way an injury. Indeed, Russia with open ports is more vulnerable to the Power which commands the sea, than Russia with ice-closed harbours.
What, then, we would do to secure an understanding with Russia, is roughly and broadly this. We would say to her, We abandon frankly and finally all attempt to prevent your access to the Mediterranean, and we do the like in the case of the North Pacific, on the understanding that you give up the policy of threatening the Indian frontier, and of working with France to injure our interests in Africa and elsewhere. Further, we are per- fectly prepared to come to a detailed arrangement as to your and our expansion in Asia generally. For example, so long as our trade interests are saved from injury, we shall make no objection to your absorbing portions of Northern and Eastern. China. We do not desire to conquer China for ourselves, but neither do we desire to play the dog in the manger in the matter, provided that our trade-rights are not damaged.' That Russia would come to such an understanding, if it were fairly and candidly put before her, and would in consideration thereof refuse to support France against England, we cannot doubt. Look at the immense advantages she would reap, and how little would be asked of her in return. Again, she would know that the rejection of this scheme for an understanding would necessarily oblige us to regard her as unreasonably and dangerously hostile, and to fortify ourselves against her enmity by favouring every force that would tend to act as a makeweight against her influence. Into these possibilities it is not, however, necessary to enter, for we do not believe that the diplomatists of Russia would dream of rejecting our offer were it made them. Let us hope that Lord Salisbury will find it possible to come to such an understanding as we have indicated. If he does, he will secure the gratitude of all those who wish to see England free and strong, and not entangled in a network of conventional and unreason- able enmity with a Power that Nature has marked out for our friendship.
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