Visit to Delhi
From IAN GILMOUR
NEW DELHT
T is difficult to get away from the Common "Market. Indians tend to share the delusion of the anti-Marketeers in Britain: that if Britain does not join, life will go placidly on as before, and Britain will continue to import Indian textiles in satisfactory quantities at the expense of her own declining industry. In fact, of course, if Britain is forced by Commonwealth or other pressures to stay out of Europe, the anti-Common - Market crusaders who complain of the selfish inward-looking tendencies of the Six will find Britain herself becoming no less selfish and introspective. The old guard of the Left and Right would unite to protect this country's dying industries and keep out competitive Common- wealth goods, and Britain's retreat from the brink, allegedly taken in defence of the Com- monwealth, would result in the ruin of some of India's chief exporting industries. Those Indians who object to a British link with Europe because it would lead to Britain putting Europe before the Commonwealth are on firmer ground, but they are not prepared to contemplate the only feasible alternative of a Commonwealth closely knit economically and acting as a unit at the UN, any more than Lord Sandwich, Mr. Fell, MP, and company would contemplate the adop- tion of a general Commonwealth policy, heeding the susceptibilities of India on, say, Katanga.
But the Communists of China are a far more pressing problem for India than the capitalists `Will the underdeveloped countries be able to stand up to the competition? . . .• of Europe. The easiest supply route for Chinese forces in Tibet runs through the Ladakh area,
which explains its occupation by China, and the building of roads indicates that the Chinese do not expect the occupation to be temporary. Despite Mr. Nehru's ingenious distinctions be- tween talks, preliminary talks, talks creating con- ditions for worthwhile talks, and negotiations, and despite his firmness and denials, his decision to talk to the Chinese about their invasion of Ladakh does suggest the de facto cession by India of some of her territory. If India can't or
won't drive the Chinese out, she is unlikely to be Able to talk them out. Probably the best solution ould be a compromise whereby India ceded some land near Ladakh, and China ceded some territory between Sikkim and Bhutan. Mr. Nehru told me that no such proposal had been made, but that if it were it would be worth considering. It may however be already too late. There is reason to believe that China has begun in- filtrating into Bhutan; and if she succeeded in absorbing Bhutan, the way into India would be open.
Chinese penetration of India is not in Russia's interests, and for that reason if for no other the Western reaction to India's project of getting MiGs from Russia to counter the F104s that America gave Pakistan seems excessive. The Western objection that the influx of Russian technicians would enable them to gain secrets from the old-fashioned jets that the West has previously supplied to India was as frivolous as 'security' arguments usually are. But India does depend on American aid, and it is_therefore im- portant for her not to offend Congress in Washington. However cogent the argument that the West should encourage any development likely to divide Russia from China, to an Ameri- can Congressman one Communist looks much like another, and the suggestion that an India- Russia deal would be in the West's interest is likely to prove over-sophisticated. India has therefore been tactless, and if she goes through with the project (which the angry Congressional reactions have naturally made more likely) she will make it more difficult for the Kennedy administration to
maintain its enlightened pro-India policy. What makes the dispute rather ridiculous is that whether India finally plumps for the MiGs or their Western equivalents, they will be quite use- less militarily, just as the Pakistani F104s fulfil no military function whatever. Jets of this type are so fast that they need a most elaborate radar net- work if they are to be used with any effect. Neither India nor Pakistan possesses such a structure; in any war these modern jets would be dangerous only to their pilots. They are mere prestige symbols, useless objects of conspicuous consumption like steel mills in underdeveloped countries or forces de frappe elsewhere.
Mr. Nehru's preservation of free institutions in India and avoidance of putsches, revolts, civil wars or dictatorship is the most considerable achievement of any world statesman since the war. But the magnitude of his feat serves to emphasise his one great omission : his disinclina- tion to build up a successor. Centrifugal tenden- cies have always been present in India. Even with Mr. Nehru's great power and prestige, and a reasonably united Congress Party, power has been drifting from the centre to the states. His qualities apart, Mr. Nehru has advantages that
no successor would possess. As he put it to me, 'I happen to be popular with the masses . . . and it is difficult for newcomers to have the same popularity as those who won through the inde- pendence struggle.' In any India without Nehru, the central government would have to defer to the states much more than at present. But if his eventual successor is not designated soon, so that he can absorb some of the reflected glory of Mr. Nehru in full power, the forces of disinte- gration, when a change has to be made, may be frighteningly strong.
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