I HAVE just returned from Rome, where events have been moving
rapidly during the past three weeks. and I am struck by the failure of public opinion in Great Britain to grasp the salient features of the political situation in Italy. Two alleged dangers to the present Italian Government have been caught hold of—the Constitutional danger and the Socialist danger—and the general opinion seems to be that if Signor Mussolini can overcome these he will win through. A series of extra- ordinarily misleading statements and messages from correspondents in the Press have completed the confusion of public thought in this country.
People in England seem to regard Mussolini as the champion of Italian Nationalism and, as such, the true leader of the great majority of the Italian people : they regret his apparently anti-British and pro-French tenden- cies; but they believe that he is in an impregnable position at the moment, and that the only danger is that if he continues to govern as a dictator the flouting of Constitutionalism will lead to a gradually increasing opposition, ending in a Socialist reaction. These are complete misapprehensions. The Socialists are for all practical purposes non-existent. (Most of them have become ardent Fascisti—extremes meet.) The Constitu- tional danger never existed. The first and most important thing to bear in mind is that the dangers to Signor Mussolini come from within rather than from without. It is the claim of the Fascisti to represent the whole country that is the chief source of their weakness. For you cannot have a strong and efficient Government which relies for its strength and support on every section of the community. Sooner or later the old quarrels recur within the party, and Italy is no exception to this rule. All the rivalries and jealousies, personal and political, which played such havoc with the country just before the institution of the present Government have burst out again during the past few weeks. But to arrive at a proper understanding of the situation it is necessary to go back for a moment and to realize how the Fascisti came into power. First of all, Italy is in no sense a "Constitutional" country, in the British sense of the term. She has not been governed Constitutionally for years, and every recent Prime Minister, notably Signor Giolitti, has been nothing more than a veiled dictator. The Italian people have neither respect nor reverence for their Constitution; they laugh at their Chamber, which laughs at itself, and are in no sense outraged by Signor Mussolini's high-handed actions. Secondly, for Italy the War is summed up in one word—Caporetto. Victory came as an overwhelming surprise, and the momentary exaltation was quickly followed by a period of poverty, disillusionment, discontent and restlessness. It was at this moment, when Socialism was definitely on the wane (a fact not generally realized), when D'Annunzio was still elaborating his schemes at Fiume, and when the Chamber was split into numerous futile groups, that Mussolini struck.
He is a magnificent actor and he had an appreciative audience ; he adopted D'Annunzio's programme ; he stood for the Italian people ; he was everything— Nationalist, Fascist, anti-British, anti-French, anti- Jugo-Slav. He said he would save the nation—and he did. The Italian people put on black shirts and were entranced. The Facta Government did nothing—but it is significant that on the only occasions when army officers considered it their duty to refuse Fascist demands the Fascisti melted away like snow. A sign, a flicker of resistance on the part of the Government, and it is tolerably certain that Mussolini was done. But fortune played into his hands—the King refused to sign the martial law decree, and within a few days the great actor was announcing to a cheering audience of the Chamber that he had no further use for their services ! The blood- less revolution was accomplished—and it was fortunate for Mussolini that it was bloodless. That is how he came into power—a fine piece of acting and a great deal of luck. To the Englishman it is all incredible—I think Italy is perhaps the only country where it could have been carried through triumphantly—but it is necessary to realize to what extent the Italians can be momentarily swept off their feet by a strong personality in order to grasp the difficulties and dangers to-day.
It is generally conceded that Mussolini is a great man. The burning question now is whether he is sufficiently great to cope with the almost overwhelming burdens and difficulties which beset him, considering (a) the manner in which he attained to his present position, and (b) his steadily diminishing support.
I propose to enumerate briefly a few of these difficulties, and leave readers to form their own conclusions. First and foremost there is the Nationalist-Fascist split, which has become acute. There are, I am informed, at least twenty lesser splits in the ranks of the Fascisti, Nationalists, Catholics, Old Liberals, and the other groups which form Mussolini's motley following, but I mention the Nationalist-Fascist split as the biggest and most formidable.
Secondly, there is the Rent Act, which has hardly been mentioned in England. Briefly, it allows evictions, hitherto prohibited. It is a just Act, but it will un- doubtedly rouse the anger of almost all tenants, and the tribunals set up by Mussolini to secure fairness will certainly irritate the landlords by their dilatory methods.
Thirdly, there is the failure to compensate both Fascist leaders and Old Liberals with places in the Administration, which, with the exception of Signor Mussolini and General Diaz, is astonishingly weak in personnel.
Fourthly, there is the financial situation, which is almost desperate. There is an estimated Budget deficit for the year 1922-23 of six and a-half milliard lire, and in a valiant effort to rectify the position Signor Mussolini has found himself involved in immense additional taxa- tion, the disbandment of the Curia Regis and the Fascist military forces, the dismissal of some 40,000 railway employees, and, worst of all, heavy reductions in the personnel of the Civil Services, formerly his strongest supporters.
It is difficult to exaggerate the dangers of these Acts, or the increasing unpopularity which must inevitably fall on the head of any man who attempts thus to govern efficiently. If he succeeds, then Mussolini must go down to history as one of the greatest administrators the world has ever seen. But it is no use refusing to recognize his difficulties, for by so doing we only fail to appreciate the extraordinary achievements and really remarkable courage of the man. A word in conclusion—and I am glad that it is a word favourable to Mussolini. He has secured the whole of the Italian Press, which merely does his bidding— a great asset; and in foreign policy he is, if something of an opportunist, essentially sound. He is far too clever to violate all national feeling unnecessarily by being pro. French, and he has no intention of actively supporting a militant French policy. But he cannot afford to be out of a possible coal deal, hence the presence of five Italian engineers in the Ruhr. He fully realizes the importance of England to Italy, and the necessity for an arrangement with Jugo-Slavia, and it is only the shadowy figure of D'Annunzio, watching anxiously for an opportunity to complete the Nationalist breakaway, that prevents him giving expression to his thoughts. X.
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