`C'est Vrai,' said the General
EUROPE
From MARC ULLMANN
PARIS
Thus Mr Wilson has a simple choice: either he can give up any idea of negotiating changes and make up his mind to accept the rules of the Common Market almost unconditionally, in- cluding the common agricultural policy; or, if he thinks the price of this is too high, he can throw in his lot with President de Gaulle and, by progressively aligning British policy with that of France, count on Paris to remove the technical obstacles to British entry. This second approach is the one secretly hoped for by de Gaulle. His aim is to give British entry —inevitable sooner or later—the appearance not of a personal defeat for himself but of a major victory. To this end, it is essential in his eyes that the entry does not seem to have been imposed upon him by an alliance between Britain and the Five, but that one fine day he can announce himself that Britain has now rallied to his own conception of Europe. In short, he wants to appear as the man who was right to keep Britain out in 1963.
It was in the light of this strategy that the General took up his attitude to Mr Wilson last week. He inquired with courtesy about the Prime Minister's position on a variety of subjects, much as though he were an examiner whose dearest wish was to see that last term's bad boys had made remarkable progress during the holidays. To set out the obstacles, and to gain time, he is relying on the experts, regardless of whether they happen to be Italian, French or German. Thus the reports received in Paris of Mr Wilson's talks in Rome were greeted with satisfaction. The political will to see Britain in, clearly expressed by the Italian government, was in fact coupled with a list of fifteen questions, including some very delicate ones on agriculture, which were set by Sgr Fanfani, the Italian Foreign Minister.
In these circumstances, M. Pompidou had no need to raise the bidding any higher. He was con- tent to ask the Prime Minister and Mr Brown what difficulties they saw about Britain adopting the common agricultural policy. 'If,' they replied,
`the arrangements laid down for 1970 are not changed, Britain will not only have to import her food at high prices, she will also have to pay more money into the common agricultural fund to subsidise the exports of community surpluses than the whole of the rest of the Six put together.' 'C'est vrai,' answered the French, 'and this is a problem which ought not to be underestimated.' No more, no less.
This simple dialogue indeed, which was duly repeated to France's five partners, was quite enough to embarrass the government in Bonn. The Germans themselves are convinced that the common agricultural policy as laid down for 1970 is practically unworkable. But to use the British approach to have the whole thing reviewed now would be to play into the hands of the General. For the French government has the signed documents and could easily make accusa- tions of bad faith. Thus the Germans (who have more than a suspicion that even French ministers no longer believe in the possibility of applying the agricultural policy in full either) prefer to wait for the opportunity for a full negotiation.
This is why many Europeans are advising Mr Wilson to accept things as they are in order to be inside the community on the day when all the practical details will be discussed; and it is pos- sible that Mr Wilson has decided to play it this way. But neither in Rome nor in Paris did he give for one moment the impression of wanting to make up his mind. Mr Brown even went so far as to make known the nature—if not the extent—of the modifications desired by the Labour government. This showed his honesty, and this pleased Paris for the double reason that honesty is always pleasing and because it suited the aims of French diplomacy. It was noted, how- ever, that, although on nearly all subjects Mr Wilson expounded the British view himself, he chose to leave agriculture largely to the Foreign Secretary. Was this not in order to be able to prepare a retreat?
Many Gaullists indeed suspect that Mr Wilson has undertaken his European visits as an exercise in British domestic politics. His real discussion is not with General de Gaulle, nor Sgr Moro, nor Herr Kiesinger, but with Mr Richard Crossman and those other Labour ministers who are reluc- tant to accept the Treaty of Rome without first negotiating substantial modifications. 'You see,' Mr Wilson will be able to say, 'I have visited every one of the Five. They are all in favour of our entry but each one of them told me that if we do not accept the treaty, they can do nothing for us.' This is the outcome which, at the end of the day, the French fear most. This is also, at least partly, why the emphasis was placed on the problem of sterling. Article 108 of the treaty, it was said, lays down that if any member gets into balance of payments difficulties the others will grant it mutual assistance. But sterling is not a currency like the franc, the lira or the mark which plays a role only within its own country. Britain is at the mercy of foreign creditors who can demand payment at any moment.
Mr Wilson wanted to reply to this objection. Last Wednesday he spoke for an hour and a quarter on the subject without stopping. His theme was that for twenty years the sterling balances had been practically stable. Besides, he said, British overseas investments were sufficient to enable the country to face withdrawals without needing to resort to mutual assistance.
There, for the present, is one of the key points in the debate. For, without doubting the relative stability of the sterling balances, French officials notice that the need to maintain the pound has always led Britain to align herself on monetary policy—and not only on monetary policy—with the United States. They believe, therefore, that the adoption of a common European position on these matters would be a major step towards an eventual policy of independence.
But what is a common position? The French government has not been able to bring the Ger- mans, the Belgians, the Italians or the Dutch round to its view that it is necessary to raise the price of gold. And it can hardly be expected that the British will line up with France on this over- night. The most that Britain could do would not go beyond a declaration in favour of setting up a common currency in the distant future and in support of a reorganisation of the International Monetary Fund which, in the French view, re- flects the world situation more as it was fifty years ago than as it is today.
Mr Wilson can claim that in this field, as on the war in Vietnam or the issue of securing the European detente, the best approach is to influ- ence American policy. The General doesn't care. He is convinced that the grandeur of Europe is demonstrated by striking manifestations of inde- pendence from the United States. What he wants is to bring the Prime Minister round to his position.
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