From Russia with What?
MR K's VISIT
From DEV MURARKA
MOSCOW
cvisitcs in Moscow say that Mr Kosygin is going to London only to forestall more of those dramatic dashes of Mr Wilson to Moscow. Therefore, after two visits by himself, and two visits by his Foreign Minister, they conclude that the one concrete achievement of the Labour government in Anglo-Soviet relations has been to coax Mr Kosygin to visit London. The ques- tion asked here, however, is not what Mr Kosygin will achieve by going to London, but why he is going at all? On the face of it, the two sides have taken up positions which are distinctly apart and there appears to be little chance of them coming any closer together in the near future.
The Russians do not expect much in London.
This is clear from the rather low-powered dele- gation which Mr Kosygin is taking with him and the total uncertainty about the agenda which still surrounds the visit. This contrasts sharply with the visit which Mr Kosygin recently made to Paris, and even to Ankara.
One reason, however, apart from purely proto-
col, why the Soviet leader is going to London is because it has become one of the major elements in Soviet foreign policy to cultivate Social Demo- crats everywhere, and especially in Europe. The reasons for this go back to 1964-65 when Moscow was swarming with VIPs who came here to acquaint themselves with the new government. Soviet prestige then was at a rather low ebb, but now the tide has turned and the Russians with their prestige restored are returning some of those visits in the context of generally improved relations. In so far as the Russians can manage it, they will try to keep these relations intact. This applies to all countries and Britain is no exception. The surprising thing is that Soviet-British rela- tions have not actually deteriorated. They have remained instead at a level of wary cordiality. As Pravda's London correspondent, Oleg Orestov, put it in the widely read weekly Za Rube jam a couple of weeks ago : 'Not infre- quently. the ways chosen by Britain to pursue its foreign policy seem to the Russians crooked and roundabout and even sometimes dangerous.' It
be
would difficult to better this as a description of how the Russians view British policy. Un- doubtedly the Russians are interested in improv- ing relations, but so long as the Labour government follows its present path. they despair of any real political improvement. In the field of economics, however, Moscow recognises that Britain has a genuine interest in improving trade, and indeed in recent years, Anglo-Soviet trade has increased. There are more British technicians working all over the Soviet Union now than at any time since the 'thirties. But here, too, it must be recognised that Soviet- French or Soviet-Italian economic relations are of greater importance for the Soviet Union than the kind of uncommitted economic relationship de- sired by Britain. It is not so much a question of what the Russians want Britain to do, as of the perspective in which they view the British role in Europe. They recognise that, even in their eyes, this can be positive as well as negative. Both countries, for instance, have a genuine interest in European security. On the other hand Moscow considers that Britain's European policy is basically orien- tated towards West Germany and is dependent on the Americans. The only concession which they may make is that ultimately Mr Wilson did succeed by his tactics in killing off the MLF project, although they remain very critical of the alternatives he suggested. The credit for this, how- ever, cannot be directly attributed to Mr Wilson who would probably be embarrassed by it. Yet the considerable Soviet interest in Britain's European policy can be judged from the fact that Mr Wilson's Common Market initiative has been followed with great attention not only in the Soviet foreign office, but also in the press. Mr Wilson's volte-face has been criticised, but on the whole the press comment has been objective and rather non-committal. A number of articles, how- ever, have stressed the negative results that could come from British membership. They have emphasised that, quite apart from France, there is rather less enthusiasm for British entry among the Five than has been made out in London.
One question which will undoubtedly come up will be the question of European security. The Russians have kept up their pressure for a Euro- pean security conference and they will want to discuss the matter with Mr Wilson, even if they know in advance that he cannot approve the idea unless it is endorsed by Washington. It is not very clear what the Russians want such a conference to achieve, but they are keeping the idea sufficiently vague so that at its broadest it could mean no more than a friendly discussion of the problems of European security. At a more concrete level, it could be used to establish the beginnings of a universal security system in Europe which would allay many of the Soviet fears of the rising power of West Germany.
The Russians know that Britain cannot be ex- pected to shelve its 'special relationship' with America overnight. Yet they remain optimistic about the way British policy will evolve in the long run, because they believe that some day Britain will have to choose between America and Europe. When it does, there will be a new situa- tion. Once Britain decides to play a European role in earnest, its outlook on the problems of the area will be different and the Russians hope that it may see the advantage of a closer relation- ship with Moscow. This, in essence. is the long- term perspective which prevents Soviet policy- makers from giving up Britain altogether as a lost island, as, at least for the time being, they have given up Germany as a lost country. Ultimately, indeed, from the Russian point of view, the decisive question may be not Britain's attitude to America, but to Germany. Presumably Whitehall will want to discuss Vietnam during the visit. Nothing is more calcu- lated to irritate the Russians, however, than hints put about by Mr Wilson or Mr Brown that there is a special Anglo-Soviet understanding on this issue. They may talk to the Americans about Vietnam when the time comes since America is directly involved and here they have at -least kept their channels of communications open. Given Mr Wilson's views, they have no use, or need, for him as a mediator. His repeated attempts to raise the question have only increased Soviet suspicions about his real motives, and Mr Wil- son's reputation here is frankly not of the highest in terms of political integrity. The formula of international and bilateral re- lations which it seems is being applied to Mr Kosygin's visit is really too vague to be of great use in producing any serious political results. What its impact will be in terms of public opinion in Britain still remains to be seen. On this score at least the Russians agree that it will increase the British public interest in relations with the Soviet Union. But, at governmental level, as far as the improvement of political relations go, they admit that these are not particularly friendly now and so long as Mr Wilson continues on his present course, they are unlikely to be much friendlier even after Mr Kosygin's visit.
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