RED LIGHT FROM COAL
I T is recorded that, when the Coal Industry Nationalisation Bill received its third reading, the Labour Members of the House of Commons, numbers of them ex-miners, celebrated the end of many years of struggle by tramping through the division lobby singing "Guide Me, 0 Thou Great Jehovah." The behaviour of their brothers in the mines indicates that, until recently at any rate, guidance had not come. It is clear enough that what is wanted is a better attendance and a bigger output per head, and it is equally clear that both are attainable. Yet the nationalisation of the British coal-mining industry took place on January 1st, 1947, after one of the worst bouts of absenteeism in an era of absenteeism, and that despite the fact that all over England, and particularly in the cotton mills of Lancashire, the fires of industry were flickering out. Exactly what happened, in terms of numbers absent and areas affected, is not yet known, but labour was so scarce in the days following Christmas that some pits could not work at all. There are some indications that in the more isolated communities, where coal-mining is the only industry, the turn-out was better than in the towns and in areas of diversified production.. This is signifi- cant, particularly when taken in conjunction with one statement made in excuse for the miners, that they were entitled to as long a holiday as those employed in other industries.
It is sincerely to be hoped that such an irresponsible remark does not represent the opinion of a majority of miners. Quite apart from the fact that vast numbers of workers resumed work after the Christmas break on December 27th, whereas the absentees from the mines only began to come back on December 3oth, it has been emphasised over and over again by everybody from the Prime Minister downwards that the whole of industry is threatened with breakdown unless coal production is steadily increased. The terms of the proposition are known and the proof is already manifest. It is utterly untrue to say that the obligation upon miners is smaller than, or even equal to, that of other workers. For the present, it is greater. And to the extent that incipient indus- trial breakdown is due to bad management in the past and transport difficulties in the present, the obligation on the miners is greater still. For the equipment of the mines and railways cannot be transformed in a day, whereas the miners as a body could improve both their attendance and their output tomorrow. For the time being they arc the only elastic element. Possibly the bad attend- ance after Christmas represented the last recoil before an upward bound in production under public ownership. If so the forth- coming rise must be truly tremendous, for with absenteeism running at about 15 per cent. for all mine workers, the spring was already well repressed before Christmas. Everybody knows that any increase in production which takes place now must be mainly due to an increased effort on the part of the miners. It is much too early for nationalisation to have any solid effect upon output. Indeed, the transfer to public ownership at such a time of crisis may well lead to a disturbance of managerial arrangements which will tend to reduce efficiency temporarily and so to offset anything the miners may accomplish. What is wanted is not a spasmodic and easily exhausted rush. Nor is it a miracle of improvisation. It is a steady sustained increase in shifts worked and output per manshift by which stocks can be built up and a cushion provided for the emergencies of the future.
It would be unfair to the miners to pretend that, particularly in the long run, the upward movement in these statistical measures pp depends entirely on them. These things are merely the simplified indicators of progress in the whole vast complex of processes which make up the coal-mining industry. They reflect not only the will and effort of the present labour force but also the adequacy of the recruiting and training arrangements, the state of capital equip- ment, the distribution of resources between coalfields and between the more and less efficient pits within particular fields, the success of the transport system in clearing the pitheads and of the market- ing and distribution arrangements in organising the demand. All these functions will in due course fall to the State. Many Govern- ment Departments will play their part and it will be an account- ant's nightmare to try to find out how much of success or failure is due to each. But the line between public and private enterprise has been crossed now and there can be no turning back. It is always the duty of the public and its representatives to press for more and more information as to the state of public undertakings, and now the effort must be redoubled. The Coal Industry Nationalisation Act is a better document than most nationalisation measures, but it is gravely defective in the provision it makes for the information of the new owners of the industry. Consequently much depends on the effectiveness of public pressure for informa- tion. If the public does not question its elected representatives about the condition of the nationalised industries it will never get an answer to that very dark and doubtful question—does the Government really know what it is doing?
The spur of enquiry should not be applied only to the public enterprise of the future. It needs to be used freely on the present situation. The man in the street does not know what is happening to the British economy today. He only knows that a clamant demand, backed with an enormous accumulation of money resources, exists, and yet the goods refuse to flow. Economists and others whose business it is to elucidate the situation have gone a little further. They have pointed out that the national output is insufficient to meet all the demands upon it for current consumption, re-stocking, capital construction, payment for imports, and the liquidation of overseas debt. The layman is presented with a plain situation in quantitative terms. But he still finds it difficult to apply the vast figures of national produc- tion and demand to his own particular case. Indeed, the truth may be so bitter that it is difficult to face in any case. It may be that the lowering of the British standard of living, so often held up as one of the terrors of the future if production is not in- creased, is already happening, under the disguise of a false boom. This is the real lesson of the manifest fact that the supply of coal is physically falling short of the demand.
What the average man experiences is a long process of frustra- tion. His income in money terms is greater than it was before the war, but a large slice of it is deducted in advance as taxation. With what remains he can buy what goods are available at prices well above the pre-war level. And he is certain to find that many goods theoretically available are going to those favoured cus- tomers whose weapon is- the bribe and whose armoury is replen- ished through the manifold devices of tax-evasion. The nei result is always the same. The ordinary man who conducts his affairs in an orderly manner and is not a parry to petty illegality finds himself with fewer goods and those of worse quality than he had before the war. In other words, his standard of living is lower. The usual argument is that a catastrophic fall may be expected when the American loan runs out. It may well be true. But in that case it will probably be a stharp drop at the end of a gradual drop, for present standards are all too clearly below those of pre-war, and the difficulties in coal industry show only too clearly how hard it will be to regain the old level. Ultimately the standard of living is not a matter of money to spend. It is a matter of goods to consume, and goods of all kinds are short. It is true that there are items on the other side of the account. The consumption of milk and of other basic foods is higher than it was before the war. But very few other goods are in even tolerable supply, particularly the houses and furniture which do so much to make life worth living. And an improvement in dis- tribution can all too easily disguise a shortfall in total production. Beyond that again, even an increase in total production is not enough now, because the burden of overseas debt, both current and funded, is heavier than it ever was. In fact in present circumstances increasing British production is compatible with a declining standard of living. Only an enormously expanded production will do, and how far we are from that is -demonstrated by the nagging fact that we have not enough coal for minimum requirements. It is the persistence of a low volume of goods avail- able for home consumption which darkens the prospect for the year 1947, and ,it cannot be lighted by the brief candles offered by those charlatans who advise the abandonment of the export drive, even though a slight diveriion of supplies might possibly have a more than proportionate _effect on industrial morale. It is not enough to advance one wing. The whole line must go forward. The danger for Britain lies not in an immediate and catastrophic slump, but in that.. slow wearing away of living standards which may already have begun.
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