THE FUTURE OF SWEDEN AND NORWAY.
WE may, we think, take it as very probable that Norway intends to set up for herself,—that is, to declare herself an independent State without any con- nection, not even that of close alliance, with Sweden. The unanimity with which her people, the statesmen included, have condemned King Oscar for vetoing the Act which gives her a separate Consular Service ; the refusal to provide or tolerate any Ministry to replace the one which, because of that veto, has resigned. ; the alleged determination to resist Swedish troops if they should be ordered to make a, sudden rush on Christiania ; and, above all, the anti-dynastic feeling which now pervades many classes,—all point to that extreme policy as the one which the Norwegian people have resolved to risk. We are told by those who know the country well that even the submission of Sweden as to the joint control of foreign affairs would not now end. the quarrel ; that the passion of nationality has seized. upon the whole population of the smaller State ; that they consider they ought to have a separate place, even if it is a small place, in the system of Europe ; and that they reject with something of pride as well as fierceness the idea that Sweden protects them against external attack. They can take care of themselves, they say, just as well as Sweden can take care of them. They have never felt real loyalty for the Bernadotte dynasty, which has no connection with their earlier history, and. which they did not elect; and. they would prefer to make alliances for themselves, and accept what fate may send them as an independent people. Inter- nally they are a homogeneous population, strongly knit together by identity of ideas and aspirations, and externally they think they are sure of friends who will not permit them to be crushed. They have therefore resolved to take a big leap in the dark, and. to face the world alone.
There is, we are persuaded, little or no exaggeration in this account of Norwegian sentiment; and as Sweden has decided not to waste her remaining resources, and to increase the terrible amount of emigration from her soil— it already equals the natural increment of her population —by commencing what in many respects would have all the characteristics of a disastrous civil war, the Norwegians must, if they please, try their formidable experiment. It will not, we fear, fulfil their aspirations ; but that is their own affair, Norway never having ceased to be a State, and Europe having, so far as we see, little interest in inter- fering. The union of the two kingdoms, it must be remembered, was not arranged in 1814 with any view to the general interests of the Continent, but as a payment to Sweden and Bernadotte for adhering to the cause of the Allies, and surrendering the ambitious General's secret hopes of succeeding Napoleon as Emperor of the French. The union has for ninety years been more or less success- ful; but nothing has occurred since 1814 to make disunion a matter of first-rate importance to the world. The united peninsula has, in fact, lost most of its political importance, the neighbouring States having developed their military and naval strength until the adhesion or opposition of Sweden and Norway to any combination has become almost a negligible quantity. When in 1864 Denmark was dis- membered, her Norse kinsfolk did not venture even to protest ; and at the present moment, with Russia powerless at sea, Germany sits at Kiel the lonely mistress of the Baltic. Whether the Scandinavian Peninsula included one or two kingdoms would scarcely matter to any plans William II. may have formed. Russia cannot grasp Hammerfest now without the permission of the German Emperor ; and if he gave his permission, no one could defend Norway except Great Britain, which would then have to consider whether her new power of inflicting a serious wound on Russia would not be ample compensation for the existence of a Port Arthur on the shore of the North Atlantic. At present we cannot get fairly at Russia, even if she menaced India ; but if her great port on the Atlantic were within reach of shells, we could. We doubt if • the weakness of Norway would be much of a menace to this country, certainly not such a menace as to induce us to interfere by force with the right of the Norwegians to dispose of their own destiny, and to encounter what political risks they please. The little country with a long history must, in fact, go her own way, Europe watching her, no doubt, with interest, but an interest which will be rather historical and. academic than strictly. political.
We should be inclined to say the same even if Norway organised her new independence in an unexpected manner. It is believed here almost unanimously that she would make of herself a peaceful and respectable peasant Republic, with an unusual equality of condition among her people ; but that, we are assured, is not quite so certain. The Norwegians, though essentially democrats, are greatly afflicted with that longing for visibleness which one has occasionally perceived among democrats in other countries, and are, it is said, inclined to believe that a Royal Government at Christiania would be better received among the great European family than a Republican one. They have no Pretender of their own ; but it is possible that a Prince belonging to one of the great houses might be tempted to accept a throne on the Atlantic, though it would be poorly endowed, and though the people are devoted to a scheme of life which is theoretically inconsistent with kingship. Many German Princes, possibly even a Holienzolleru, might accept a throne which, owing to some historic charm that lingers about Norway, would not, like the thrones of the Balkans, have about it a taint of vulgarity and newness. We do not see, however, why Europe should fidget herself about either organisation, should fancy that Republicanism would. spread from Norway, or that a King of Norway, even if a Hohenzollern, would. be able to make dangerous alliances. To possess a coast-line is not of necessity to be powerful, nor is cousinship among Princes a strong bond of solidarity. The Norwegians, if they elect a King, will soon find that his prerogatives are inconvenient ; while the Prince who accepts such a throne will soon discover that he has gained little except a step in rank which entails the obligation of being much advised. The fate of Europe was not much affected by the separation of Holland from Belgium, nor will it be if Norway and Sweden are no longer united. We shall regret the division if it comes, as apparently it will, because we regard it as a needless waste of political energy, and a reduction of the reservoir of political ability in two ancient States ; but we do not fear that its effect upon international politics will be great, or that the more westerly kingdom will assume towards its ancient ally the attitude which, till the thrones were joined, Scotland cansisteutly maintained towards her southern neighbour. The two peoples will not dislike each other more than they do already, and the mutual dislike of peoples is only occasionally of political importance.
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