BOOKS.

PROFESSOR GREEN'S PHILOSOPHY.* ENGLLSJI Philosophy sustained a great loss in the death of Pro- fessor Green. He was cut down in the prime of life, when his powers were coming to their ripeness, and his thought had be- come clear to himself and was about to obtain adequate expres- sion. We are glad to receive the first volume of his works. The present volume contains his Introductions to Hume and his criticisms on Spencer and Lewes. All the contents of this volume have appeared in print before, with the exception of the paper on Lewes. But it is well to have them in this collected form; and the volumes, when complete, will form a worthy memorial of their distinguished author.

At the same time, it must be said that the place and power of Professor Green in English thought cannot be measured by the literary work he has left behind him. He is greater than his works, and his real contribution to philosophy must be sought not merely in these printed pages, but also in the men who came under his influence and were imbued with his spirit. His pupils have already done good work in philosophy, and we can name not a few of them who will continue the high tradition of the lofty teaching of their master. The personal influence of Professor Green was incalculable, and is of the kind which cannot be transmitted by the printed page. More especially is this the case where the printed page labours under the disadvantage • of a style like his. For we must say that his style is harsh, clumsy, and forbidding. He always has a meaning. He never writes nonsense, and with diligence the meaning may always be found. Still, the style in which he writes gives one the impression that Professor Green was a man more anxious to think truly than to give adequate expression to his thought; more concerned about the matter than about the form of his thought. He goes on to write one rugged sentence after another ; he toils with infinite energy ; he involves himself in repetitions, and at last, in seeming despair, leaves the matter to take care of itself. There are, however, luminous points, flashes of humour, gleams of wit, which make one regret that they are so few and far between. There are signs, also, of advance. The Prolegomena to Ethics is easier reading than the Introductions to flume; and one has great regret that he had not time to give a finished expression to his thought.

The present volume contains an important contribution to the history of philosophy. It is a critical history of philosophy from Locke to Hume, with occasional references to the philosophy of a later time. His aim is to show that English philosophy has- never understood or rightly faced the problem set to it by the works of Hume. For the most part it has taken refuge in habitual or instinctive experience, and found a starting-point in the instinctive, unsifted beliefs of the common man. In order to understand Hume, it was necessary for Professor Green to expound and criticise the method and results of Locke, to show how Berkeley transformed the problem and gave it a new shape, and how Hume, taking action on the results of Locke and Berkeley, showed that knowledge was impossible. It is not necessary for us to say how well Professor Green has done this bit of work. It has taken its permanent place, and is a work which need not be done over again. The papers on Spencer and Lewes form a fitting continuation of the history told in the Introductions to Hume, and prove that these are in the line of direct descent from Locke. Whatsoever value may be attached to the work of these writers, Professor Green seeks to * The Works of Thomas Hill Green (late Fellow of Balliol College, and Whyte's Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Oxford). Edited by R. L. Battleship, Fellow of Pallid College, Oxford. Vol. I., "Philosophical Works." London : Longmans, Green, and Co.

show that they have never apprehended the problem of philo- sophy in its new shape as determined by the work of Hume. They have accepted as axioms positions which Hume has proven to be untenable. They take flume's premisses, and seek to evade his conclusions—a dangerous procedure in the case of a writer so logical as Hume.

Leaving, however, the historical aspect of Professor Green's writings, we may ask,—What is the value of his own contribution

to philosophy ? His work as historian may be separated from MEI own theory of knowledge. No doubt he always criticises

from his own point of view. At the same time, his setting-forth of the systems of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume in themselves, and in their successive statements, has an objective value, and is independent of the particular views held by him. We wish to state this plainly, because for ourselves we have been unable to accept his system, although we have been able to appreciate the value of his contribution to the history of philosophy. The magic word in Professor Green's philosophy is "consciousness."

It is the key by which he unlocks every door and solves every problem in philosophy. Every question gets transformed until it becomes fit to be stated as a question of consciousness. Sensation in itself, feeling also, are only a blurred manifoldness until consciousness steps in to give to them the connectedness and unity which make them experience.

We should like to ask,—Is there not a selective process done by the organism before consciousness comes into play Are there not an order and a method in our sensations themselves—a unity, in short, which does not depend on the individual conscious- flees? Of the innumerable vibrations of the ether, the organ of eight is open to and makes selection of a few only. The other

organs of sense are also already relative to the world, and con- sciousness has only to take account of the relations thus given to it. Here we might refer to Dr. Stirling's affirmation that Kant has not answered Hume, and his profound discussion on that topic. But we press on to ask, what does Professor Green mean by consciousness ? and we are unable to reply. It is a mystic doctrine which sometimes seems very intelligible and sometimes quite the reverse. We can understand him when he says that the world rises in consciousness. We can also under- stand what is meant by the unity of experience of the one self, and that reference to the conscious self is the foundation of knowledge, and its guarantee. Here, however, we get face to face with the problem of common knowledge. My conscious- ness constitutes for me the objects of my knowledge, and the world of my experience. The consciousness of another does the same for him. What guarantee have we that the objects and the worlds will coincide ? It is strange, yet it seems to us to be true, that Professor Green has not considered this question ; or if he has, he has given a mystic answer to it. In truth, the consciousness he describes is an ideal consciousness, which no individual can be supposed to have. Here is one description out of many :—

"Relations exist only for a conscious subject. A world which is a system of relations implies a unit, self-distinguished from all the things related, yet determining all as the equal presence through relation to which they are related to each other; and such a unit is a conscious subject. Consciousness then being in this sense a condition of the existence of the real, though it does not follow that the rela- tions by which a feeling is determined in our consciousness when we present it to ourselves as real, are those by which it is really deter- mined, it does follow that the difference between the real as it is, and as we take it to be, is not a difference between what is in conscious- ness and what is not so. The relations which form the real fact are relations for a consciousness, but for one which is only partially and interruptedly ours. If it were not ours at all, there could, for us, be no such thing as reality. Because it is but inchoate in us, the relations by which a feeling is determined in our interpretation of it are never more than a fragment of those under which it exists for the complete or eternal consciousness, and a fragment wl icb, in the effort after its extension, is constantly becoming confused." (p. 500.)

If the consciousness which constitutes our world is inchoate in each of us, may not the inchoateness be different for each ? Then how are we to get beyond individualism into the stream of common life and common thought, and attain to the unity of a knowledge available for all ? This question presses with urgency on all systems of philosophy, and with special urgency on the Hegelian. Then, again, how do we attain to the know- ledge that the "relations by which a feeling is determined in our interpretation of it are never more than a fragment of those under which it exists for the complete and eternal conscious- ness ?" If these are never more than a fragment, how do we

come to suspect the existence of a whole Is the fragment a true and aderaate representation of the whole May we trust

it as containing all the elements of the relations which constitute reality ? These are questions to which we find no answer in the pages of Professor Green.

Again, what is the relation of our "inchoate" consciousness to the "complete and eternal" consciousness ? Is my self- consciousness destined to expand till it cease to be fragmentary, till it is fit for the reception of and apprehensive of all the rela- tions which constitute reality ? Or is it destined to be swallowed up, and to lose the outlines which make me a personal self to-day ? As a matter of fact, both Professor Green, and all who follow in the steps of Hegel, use consciousness in various senses. Sometimes consciousness means the complete and universal and eternal consciousness ; sometimes it means the organic con- sciousness of humanity, or of a race ; sometimes the " inchoate " consciousness of the individual. These meanings are inter- changed without notice in the course of a single paragraph. It would be well if some distinguishing adjective were attached to consciousness in all the uses which are made of it. Yet if this were done, a great deal of what has been written by Hegelians would never have been written. In all their expositions of his- tory, in all their criticisms of science, art, and philosophy, they assume consciousness to be clear, universal, and complete ; and the individual writer forgets that his own consciousness, inchoate, partial, and fragmentary though it be, is the only instrument he has to work with. He assumes his own consciousness to be universal and complete, and able to grasp all the relations which constitute reality. The individual consciousness has unconsciously become universal. We do not deny the possibility of this ; we ask to be shown how it is possible.

While we confess that we find ourselves puzzled by the writing of Professor Green, and, on almost every page, unable to know in what sense consciousness is meant, we yet take leave of his writings for the present with unfeigned respect, and with high admiration. We have felt ourselves in the presence of a man who dwelt apart and lived a life of lofty thought and high endeavour; yet we have also felt that here is a man who has taken a deep interest and an active share in the duties and the work of common life. With him life and philosophy were one ; and while we cannot agree with his conclusions, we acknowledge ourselves to be better, wiser, stronger, from our contact with a spirit pure, and brave, and true.