THE QUESTION OF KHARTOUM.
OUGHT we to stop at Dongola or advance at once on Khartoum ? That is the question which is agitating all those who are interested in the fate of the Soudan. The answer to the question is not an easy one, for it depends upon a great many external circumstances. The first point which it is necessary to consider is what is the object of our policy on the Upper Nile. To put it plainly, our object is to make effective our claim to control the whole of the Upper Nile Valley, from the Lakes northward, and to get rid of the hideous tyranny erected by the .Mahdi and his successor,—a tyranny which not only desolates the Valley of the Nile, but was, until six months ago, threatening the Nubian provinces of Egypt. But though it is our object to destroy the Empire of the Mahdists, and to extend our power up to the Lakes, and until it reaches Uganda, it does not follow that it would be wise to give it instant expression. We want to destroy Mahdism, but we want to do it with the minimum of loss and inconvenience to ourselves. We want, that is, to bring the ruin down, not about our ears, but carefully and judiciously. One of the great reasons for being circumspect in our attack on the Mahdists is the necessity for economy. The fact that the Egyptian Treasury, though full—nay, running over—is under the control of " the man in possession "—i.e., the Caisse de la Dette—and that the Government cannot spend what it likes and when it likes, makes it specially necessary to subdue Mahdism as cheaply as possible. If two ways of putting an end to the Khalifa's rule present themselves, the Egyptian Government is almost bound to choose the cheaper of the two,—unless, of course, it can be shown that the so-called cheaper plan would really turn out dearer in the end.
Practically there are two plans before the Govern- ment. The first is to follow up the present success and make a rush for Khartoum while the enemy is demoralised. The other is to wait at Dongola, and allow the Khalifa's Empire either to crumble away from internal causes, or else to break itself to pieces by hurling its troops against an entrenched camp at Dongola, covered by heavy guns and protected by gunboats on the river. We do not doubt that the Government will choose the second plan, will make themselves strong—nay, impregnable— at Dongola, and there calmly await the destruction of the Mandist power. In all probability the news that the rich province of Dongola has been wrested from him will raise up hosts of malcontents among the Khalifa's de- pendents, and he will find himself face to face with civil war. If, however, he escapes that peril he must for his honour's sake attempt to drive us out of Dongola. But to do that will cost him the loss of another army,— and the loss of another army could hardly be sustained by him without desertions so wholesale that they would rob him of his Empire. Prudence, then, points to a pause at Dongola, and the organisation of the province as a base for further action. If the railway is pressed on to the bead of the cataract below Dongola, a ship-yard is established from which a flotilla of gunboats can be launched, and stores of arms and ammunition are accumulated, Dongola will soon be as absolutely safe from a Mandist attack as is Assouan itself. The pause at Dongola need not, of course, mean stagnation. Though the headquarters of the force holding the re- conquered districts will, of course, be at Dongola or near it, there is no reason why such places as Korti and Merawi, already seized by the Sirdar's troops, should not also be firmly held. We would, however, do more than this. We would gradually push along the great reach of river which, turning at Korti, runs east to Abu- Hamed until we had occupied Abu-Hamed itself. With the whole river from Korti to Abu-Hamed in our hands we could easily drive the remains of the Dervishes out of the country between Abu-Hamed and the Murad Wells, and we should then be in an excellent position for taking Berber. If gunboats ascended the river from Abu- Hamed, a desert column marched at the same time from Dugyet—a place above Merawi, but on the opposite bank —and another land force were despatched from Suakin, Berber would fall into our hands probably without a struggle. But if once we hold Korti and Berber, Khar- toum is within our grasp. In sketching this plan we are assuming that the Khalifa is able to do what would, no doubt, be his best policy,—that is, hold on securely at Khartoum and defy us to come after him. It is, however, as we have pointed out above, very doubtful whether the Khalifa will be able to carry out these waiting tactics. It is far more likely that he will be forced to attack us, instead of waiting for us to attack him. That, of course, as we have said again and again would be the very best thing that could happen to us. It would mean that we should be in Khartoum even before this time next year.
There is only one serious objection, as far as we can see, that can be raised against the policy of pausing at Dongola. It may be urged, and doubtless truly, that one of the chief reasons for our advance into the Soudan was the knowledge that other Powers were also advancing in the direction of Khartoum. We were anxious to forestall them in the occupation of the capital of the Soudan, and to be able to back up our claims of right with the sub- stantial argument of possession. To stop short of Khartoum might be, then, to run the risk which we set out to avoid. Certainly it would be most annoying, after having half-conquered the Khalifa, to see another Power step in and take the fruits of our toil. But we do not seriously think that there is much in this plea for an immediate advance. By getting to Korti we have got with- in striking distance of Khartoum. It is not more than two hundred and fifty miles by the desert route. No doubt the Sirdar will establish a strong garrison at Korti and post there a body of cavalry and a portion of the Camel Corps. The troops will be daily exercised in the desert,. and in a couple of months the officers will know the routes- of the Ba.yuda Desert as well as or better than the Arabs. Thus prepared, a telegram from Cairo will be enough to have the wells seized and preparations made for a desert march on Khartoum. For the next eighteen months at any rate the organisation of a mobile force at Korti will enable us, if necessary, to strike at Khartoum with sufficient swiftness. We come, then, back to this, that if the circum- stances are really those known to the newspapers, the wise plan will be to stop at Dongola for at least a year. By this time next year, if the Klialifa still exists, we may wisely give his throne another shove.
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