MACEDONIA AND SIR EDWARD GREY.
EUROPE is not a federal State, and probably never will be, the differences between its component nations being too radical to allow of any regularised and consistent action. Its diplomatists have, however, of late years bound together its five Great Powers into an informal Union which they call a "Concert," which when- ever it acts heartily together is irresistible, and which could unquestionably, if so inclined, put down a variety of very serious abuses. We notice the appearance within it of symptoms of slow decay, therefore, with a regret which is possibly the more sincere because within Europe Great Britain has no ambitions, and indeed no objects, except that every nation should be allowed as much fair play for its people as is consistent with their territorial safety. Of late this decay of energy in the 'Concert has beet perceptible. The King of the Belgians, for instance, is not a mighty potentate, but the atrocities permitted to exist within his special and separate dominion, the Congo Free State, are allowed on one pretext or another to continue, though all Europe shriek disapproval, until he can make a profit- able bargain for himself. Atrocities nearly as bad exist in Macedonia, and, as the Macedonians are white men, no one of importance denies their existence, or questions that Europe ought in some way to put an end to them. Great Britain, moreover, has in this case suggested a method by which, if it were accepted, the sanguinary anarchy which is the general condition of the province might be brought to a summary conclusion. Sir Edward Grey, whose clear- ness of insight and spirit of moderation make him one of the most acceptable of European Foreign Secretaries, has suggested a plan which, without once again disturbing what is known as "the Eastern question "—which means the final replacing of the Ottoman Power by some reason- able and humane substitute—will put a stop to the scenes that at present shock even the hard-hearted dynasties involved. He suggests that Macedonia, whose two millions of people have now absolutely no protection against sudden and violent death at the hands of the conflicting and murderous bands which incessantly traverse its territory, should be placed under a single Governor-General, not technically independent of Constantinople, but selected by the Sultan with the assent of the "Concert," and irremovable without its formal permission. This official should raise an adequate force of gendarmerie, should dismiss or reduce the Turkish c and should pay the new and more civilised force out of the savings so effected. The Powers see that this plan would be effectual, and that it would establish a political moratorium during which the greater question—that is, the question of Turkey—could wait, or could, at all events, be treated as if it did not involve the future of Mace- donia; but they all on one pretext or another object. One or two are putting forward alternative proposals ; but we fear they will be too feeble to convey any sense of security to Macedonians, and will be dictated by a dread of losing ultimate advantage. 'Unless that advantage can be assured, the Powers will not let the Concert work, and until the Concert works, the Sultan, whose assent is theoretically indispensable, will maintain his sullenly obstinate refusal to accept any plan which limits or destroys his own evil authority. He always yields if he thinks the Concert in earnest, but when it is divided or feeble in its unity be adheres to the position which he in sincerity, or otherwise, thinks it his religious duty to maintain. He is Caliph, and the Caliph can surrender nothing, except to a force he is visibly incompetent to resist. Russia, however, fears that a Macedonia thus organised would be as independent as Bulgaria, and would supply one more obstacle to that capture of Constantinople which for hundreds of years has been the first object of her external policy. She therefore rejects the British proposal. Austria hopes by and by to include the whole Western Balkan in her own dominion, which would then stretch to Salonica, a port which, if it were once Austrian, might become—we should fancy and hope would become—a grand emporium for the trade of Western Asia with Southern Europe. Germany, again, which hopes at some future period to acquire Mesopotamia, backs up Austria ; while Italy, which has hitherto claimed the reversion of Albania, insists that she should be assured either of that bit of Turkish territory, or of Tripoli, through which she might have permanent entry into the rich conti- nent of Africa. Sir Edward Grey's proposal therefore may be considered at an end. Great Britain no doubt could enforce it while acting alone, for, as Mr. Gladstone once pointed out with singular energy, Turkey is practically cloven by the Bosphorus, and lies at the mercy of any great maritime Power. But this might mean a general war, and the British people is unwilling—no doubt righteously unwilling—to start a general war for the benefit of a single province of the vast Ottoman possessions. The Concert, therefore, as regards Macedonia may be con- sidered paralysed, and during the summer, it is reported, the civil war will go on, and the unhappy villagers will be slaughtered, burnt out, and outraged even in greater numbers than has hitherto been the case. Macedonia, in fact, has no prospect of peace before it except through the gradual extirpation of its people. It is a horrible prospect, and one which the Powers are bound to take into consideration since they have refused Sir Edward Grey's specific and perfectly practicable pro- position. We do not recommend that Sir Edward Grey should add direct threats to the prophecies of evil with which he concludes his latest despatches, and risk the possible war which the Sultan, if Britain were his only opponent, would feel himself bound to precipitate, and which he would probably commence by an appeal to the fanaticism of the seventy millions of Mussulmans who in India look to him and to the Shereef of Mecca as the appointed defenders of their creed. We do, however, feel that a great responsibility rests upon those who advise and encourage a purely negative policy. Macedonia, if it were fully united, might no doubt defend itself ; but it is not united, the Bulgarian, the Greek, and the Moslem sections of its population, though all oppressed until life is nearly worthless, being all incapable of the unity for defence which, if they only possessed it, would make them as strong as, say, Holland, or Roumania, or Bulgaria. They are brave enough, but they are not fully armed, and they are entirely without the great advantage of a governing family which could lead them in a supreme effort. But though we recognise this fact, we hesitate to adopt the purely negative conclusion that there is nothing to be done but to wait, and to praise Sir Edward Grey for devising a scheme which, if it were only put into operation, would furnish a reasonable solution of one of the most difficult and complicated of European problems. That solution has succeeded in the Lebanon, and might possibly be improved by one addition, the guarantee to the Sultan not only of his suzerainty—which Sir Edward Grey, indeed, now offers—but of a considerable annual payment, which Yildiz Kiosk in its constant necessity for more money would reject with extreme reluctance. It would, however, we fear, be nearly impossible to increase Macedonian taxation, and quite impossible to induce the Concert to subscribe, even for ten years, to aid the unhappy people whose economic ruin is even now as complete as their loss of security for either life or property.
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