A WARNING TO MR. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN
FOR the first time since 1918 (some observers might say since the fall of Bismarck) German Foreign Policy has shown signs of conscious and intelligent direction. A German proposal has been received, first in London and then in Paris, which in brief suggests a tripartite pact with France and Britain, " guaranteeing " the eastern frontier of France and renouncing all am- bitions to regain Alsace-Lorraine. As to Germany's eastern frontiers, she will not consent to regard those as fixed. in perpetuity, but she will pledge herself not to attempt to alter them by force. This offer, it is evident, impressed the British Cabinet in London, and Mr. Austen Chamberlain saw in it " the possible dawn of a better day."
It is clear that the French Government cannot possibly incur the odium of refusing to consider such an offer, or even of directly rejecting it. But it is held that such a pact would be less advantageous than a simple British guarantee. Hence, it is believed by some observers that France will try to " stall " the German offer. While seeming to examine it on its merits she will make conditions such as she knows Germany cannot accept and will then lay the blame for the breakdown upon Germany. At the same time she will press on with the task of obtaining a unilateral British guarantee (that is, a pledge guaranteeing France against German invasion but not guaranteeing Germany against French invasion) in some form which takes cognizance of the close French alliance with Poland. It is suggested that her tactics will be something as follows. When Mr. Chamberlain invites the French Cabinet's opinion on the German proposals it may submit to him the fol- lowing thesis : " You wish us to consider the German offer. Very well, we agree entirely that it merits the closest consideration. We will do our utmost to find a basis of agreement in it. What, then, is this ' pact ' of which the Germans speak ? It is, first of all, we may presume, a general treaty of arbitration between the three countries. Very well, we have no objection to that. But what is to happen if one of the countries, if Germany, breaks this engagement—if she simply marches troops across the frontier in one more invasion of France ? After all, her word in this new pact will be just another scrap of paper, as was the treaty of Belgian neutrality. What guarantee have we that she will respect it any better? Hence, we suppose there will be some sort of sanctions', in this new pact in case of a violation of the engagement to arbitrate. This means that you, Great Britain, pledge yourself to go to war with Germany if she, refusing to arbitrate, puts a soldier across the French frontier (or into some neutralized zone if the new pact provides for one) and to go to war with France if she does the like. In other words you give a bilateral pact of guarantee of the Franco-German frontier. But the first thing to do when a pact is made between two nations guaranteeing a frontier against a third is to implement that pact. The two general staffs must get together and con- cert their plans for resisting an attack. In the case of an expected attack by Germany on the Rhine frontier which has been guaranteed by France and Britain, Lord Cavan, the Chief of the British General Staff, must come over and confer with Marshal Foch as to the number of divisions he can place at, say, Toul and Verdun within so many hours of a German infringement of the frontier, the amount of heavy artillery that will accompany them, the rail transport he will require from the channel ports, &c., &c. That is reasonable. It was done before 1914 under the aegis of Lord Haldane, and the arrangements enabled your Expeditionary Force to land without fatal loss of time. But under this new- fangled bilateral pact, with Germany included, what is the position ? After Lord Cavan has made his arrange- ments with Marshal Foch, will he next week go to General Ludendorff and conclude with him the arrangements for a combination of Anglo-German forces in the event of France infringing the frontier ? We ask you frankly, is this a sane or possible arrangement ? Lord Cavan would know the entire plans of both the French and German General Staffs. He would be able to tell either of them just as much or as little as he chose about the other. The result would be, of course, that neither would trust him in the least and the entire scheme would break down before it had ever started. Certainly, we are willing to examine these German proposals as carefully as you like, but we must frankly say that we believe that such an examination can only lead to one result. Even if we do not push home the logical absurdity of the whole scheme we cannot believe that Germany is making these proposals sincerely:" Such may be the arguments by which France will seek to prevent any practical result being realized from the German offer. But at the same time she will go on with her endeavours to obtain a unilateral guarantee, if not in form—for it is becoming clear that the present British Cabinet will not give her that—then in substance, by indirect methods. Following the diplomatic adage of the post-War period, "When in doubt, re-read the Treaty of Versailles," she will turn to Article 44 of the Treaty.
" In case Germany violates in any manner whatever the provisions of Articles 42 and 43 (` Left Bank of the Rhine she shall be regarded as committing a hostile act against tho Powers signatory of the present Treaty, and as calculated to disturb the peace of the world."
In other words France may say Great Britain is bound already by the most solemn Treaty obligations to defend, not merely the French frontier or even the Rhine Valley, but to defend a line drawn 50 kilometres east of the Rhine, against German aggression. If a single German soldier crosses that line, Great Britain is bound by her Treaty obligations immediately to declare war.
All those who have read Mr. Chamberlain's speech in the House of Commons on March 24th may have wondered whether the French have not already begun to speak in this strain. For he inser:ed between his lucid attack on the Protocol and his eloquent commendation of the German offer and of all sincere efforts at reconcilia- tion a passage in which he read out articles 42, 43, 41 of the Treaty. After he had done so, he said : " We have these Treaty obligations, and the peace of the world, and with it the peace of the British Empire, depends on their preservation and maintenance."
May not the French, then,' go on to suggest that since Mr. Chamberlain so fully acknowledges our Treaty obligations, he should at once take the logical step of implementing them ? Surely, the British and French General Staffs should without delay get together and concert their plans of action in the event of Article 44 being infringed ?
If this should prove to be the French case, what could be more logical and yet what more disastrous ? If we accept it, we may find ourselves bound irrevocably to a unilateral guarantee of what is in effect a French frontier drawn a hundred miles within German territory. Such an arrangement would be at once the shortest and best way of ensuring that there • would 15e another European war, and that when it broke out we should be engaged in it.
And yet what possible defence is there against the remorseless logic of France ? At the moment, no doubt, we are making a defence. We say that we have a different interpretation of Article 44 from that of France. We say that the article declares that the infringement of the demilitarized zone by Germany would indeed be " a hostile' act." But " a hostile act " does not necessarily mean war. Great Britain has often before ignored hostile acts in order to preserve the peace of the world. She would still be free to choose whether to go to war or not should Germany break Article 44. It is on this interpretation of the article that our freedom of action rests. We implore Mr. Chamberlain not to abandon it. If he does so, he will find that before he knows where he is, he is deeply committed to the unqualified support of France. And France in her turn is bound, perhaps more closely than we know, to Poland and to her system of alliances in Eastern Europe. If they are menaced, she will regard her whole system of European alliances and so her security as menaced ; she will feel bound to go to their assistance. But if she does that she may well find herself face to face on the Rhine with a militant Germany. Germany might quite conceivably look into the demi- litarized zone, if she feared a new invasion of French troops going to the assistance of Poland. Then if we have yielded on Article 44, we shall be committed. Thus the nightmare of British foreign policy will have come true and we shall be pledged to maintain, in perpetuity, with the entire might of the Empire, such settlements as the Danzig Corridor, the eastern frontier of Poland, the partition of Upper Silesia, the Polish annexations in Galicia ; all those settlements which Mr. Lloyd George so gaily made in 1919-21 and so superbly arraigns in 1925. The British frontier will be not only " on the Vistula," it will be all over Eastern Europe. We shall be bound to maintain the whole crazy erection by which France now dominates Europe.
All this may sound unduly alarmist. Indeed in a sense it is, for we know that the British people would never undertake such obligations, whatever their rulers had said. But a false step now might give the fatal impression in Europe that we would do so, and infinite harm might be done. Mr. Chamberlain is doubtless aware of all this. Yet we cannot help appealing to him to be on his guard, otherwise the Government, by entering upon commitments which the country neither Can nor will fulfil, may do irreparable damage.
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