Commonwealth and Foreign
THE DUTCH INDIES AND JAPAN
By ALAN HOUGHTON BRODRICK
IT is estimated that, as far as fields at present prospected are concerned, there is not, at the present rate of consumption, more than fifty years' supply of oil left in the world. Of course, new fields may be found at any time anywhere, but huge spaces of the earth's surface seem very unpromising from the oil-production point of view. There is little oil in Africa or anywhere within the vast French empire. In Europe the only really important fields are those of Russia; Rumanian oil production is being barely maintained. The rich Venezuelan fields are mostly under British control. The United States still remains the main producer, and doubt- less will be for years to come. The future of liouid fuel may lie in the direction of natural vegetable products, but we are a long way off solving the problems presented by the methods suggested for utilising plants for combustible.
The promising new fields are those of the Royal Dutch in Borneo and in Sumatra, especially in Borneo. Java appears to have little or no oil. The Dutch East Indies pro- duce all the oil of the Far East. There are no oil wells except those of Holland between the Persian Gulf—where the Americans are working as far east as the Bahrein Islands —and California. The small production from the wells in the Islands of Sakhalin may be, for practical purposes, ignored, although all the so-called " fishery disputes " be- tween the Soviets and the Japanese in tLat part of the world are really quarrels about oil.
The Japanese buy, at the present time, the greater part of the oil they need from the United States. The whole economy of Japan is built up upon a system of exchange with America. The hulk of the Japanese raw silk and silk stuffs goes to the United States. With the money thus realised the Japanese import cotton, oil and other essential raw materials. It is well to bear in mind in estimating the reactions of the Americans in the face of the situation in the Far East, that their interests in Japan are greater than their commitments in China. The mass of the American people may feel sym- pathy, often a very ill-informed sympathy, with the Chinese, but their big business is tied up with Japan. Japan must have oil. She has today little money to pay for it. To- morrow she may have still less. There is no oil in China.
The Dutch possessions stretch in a string from Sumatra to New Guinea,—from a few miles off Singapore to a day's sail from Australia. The area of this immense empire is many times that of Holland itself. The President of the active " Siam Society " of Japan has said, " Who can say how long Holland will be able to keep an empire sixty times larger than herself? " As long ago as October, 1935, an article appeared in the Nichi-Nichi Shimbun, in which was declared that " Japan would find in the Dutch East Indies sufficient quantities of cotton, iron ore, wool and rubber for her needs," and further that " In Tokyo military circles a plan has been drawn up for the exploitation of the Nether- lands East Indies and the Southern Islands which would strengthen her militarily."
The people of Holland are seriously alarmed at the menace to their source of national wealth. They are acutely conscious of their exposed position in Europe and regret that they did not several years ago construct a Maginot line against their German frontier. They are making efforts to defend their possessions overseas, but it is evident that they can never hope to defend them alone. The Dutch Government has bought Glen-Martin bombers from the United States. Most of the small Dutch fleet is concentrated in the East. What they have to try to protect is tempting. Half the tin in the world comes from Billiton and Banka Islands ; the coal of Sumatra, with that of Indo-China is the only coal in the China Sea area. The oil production increases daily. Immense quantities of cane sugar, rubber, spices and rice are exported. The trade turn-over is well over a hundred million pounds a year.
The Dutch are undoubtedly among the best colonisers in the world. With the exception of the Napoleonic period, when we occupied their eastern islands, the Dutch occupa-
tion has been long and there has been a continuity of policy; and all Dutchmen are more or less in the colonial game. The waiter who serves you at table in Holland has, so to speak, Royal Dutch scrip in his pocket.
The policy of the Dutch in their empire is, in some essen- tial respects, different from that pursued either by the French or ourselves. From the first the Hollanders have set their faces resolutely against the Europeanising of the natives. The Javanese may not learn a European language. The Dutch have systematically favoured the formation of a half-caste class to serve as intermediaries between them- selves and the bulk of the natives, on the principle that these half-castes will play the same role as the tame elephants in the corral. The total population of the Dutch East Indies is not less than 62 millions, of whom 55 millions are Mohammedans. The total " white " population, including the half-castes, does not exceed two hundred thousand.
The Dutch Colonial administration is, generally speaking, admirable and leaves one astonished at the achievements of so small a country. Java has the best roads in all the Far East, and those of Indo-China are very good. The Dutch roads, however, are all asphalted, even the smaller ones and those in the mountains. The towns are well built and the streets are as cluttered up with bicycles as those of Haarlem or Delft. The Dutch work hard in the Tropics, spend less money than we do, and are, as a consequence, almost all better off after their colonial days arc over.
The future of world domination, both economic and com- mercial and to a certain extent cultural, seems to be definitely assured to the white peoples everywhere except in the Far East. Until recently we were alone outside Europe on the high- ways of the world, the British Fleet maintained a sort of economic internationalism, or, as a French writer has put it, une republique mercantile internationale, outside Europe, founded upon free trade and fair play. Our pres- tige was the prestige of the whole white race. All the Empire lives on this prestige, and French Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies still exist because of our Fleet. Until quite re- cent times no one could challenge our supremacy. The greater Powers enjoyed, without ever referring to it, the benefits accruing from the protection of our Navy. The smaller Powers were ready to admit that they owed their empires to a state of things depending upon the British Fleet.
This state of things has been changed by the rise of japan to Great Power status. All competent observers agree that on land, in the air and on sea the Japanese would be no match for first-class modern European forces. In the ordi- nary course of events, however, it is difficult to see how the Japanese will ever have to take on a first-class army or navy on anything like equal terms. The Japanese are at home in the Far East and Europeans are far from their bases. This argument is the trump card of Japanese propagandists among the little yellow peoples of the Far East, Siamese, Annamese, Malays and so forth. " Whatever happens, we shall always be here," they say, " for we belong here." The " Southern Islands," from which the ancestors of a con- siderable part of the Japanese population are thought to have come, have never ceased to attract the people of Nippon. Not only do these islands contain fabulous wealth, but the Japanese can live in them. They cannot stand the conti- nental climate of Manchuria. There are already more Japan- ese settlers in the former German islands of Micronesia than in all Manchukuo.
The German plans for the attack on Holland and for its occupation have often been discussed. It is, however, possible that the spark which might set alight a general con- flagration may come from the East. If, for any reason, the Japanese were to decide to risk their all unon one throw and to attack the Dutch East Indies, the much-vaunted neu- trality of Holland could not survive. a moment. An excuse would be readily found, if one is needed, for the Blitzkrieg and the carrying out of the German plan for the occupation of Holland in a day or so.
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