THE DANGERS OF AGREEMENT.
THE instinct of contradiction, like the instinct of acquiescence, is inborn. There are many young people of whom their older friends can say with certainty that they will, at any rate for a time, abandon all the points of view in which they were brought up. There are others who just as certainly will remain standing where their fathers stood, though they may prove far longer or much shorter sighted than they. In some minds the direct power of suggestion is dangerously great, while in others it produces nothing but reaction. These instincts are very deep rooted and absolutely incorrigible, either from within or without. Both springing as they do from a radical defect, from a want of original independence, they affect the whole mind and • character, though where the disposition is specially reserved they do not show upon the surface. We have all known people who inwardly suspected most of the theories and many of the statements to whose expression or assertion they listened with genial sympathy and no apparent lack of confidence, and others who, while they may be inwardly carried away by the last speaker, yet listen without a sign of assent or approval. In simple natures, however, these two kinds of mental bias, where they exist in force, colour the whole conversation and manner, and the extended meaning now given to the word " agreeable " leaves no doubt as to which of them leads to popularity. On the other hand, the person whose inclination is to differ is not infrequently the best company in the long run. The man who throws the conversational ball at, instead of to, his interlocutor is more exciting. to play with than the man who drops it alto- gether. Roughly speaking, perhaps we might say that the man whose bias is towards contradiction will be the more interesting, and the man whose bias is towards agreement the more amiable. But, like all rough rules, this one admits of many exceptions. Perhaps there is nothing so dull as a " cussedness " which may be calculated upon, and no companion so intolerable as one in whose mind nothing is to be seen but an unflattering reflection of his interlocutor. But there are those who can differ amiably and those who can agree interestingly, and they are the most charming company in the world. They turn an inconvenient mental bias to social account, and a defect into a charm. To be able to oppose without a sign of antagonism,
to direct every blow at an opponent's theory and wirer one at his personality, to argue with him as though he put every point as well as it can be put and resolutely to refuse to take advantage of the fact that he does not do so, is the art of arts so far as discussion is concerned. And for the man who cannot help taking the other side, to demur to praise without seeming to be bent upon detraction, and to defend the accused without seeming to condemn the critic, is perhaps more difficult still. Yet there are those by whom both feats are accomplished. The self-control, however, which enables a man to do this is rare, and presupposes an unusual tolerance and an unusual determination to be pleasant.
But just as there are many more people to whom agreement comes more naturally than contradiction, so there are many more who succeed in agreeing interestingly than there are who succeed in contradicting amiably. There are a great many people in the world who, while they can originate nothing, are able to express anything, and to whom, apparently, much less brilliant talkers seem to act as a positive inspiration. They can take up and develop almost any idea, to the delight and astonishment of whoever origi- nated it. They diffuse in every assembly an atmosphere of well-being and social self-satisfaction, establishing themselves, for the moment at least, in the favour of every one to whom they speak. Nevertheless the dangers in the path of the man who constitutionally dislikes to differ are very great. He will be generally liked by his acquaintance, but he stands to lose his character both for independence and integrity with thoughtful people, while the contradictory person will never lose anything but his popularity. People may say, "What a disagreeable brute he is" ; but though his overweening love of dissent may constantly lead him to contradict himself, no one ever seems to blame him for insincerity. On the contrary, he often establishes a most illogical reputation for candour, and thereby obtains a measure of respect even from those who dislike him. Moreover, he is never put down as irretrievably narrow-minded, and, indeed, he seldom is. The difficulty he experiences in acquiescing in any given creed or conclusion delivers him from the dangers of partisanship. As a rule his want of sympathy makes him superficial ; but that is a fault no man has the power to suspect in himself, and one, there- fore, which cannot humiliate him. The pitfalls in front of the agreeable person are far deeper. Suppose, for instance, that he is a very consoientious man, and that because it goes against him to differ he seeks exclusively the company of those with whom he agrees. In this case he will debase the value of his own judgment in the shortest space of time, and will know when he is alone, and therefore himself, that he bas done so. What is far worse, by consorting only with those whose interests, whose environment, and whose type of mind cause them All to look in one direction, he will add his mite to the forces which make for discord in all communities. It is the close associations of the like-minded which set the world by the ears. They are the breeding-grounds of fanaticism and ignorance, of prejudice, party politics, persecution, class hatred, and everything which makes for blindness and decadence. If, however, onr agreeable man is less full of scruples, if he lives among all sorts and conditions of men in seeming sympathy with them all, he will be lucky indeed if he escapes the painful and constantly unjust censure of thoughtful persons. Of course there are a few people so soaked in their own eloquence, so enamoured of their own notions, and so hemmed about by the high wall of their own convictions that unless an interlocutor is prepared actually to insult them, they do not realise that he differs at all, and will go about declaring that So-and-so entirely agrees with them. Indeed, So-and-so may be thankful if they do not quote their own words with his name attached. Against men like these none but the truculent are quite safe. Such swashbuckling partisans are, however, quickly recognised, and few put faith in their criticism. By them, as soon as they find out that he has convictions which are not theirs, the man whose instinct prompts him to refrain from controversy is always looked upon as a turncoat, while after their anger has cooled they are inclined to regard the person who has forced a con- tradiction upon their notice in the light of a noble foe. But their condemnation is not worth grieving over nor their praise worth having. Unfortunately, far juster judges are apt to misunderstand the man whose nature prompts him to agree. His sympathy and power of putting himself in his neighbour's place is taken for want a conviction, and the popularity which comes without effort is supposed to be the thing he lives for. All the while the agreeable man is in all probability far more anxious to pursue the truth, and far more likely to arrive at it, than the man who judges himself and others by no standard but that of conversational consistency. He is able to learn from every one, which no one can who is not prepared to show some sympathy to every one who can teach him. Probably he may become interested in the setting rather than in the solving of problems ; but that, after all, is a more defensible mental position than that of the man who is always ready with a list of answers to questions he knows nothing about, and by no means weaker than the position of one whose answers are dictated by the spirit of contradiction. Knowledge and sympathy are not strength, but together they make a better working substitute than does obstinacy.
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