THE NAVAL BATTLE.*
THE naval mind loves to dwell on the concrete, and is thus only too liable to miss the underlying principles. Hence is seen its readiness to adopt over-hastily ideas and methods which prove to be unsound, and instruments which fail under the searching test of war. Very opportune, then, and useful is the appearance of a book such as The Naval Battle, which approaches naval problems from their abstract side and dwells on their underlying principles. All the more welcome is it since the author—Lieutenant Baudry, of the French Navy—enunciates the sound doctrine that in war at sea as on land all depends upon the decision by battle between tbe. armed forces. He relegates to their proper secondary position the protection of commerce, coast defence, military expe- ditions, &c. This indicates a complete chance in French naval thought, which has held the opposite view for several generations. During the wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries French Admirals were usually instructed to avoid the risks of battle, if they could gain their ends in any other way. Even Napoleon, as the author points out, failed to apply at sea the principles which had brought him success on land. The reason is obscure. It may be that war at sea is a very technical art, and that its technicalities make the principles obscure to a layman, even of Napoleon's genius. Certain it is that, as in other walks of life, there is an immense difference, when it comes to taking action, between the amateur and the professionaL The coast defence flotillas and the armoured cruisers to attack commerce, which were the pet ideas of France at the end of the nineteenth century, show how recent has been the change in thought. It is not unimportant to note that a strong and influential undercurrent of thought is unfortunately setting in the opposite direction in this country. The school responsible for it is advocating the doctrine now discarded by the French. The conception of war held by this school starts by declaring that the aim of naval strategy is to get command of the sea, which, as our author points out, is an incomplete formula. It is ambiguous and misleading, because no indication is given of what command of the sea means or how it is to be obtained. One of the ambiguous interpretations given to the words "command of the sea" is that they mean control of com- munications, and hence it has been taught that the aim of naval strategy is to control the sea communications. Here there is no reference to the decision by battle, and no indica- tion as to how the communications are to be controlled. With- out explanation or previous knowledge no one would know what was meant. It is not surprising that such an ambiguous phrase leads those who use it to the conclusion that there is a fundamental difference between war on the land and on the sea, which, as our author points out, is entirely erroneous. Another deduction from the basic importance of decision by battle is that the strength of a navy should be determined by that of the armed force it has to meet rather than by the length of the coastline, or the extent of the territory, or the volume of trade, which is so often erroneously placed in the forefront by those who take council of their fears.
Very interesting is the discussion of the ship as an instru- ment in battle, and the author's confession that as the result of a long peace naval officers think primarily in terms of material. This influence can be distinctly traced in this book, notwithstanding the efforts of the author to wean himself from it. Is he down to bed-rock in placing in the forefront destruc- tion of the material rather than disarming ? Is he not mixing up tactical with structural problems when he assumes that all "ships of the line" must be armoured and all other vessels must be unarmoured? Does he not suppress an important point when he states that armoured ships alone carry their own means of protection, but fails to call attention to the defending power of superior gun-fire ? This is all the more strange since he admits that armour gives only partial pro- tection, although he thinks that it is more effective than proving-ground experiments would have us believe. He evidently is not aware that thick armour has been seldom perforated in recent battles, because the area presented by it has been so small that it has seldom been struck. His demand for uniform armour protection may or may not be the correct • The Is'aral Battle. By Lieutenant A. Bandrj (French Navy) and Car Lain G. tans' (French Array). TrAn31ated by C. F.. A. 14,114013: Hugh. *SS. [6s. 6ct. net-3
solution, but does not carry us very far. Against what does he propose to protect ? Against the primary gun, the Secondary gun, or against splinters ? What is practicable
against modern artillery ? Here it must be noted that he advocates two sizes of guns, one of 9.4 inch calibre for the
main armament and another of some smaller calibre for use against light vessels. Unmeasured is the condem- nation of the armoured cruiser as being based on the non- battle idea. The translator is in error in assuming that the "battle cruiser" does not fall under the same ban. The underlying principles are the same in both—viz., greater speed, less protection, and less gun power than the ship of the line of its own generation. The new label is useful to mislead the uninitiated, but cannot alter the principle. Very curious is the illogical proposal for a "battle scout," which would be an armoured cruiser under another name.
Great is the author's faith in the Whitehead torpedo, on which he relies as the principal armament of light vessels.
But he does not set forth the foundations on which his confi- dence is based. No attempt is made to examine its capabilities as a weapon. This is all the more remarkable in that the principles underlying the use of gun-fire are examined with scientific precision. The capital importance of numerical superiority in guns and ships is well brought out, and makes the third study the most interesting in the book. If the Whitehead torpedo had been similarly examined, the author's conclusions might have been different.
The study of the "tactical factors in the battle" shows the
same curious leaning towards the material side, which is kept in the forefront, although its evil influence on the mind of the specialist i et forth. True ideals are seen to be of the
first importance, but surely the need to aim at a complete and decisive victory should come before the method of achieving it. Unless and until the mind has completely grasped the former, how can it formulate the latter ? The author dwells with reason on the difficulty of freeing the mind from the enervating influences of peace routine, and on the need not only to keep war ever foremost in thought, but to act in peace as far as possible as in war, whether when cruising or anchoring, and thus gradually to inculcate among subordinates the leading war ideals of the chief.
In his fifth study Lieutenant Baudry is at his best. The analysis and criticism of the Nelsonian battle, as exemplified at the Nile and Trafalgar, are deserving of close attention and study. Still more so is the discussion of the future battle, and the comments on the long-range craze and its revival of the defensive spirit. In the words of our author-
" This spirit still infects more than one of the navies of the world, which say, like our own [French] defeated ancestors, Our guns, well aligned, will destroy the well aligned hostile guns, and at long range. Let us fix our attention exclusively upon them : our guns will stop them and will also arrest the hostile will power should it seek to close with us or manceuvre at the inner ranges. The irrefragable proof is there before our eyes, in the gunnery tables. Let them come on !
Is it possible that the British Navy is one of these ? Or is it included among those, more ardent, who, according to the author, answer : "We shall not allow you the time either to .destroy us or to stop us. We shall manceuvre upon you, and
break you!"
We have left ourselves no space to deal with Captain Laur's comments, although they are striking and suggestive, especially those on the possible limitations of the submarine. Sufficient has been said to direct attention to the wide and far-reaching importance of the questions dealt with in this work, which calls for close study by the naval profession and is not without interest for the layman.
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