ROSSEL'S PLAN FOR A FRENCH ARMY.
TIIE Parisian Commune rallied to itself, at least, one man of uncommon character, Captain RoseeI ; and perhaps the worst use to which the French Government could put him would be to kill him. A young man of dauntless spirit and largo capacity, he belongs to the severe type of French officers, who are the masters and not the slaves of their profession, who are soldiers by instinct and education, but who at the same time do not sacrifice the State to "the Service." Nothing could be farther removed from " mili- tarism" than the mind of Captain Rossel, yet, short of the highest genius, it would be difficult to fiud one who possesses in a greater degree the wholesome side of the esprit militaire. To him the Army is an agency subordinate to and not above the State, and he habitually thinks of it and reasons about it as something which it were well to get rid of altogether, but which it is most needful to have ; and regarding it from this high political point of view, he arrives at conclusions more nearly akin to English than to the ordinary run of French thinkers. From his prison at Versailles he has sent forth a little book which, abounding in strong thoughts, rarely passes the limits of a wise moderation. A thorough Soldier, he yet tells the people that if they would escape future danger, military questions must no longer be treated as mysteries, but [some under the influence of intelligent public opinion ; and he lays it down that it is dangerous in a democracy to leave exclusively in the hands of a class of " specialistes " knowledge which is most important to the safety of the State, adding that, intelligent, these specialists would be usurpers ; negli- gent, more dangerous than traitors. This is novel doctrine in France, especially, from the pen of a man who rates as highly as any one the absolute necessity pressing on all nations to maintain a sound and instructed army, and a complete knowledge of war in
the superior ranks.
But what kind of army ? As military institutions are not the be-all and end-all of this accomplished soldier, he sees the distinct connection between the proportions of the public force and the character of the public policy, the interdependence between State aims and State means. If your policy is repressive at home, active, provoking, aggressive abroad, a numerous and powerful regular army is needful ; if the defence of the country is the main, but not the only object, a lesser regular army and a sub- stantial militia are amply sufficient. In March, 1870, Reuel 'held the lofty doctrine that the apprehension with which France was regarded in Europe should have led her to reduce her armaments far more than foreign nations ; aud he thought that the country, longing for continuous peace, was wearied out with the barren and onerous sacrifices of men, time, and money which for twenty years had been exacted, on the pretext that it was necessary to keep up a dominant military power. The maintenance of an army in excess of what was demanded for the defence of the country he declared to be the ^ Wilma ratio of Imperial home and foreign policy, and in the excite- 'silent attending an apparent return to less despotic government he 'foresaw the reduction, even partial suppression, of standing armies in France. Here we have the key to Rossel's system, eminently moderate and politic, a non-aggressive foreign policy, a free government at home, and a relatively small but well built- up Army backed by a numerous and substantial Militia. It need not be said how great a change would take place in Europe, were it once possible to believe that the French, without abating one jot of their dignity or sacrificing a particle of the national honour, would cease to have a foreign policy the end of which is French aggrandizement. To show that Roesel is as French as it is possible to be, 'we need only quote these words :— " The least movement in France causes sommersaults in Europe. France may be likened to Gulliver pegged down by the Lillipn-
tians ; every time the colossus breathes, the little people tremble." Those words are a sufficient certificate of Rossel's character as a genuine Frenchman, and they destroy all suspicion of any desire on his part to detract from the greatness of his country.
Whether it be excess of confidence in his own people or error of judgment, his very pride and moderation lend weight to his plan. It is simply this —Instead of the heavy drafts of 80,000, 100,000, or 110,000 men per annum, which the later conscriptions have exacted from the people, he would take only 30,000; but he would abolish substitution absolutely, and compel the 30,000 to serve for eight years. He would raise the pay both of officers and privates, and aim at keeping up a permanent force of 300,000 regulars. Of course this body would receive the best possible instruction and training, would be kept engaged solely in military duty, and would, therefore, not act as a police or an industrial force in any way. In short, the 300,000 men would be a complete and efficient army, as little onerous as it is conceiv- able any army could be to the country. The serious and thorny problem of providing officers and arranging a system of promotion is not worked out, but like most soldiers, Rossel distrusts pure com- petitive examination, and even inclines, heretically, towards a very guarded mode of election, at least with respect to a limited portion. But, it will be said, 300,000 men for France, facing powers armed to the teeth, is a weak force. Rossell perceives and provides against that objection by suggesting a strong backing of militia. Lie would raise militia by hundreds of thousands, would subject them to limited but continuous instruction, forty days in two periods of twenty annually, and give them the best officers and instructors that circumstances would permit. The net result, if the plan could be carried out, would be this :—France would have a standing Army so effectively constructed and trained, that at the first sign of danger the Militia could be summoned, and as it were absorbed in the Regular Army ; for the latter would have to supply both the officers and instructors needed to complete the organization. In other words, war or danger of war would find France with a splendid body of soldiers, able at once to appropriate and utilize a fairly-trained and immense body of infantry, com- posed of the young men not included in the sedentary na- tional guard. Here it is necessary to observe that Rossel would have the special services—artillery, engineers, cavalry_ maintained always in strength out of all proportion to the standing infantry. He does not dream of making militia cavalry and artillery ; but relies on the militia to furnish the infantry, the most easily manufactured arm of the service. "One may be born a cook," he observes, "but not born a trooper, or an engineer, or a gunner ; " these are trades to be learned before they can be practised, and therefore these arms must be permauently main- tained. The militia would have to be paid for service. The problem in• 1868, he sharply remarks, was to present France with 500,000 men, on condition that they cost nothing to the budget, and did not take the citizen from his business. "To have soldiers without instructing them or paying for them,—that was the impracticable programme imposed by circumstances." Of course it failed, and doubtless Rossel's plan, whatever its defects in a military and national point of view, would have lessened, if it had not averted the failure, Whether France, under M. Thiers or any other probable ruler, is likely to adopt a scheme based avowedly on a defensive policy may be reasonably questioned ; but whatever project is ultimately fashioned and set in operation, France will be wise if she insists that the work shall be undertaken in a spirit like that which animates Rossel's little book ; and not France alone, but another nation would benefit by drinking at the same source.
Previous page
