THE EVACUATION OF COLOGNE
BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR ROBERT HUTCHISON,
K.C.M.G.
AFTER cloSe association with the Army of the Rhine for over three years, I feel a: certain sense of sadness at the departure of the British Army froin Cologne. - But, putting sentiment aside, I am convinced that we ought to have left Cologne at the end of last year.. Occupation of European territory is Of no use to Britain, and only draws us into situations which seriously affect our trade and general relations with other countries.. For this reason I am glad that the end of the oecupktion has come, and I regret we have to occupy further German territory higher up the Rhine.
Looking back on the past occupation, I venture to give one or two incidents that I noted. On the whole the rela- tions between the Rhine Army and the German population have been good.: we had difficult times, but . these were successfully surmounted with a minimum of friction. Our British military police, many old London policemen, did a great deal to establish confidence, and they handled many angry crowds of unemployed with tact and skill when the German police—many times more numerous— had failed to keep order.
In 1920 we had a very difficult situation to deal with. Riots and serious disturbances of a Communist nature bad broken out in the Ruhr Valley, and were specially severe near our frontier at Solingen, The German Govern- ment sent troopS from Berlin to reinforce the local police, and severe fighting took place. During this over a thousand German troops were driven into our bridgehead by the Revolutionary forces. The question then arose : what were we_ to do with these troops ? We immediately in terned them in a camp outside Cologne ; and glad they were to be interned, for they had been very roughly handled by the Communists. We had to take precautions against the ". Red " element in our area getting at these German troops. In due course these soldiers were re- turned to Germany.
Shortly afterwards we -had to deal with detachments of Communists who fled to our area from the Ruhr when the German troops and police gained the mastery. We treated these Communists in the same way as we had treated German troops. Our policy was to keep a strict neutrality, and I think up to date we have successfully done so.
Another notable movement we had to deal with was the Separatist movement, which aimed at detaching the Rhineland from the -rest of Germany. ThiS was Un-1 doubtedly engineered by outside influences. I ath glad to say it did not affect the Cologne area, but in Bonn) Coblenz, Wieibaden and Aix-la-Chapelle Separatist forces 'took over the control of these towns for a period; un-! 'doubtedly with the sympathy of the French and Belgian' authorities. The population had no heart or desire for the "movement, which quickly collapsed when foreign 0'0-) tection was withdrawn ; the enraged populations soon dealt with these intruders.
Then we had the very difficult period of the French .andl -Belgian occupation of the Ruhr Valley, carried out against British advice and without the co-operation of the British Army. This unfortunate incident had a great, effect on the evacuation of Cologne. The evacuations ought to have been carried out at the end of 1924, but because we in Cologne acted as a link between the Frenchi forces in the Ruhr Valley and the French Army higher ups the Rhine the British Government decided to postpone', our departure. This action did create a suspicion in the minds of all Germans that we did not intend to fulfil our. agreement. I would like to point out to the inhabitants of Cologne—and perhaps to those of all Rhineland—that had the British Army not been in Cologne revolutionary changes in all probability would have been carried out. - I believe we might and should have left Cologne a con- siderable time ago, but perhaps Mr. Chamberlain found( our presence there of some value in his negotiations foil the Pact of Locarno. By the Pact of Locarno we guarantee German and French security ; we promise t give a lot. What do we get in exchange ? Have we no safety of the British Empire to look after ? It seems to me that however desirable it may be to secure the peace, of Europe by the Pact of Locarno, we must looi after ours own safety. If there ever is another Great War—which God forbid !—I venture to suggest that we shall not be fighting on the Continent of Europe. We shall he fighting for our lives on the sea and in the air. If. this Pact of Locarno is to be of any use to us it must lead to dis- armament, especially at sea and in the air. I do hope and trust the British Government will do all it can to with- draw our forces from occupation duty in Europe (and I might mention other places), and to this end the force remaining at Wiesbaden should be cut down to a small guard. Our flag is as safe with a Captain's guard as with a Division. From an economic point of view it is most desirable our force should be as small as possible. The cost of the Armies of Occupation has been enormous, and if we include all the German Government has spent directly and indirectly we can well understand whyl German finances became chaotic and European trade languished. The cost is still large, though expenditure is now under greater control ; but I venture to say that the sooner the Allies can hand over the Rhineland to: Germany the better for the peace and trade of Europe. Do not forget that the Rhineland is intensely national; the whole, folklore of the Rhine is deep in the hearts of all Germans,! and no such policy as an independent Rhineland has a chance of success.
The evacuation of Cologne is another milestone passed on the way to real peace, and I hope the pace to the next.
will be greatly accelerated. The occupation has been arduous for the citizens of Cologne, and naturally they will rejoice at our departure ; but I believe the British, Army has gained the respect of the Germans, and perhaps, a few will view the evacuation with regret.
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