5 FEBRUARY 1898, Page 4

TOPICS OF THE DAY.

THE POSSIBILITY OF COMMERCIAL WARS. NIR. GREENWOOD is not the only man who has called attention to the possibility of a commercial war to be waged by the Continent against Great Britain. He puts his case in the Nineteenth Century with his accustomed force and directness ; but Mr. Chamberlain in a more cautious way has pointed to the same danger again and again, and suggested a far-reaching, though somewhat risky remedy. He wants, to put it broadly, to take enough of the unoccupied world to make us sure of sufficient markets. It is quite possible, also, that Count Goluchowski had the idea of such a war in his mind when he spoke of the existence of the Continental nations depending upon some transmarine struggle ; while the newspapers alike of Germany and Russia make the same notion the foundation of their violent diatribes against Great Britain. It was only on Monday that a St. Peters- burg paper ended an article with the statement that England would henceforward be fought behind barri- cades of tariffs. Though we do not, for reasons to be stated, consider the crisis so acute as Mr. Greenwood seems to do, we incline to believe that there is solid foundation for the widely spread apprehension, or rather belief in a coming combination against °lir prospe,ity. The nations, if we may write brutally, are raging for plunder. We believe, that is, that the statesmen of Europe have reasoned themselves into a full belief that the poverty of their populations, which in all countries but France are rapidly increasing, threatens social order with imminent disaster ; that emigration is at best a feeble and inefficient palliative ; that more tangible and spendable wealth must be obtained to keep the people in content and acquiescence ; and that as profitable conquest in Europe is barred by the military equality of the Powers, the wealth can be obtained only through an enlargement of trade. The first condition of that enlargement is new markets, and they are seeking new markets everywhere, with a desire, half hidden and half revealed, that they should be closed markets. For, they say, if they are perfectly open markets, the English will get them. It does not matter whether they get them fairly or unfairly, by underselling and in- trigue, or by fair competition, they will get them somehow as they have done in Tonquin, and the Continent, for all its exertions, will obtain no benefit. It can, in fact, hardly compete with these Carthaginians in its own ports. The Powers other than England must therefore obtain either territorial dominions, which is the French idea, or special lreaty rights, which is the German and Russian idea, and to both Great Britain is the one serious, almost insur- mountable, obstacle. Great Britain is everywhere already except in South America, where nobody can go because of the United States, and as she has the secret of making Colonies pay their expenses, she can expand indefinitely ; and in East Africa, West Africa, and South Africa she is so expanding. At the same time, she resists fiercely the scheme of special treaties, demanding that if new ports are opened anywhere, they shall be open to all the world, that is, practically to herself alone as the one trader who succeeds. It follows that Great Britain must be warned to be content with what she has, and must, as regards the one grand unoccupied market, be gradually edged out, even if it takes a combined menace from the whole Continent to secure that end. What remains of trading profits must, in fact, go to the poor Continent, and not to bloated Britain. This is the plan to which everything points, and which well-informed men in every country believe in, and no doubt it threatens this country with a danger all the more serious because the working classes of the Continent, in- cluding this time the peasantry, would agree in the main with their Governments. They all think England "too rich," they all believe that we have become too rich by a trade which, if they could get it, would make them wealthy too, and they are all hungering with a new hunger born of a new self-consciousness for more physical com- fort. "If there were a God," said the bitter Berlin woman to an audience of hundreds, "would he let my children starve?" They would fight if bidden for colonies as fiercely as ever Spaniards fought for their monopoly of the New World. Great Britain, therefore, may be called on in the extreme case to resist the combined Con- tinent either in defence of her possessions, or, which is more probable, in defence of her general right to enjoy a, fair share of the world's profitable trade. She will have no ally either. America is a planet by itself with all climates included within her own dominion, and would hardly be content to spend millions on such a battle ; France, which does not increase her population and does not live by trade, would be but a languid ally on either side ; while Germany, Austria, and Russia would be the very Powers interested, as they would say, in obtaining "more certainty of plentiful food." Only Japan would be heartily on our side, and the national conscience will not long consent to any active alliance with any Mongol. Cruelty shocks him too little.

The outlook, it seems to us, is very grave, for we do not believe, if the nations once started on a career of indus- trial war, they would be deterred by anything except defeat. Expenditure would only increase their sense of the necessity for great compensations, while moral con- siderations would die away as they always do amid the fury of war. It is easy to say that more commerce is a, base end, but the nations have fought trade wars at intervals for the last three centuries, and in periods when the needs of their populations were much less pressing than at present. We all know what a Continental rising against the rich is like, and no one would trust a Continental Trade-Union not to take up arms if it thought that by so doing it could win its battle. As for our own people, they are very good when well fed, but when hungry we will not trust their tempers, or affirm that they will reject with firmness the advice contained in the- old motto of the Earls of Cranstoun, "Thou shalt want ere I want."

At the same time, though there are terrible rocks ahead in this direction, it is foolish to be too pessimistic. Our people could live for a time, though the distress would be sharp, upon their accumulated:capital. They have a very large section of the world in their own hands already, which cannot be shut to their commerce until they are conquered. Closed markets are never quite closed, the best goods still finding their way through neutral inter- mediaries. Even Napoleon failed, with all his power and all his severity, to keep out British goods whenever they were seriously wanted. Above all, the terrible conflict, if it ever comes, cannot come yet. None of the Powers are ready for action, or can be ready for many years. Even the combination is not yet strong enough to face Great Britain at sea, and its advocates openly declare that their policy is not one of immediate violence, but a, gradual edging of Great Britain out, partly by menaces, partly by treaties, and partly by internal legislation. That is a policy which takes time, and with time the conditions of the world may be materially modified. It will be six years before Russia has really finished her great railway, five before Germany is fairly settled on the Chinese sea- board, four before France can put her Navy in anything like fighting trim for a great maritime war. In the interval a great many things may happen, a great many ruling men may be changed, and a great many policies may be radically modified. We all write, and most of our states- men form plans, as if the political arrangements of the world were settled for years, while in truth there is no certainty that they are settled for months. A revolution in France, an outbreak of racial feeling in Austria, a change of rulers in Germany or Russia, the growth of a new ambition for foreign trade in America, may alter everything, as also may certain changes of opinion within our own country. There will, for instance, be a furious reaction—that we predict confidently—against the present passion for expansion, and against the present belief of our people that public expenditure, even waste, matters nothing to their resources. These are no reasons for neglecting precautions either by sea or land, or for allowing ourselves to be bullied out of any just or reasonable claims, but they are reasons against panic or against unworthy compliances to secure any powerful ally. We wish with all our hearts we could compromise with Russia, honestly compromise, because that would mean peace and prosperity for all Asia—that is more than half the world—but if the price to be paid is too large, so be it. We must possess our souls in patience and watch the stream of events. The New Armada is not in sight yet, and when it is, it will not be here till a very big fight has been fought and lost.