THE RAID ON THE MOORISH COAST.
TT is possible that the Moorish question—that Western question which Prince Bismarck once said was in reality more formidable than the Eastern—is going to be raised in a very disagreeable form. A yacht belong- ing to a body of traders who term themselves the Globe Venture Syndicate—true to the old tradition of "rum and utlasses " which haunts the African trade—have been attempting to land a cargo alleged to consist of arms on the shore of the Sus country, which is part of the Empire of Morocco. The effort to get the cargo ashore and into the hands of the Sus natives, who are rebels en permanence, was opposed by a small unarmed steamer which belongs to the Sultan of Morocco, and the result was a scrimmage. The Globe Syndicate's yacht turned her Maxim on the boats of the Sultan, but they were not able to prevent the advance of the Moors, and the capture of three Englishmen and a German officer in the service of the Syndicate. We gather from the very full and interesting accounts published in the Daily Mail that the Syndicate considers that the Sultan had no business to interfere with them, and that they were only engaged in doing what they had a perfect right to do. They declare that the Sus territory does not belong to the Sultan of Morocco, that the country is a sort of no-man's-land, and that there- fore they had a right to trade with the natives. This plea is absurd. No doubt the Sus tribes hate the Moorish Government, as they have every right to do, for it is corrupt, inefficient, mid oppressive in a high degree. This does not, however, alter the fact that from the point of view of international law the Sus country belongs to Morocco. The Sultans of Morocco have led innumerable expeditions across the Atlas Mountains with more or less success ; and a war in the Sus country has marked every accession. The Syndicate cannot be excused on the ground of ignorance, for they were, it appears, for- bidden by the Moorish Government to trade with the Sus natives, and warned by our own Foreign Office that if they did they would do so at their own risk. We do not, of course, wish to say anything which may prejudice a case that will probably come before the Courts, but as far as we can see the action of the Globe Syndicate was entirely without justification. They were, if the facts are as stated, trying to sell arms to the natives of Sus contrary to the wishes of the Moorish Government. We say "if the facts are as stated" advisedly, for of course it may turn out that they were only engaged in legitimate trade. But even if that be the case, the Syndicate officers had no right to insist on trading contrary to the wishes of the Moorish authorities. If wrong was done them by the Moorish Government, they should have appealed to our Minister at Tangier, and not have taken the law into their own hands. No doubt our Government will insist that the prisoners shall be handed over to them for punishment, if punishment should be found to be legally their due, for Moors are not fit people to imprison or try Europeans. When, however, the prisoners are given up, the operations of the Syndicate must be most carefully examined. Mr. Rhodes's example has borne plenty of evil fruit already, and we must take steps to discourage most strongly any imitators in the matter of private war. If trading bodies are to make raids at will and to be their own judges in matters of international law, our Government will become the laughing-stock of the world. No doubt it is a difficult task to control such eager and adventurous traders as ours—we cannot guard all coasts day and night—but if a breach of law has taken place it bhould be dealt with most stringently.
Though the incident on the coast of the Sus country is s disagreeable one, its chief importance lies first in the evidence it affords that the Empire of Morocco is at last entering upon the stage of dissolution ; and secondly in the possible international complications which may ensue therefrom. Let us deal first with the chances of internal dissolution. When the present Emperor came to the throne, it was freely prophesied by those who knew Morocco that the break-up of the country was likely to be imminent. If the late Emperor, though a strong and able man, was only just able to hold his own, what chance was there for his weak and youthful successor ? No doubt these forebodings have not yet come true, but there is reason to believe that things have of late been steadily going from bad to worse in the Moorish kingdom. The last expedition of the Sultan beyond the western half of the Atlas was a failure, and now we find the Sus tribesmen obviously most eager to get arms. This probably means that there is going to be a general shaking off of the Sultan's authority in the Sus country. If the Sus tribes succeed, they will certainly be imitated by the tribes in the Tafilet country and in other outlying districts, and this, again, will probably mean insurrections nearer home. Of course luck may attend the Sultan and he may pull through, but we must not forget that his seat on the throne is extremely insecure, and that a very little would bring the whole Empire in ruin about his ears. But if once Morocco gets into a condition of anarchy, the dreaded partition must take place. Anarchy will give France something more than an excuse for moving on the Algiers frontier ; while anarchy, as soon as it touches the great trading centres like Tangier, Rabat, and Mogador, will make it necessary for us to act. And even if none of these things happen, we can hardly hope that present conditions will much longer re- main unchanged. Even if we have no great difficulty in getting the prisoners released, the Globe Syndicate has put our Government in the very awkward position of having to make reparation to a Power which under normal con- ditions is perpetually having to make amends to us for petty acts of wrongdoing. The foreign Ministers at Tangier spend their time in getting, or trying to get, advantages for their countries, and advising the Sultan not to give similar advantages to their rivals. We may be sure, then, that the French and the German Ministers will seize the present opportunity to lower our influence and to raise their own. But if we see our influence being visibly impaired in Morocco we shall have to retort by strong measures of some kind, and strong measures may have extremely unpleasant consequences. The Empire is in a rotten condition enough already, and any pressure applied to it may end in a catastrophe. The only way of safety in a crazy, overweighted boat is for every one to keep still. If for any reason some one has to get up and hit out with his fists, an upset is only too likely to happen.
Considering what the conditions are in Morocco, and considering also the longing eyes that are cast at Morocco from all sides, would it not be better for our Government to take time by the forelock and work out a scheme of partition before matters get acute? If the Sick Man's inheritance is divided up in anticipation before he dies, there need be no fighting at the funeral. Practically the only Powers concerned with Morocco are France and Spain, because of propinquity ; England, partly because of propinquity at Gibraltar, and partly because of her trade ; and Germany, because of her trade interests, actual or potential. But Spain can be eliminated as fax as controversial action is concerned. She is too weak to insist on her voice being heard. As regards the other three, it is safe to say that if France and England agree as to terms Germany can do nothing. She could not go to war alone, and Austria and Italy are certainly not going to make war about Morocco. France, then, and England could, if they would, settle the matter. But we shall at once be told that France is always so suspicious when approached in regard to such matters that it is im- possible to do business with her. France would simply decline to consider any abstract proposals as regards the future of Morocco, and would bow us to the door without entertaining our scheme. Very likely. That, however, need not in the least prevent us from arriving at a, plan of eventual partition and imposing it on France and the rest of the world, not by the weight of arms, but by the irresistible force wielded by any plan which shows the line of least resistance. Let our Government think out the plan which is most likely to preserve the peace of the world without injuring England, and quietly let it be known that this and no other plan will when the time comes be accepted by us, and it is almost certain that such a plan will carry the day. The reason why this suggestion is feasible is that we do not want any part of Morocco for ourselves. Suppose we say to France that she may have all Morocco except the blunt-nosed peninsula in which Tetuan and Tangier are situated, provided that she agrees to let in our goods and our traders permanently on the same terms as they are admitted to Tunis. Suppose, next, that Spain is given the aforesaid blunt- nosed peninsula to hold on condition that Tangier is a free port, and that neither it nor any other place along the coast is fortified. Such a scheme, when it came to the point, would obviously not be rejected by France. Spain would be pacified by the possession of Tetuan, which she already regards as hers, and she would come into posses- sion of the ten thousand or so of Spaniards who are already settled in Tangier. Again, the arrangement places Tangier, the key of the Straits, in neutral hands. Europe could not bear to see both Tangier and Gibraltar in British hands. We could not endure to see Tangier made by the French into a new Toulon or Biserta. No one need mind Spain holding the place, especially if she is bound not to fortify. But, it may be asked, how do we benefit ? By obtaining an access for our trade, by securing the freedom of the Straits, and by enabling France to obtain that great Northern and Western African Empire which we do not want for ourselves, and which, if she possesses it, will prevent her "crowding us" in the rest of the world. If the North African Empire of France includes Tunis, Algiers, and Morocco, France will have secured for herself a morsel which will need much digestion. In words, of course, nothing need be said about Egypt ; but the moment France has Morocco she will no longer want to worry us on the Nile. As we have said above, every French statesman will re- pudiate the notion of such a deal, but if we let it be known that it is the only solution of the Morocco problem to which we will agree, it is the solution which is certain to take place. For our diplomatists to refuse to entertain the notion merely because the French would not be pleasant and polite about it seems to us simply absurd. We don't want our policy to be the cause of friendly smiles but of success. If we are determined, as there is no doubt we are determined, not to take Morocco ourselves, let us insist that it shall be disposed of in the way which will be most beneficial to ourselves. But this way is un- questionably to give the Tetuan and Tangier Province to Spain, and the rest to France, with proper provisions for the non-exclusion of our trade. Having decided that it does not want a valuable international asset for itself, the wise nation does not play the game of dog-in-the-manger or insist that the asset shall remain derelict. Instead, it insists that the asset shall be beneficially disposed.
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