FRIEDRICH VON GENTZ.*
[SECOND NOTICE.]
AMONGST the many documents of interest in the present volume, a confidential letter, written in April, 1824, by Gentz to Baron Ottenfels, then Austrian Internuneio in Constantinople, invites our special attention. It gives an admirably lucid statement of the
political situation, as it presented itself to one looking keenly abroad from an emphatically Austrian point of view, while it contains besides what, as coming from one with such ample means of intimate knowledge, must be considered telling testi- mony to points of character in important political figures of the day, notably of the Emperor Alexander and Prince Metternich :—
" I gladly avail myself of some spare hours, my most excellent friend [wrote Gentz from Vienna], to discuss with you a few matters which touch us both dearly. I still make the old- complaint that, excepting myself, no one in Vienna (the Prince himself included) takes to heart the Greco-Turkish complication in its full importance. In Spain, in Portugal, in the whole range of North and South America,
there may eventually happen what will Austria will not be shaken in her foundations, if in those distant countries everything were even to turn topsy-turvy. Wholly different is the case as to the course and destinies of our neighbour States to the East ; here the mainten- * Zur Oeschichte der Orientatisehen Frage: Brieje aus dem Nachlasse Friedrichs rots Gents. Wien : W. Braumiiller. 1877. ance or ruin of our political system is at stake ; here it is a question of life and death. The Prince does not, indeed, view these large subjects from a stand-point that is exactly different from mine, we are rather at one whenever we talk them over. But it often makes me uneasy and very sad that he does not devote to them the time and attention with which he deals with other and less important matters He counts on the good-fortune with which he has hitherto conducted this complicated business—that means he has spun it out ; unwillingly does he occupy himself with perils not close at hand, he especially dislikes all matters with which he cannot deal immediately, and would gladly altogether argue away to himself and others the exist-
ence of evils which he is not in a condition to overcome communicate to you, under the strictest secrecy, the Russian memo- randum on the pacification of Greece, and our reply thereto. The sub- stance of this scheme has something so fanciful, that our exposition of the means for its execution resembles more a quiz than a serious
opinion Far more disquieting, to my mind, than the substance of this Russian memorandum was the language held by the Cabinet as to its position towards the Porte ; the reiterated sharp remonstrances with which it presses upon its allies that peace manifestly cannot be maintained between the two Powers, unless the Greeks are in some manner relieved ; the not ambiguous prophecy of a now, unavoidable rupture, if the question is not decided according to Russian wishes. Will you blame me that, under such aspects, I decline all reliance on the assurances of Tatischeff and others, that ' the Emperor cares little about the result of the Greek disturbances, wishes but to keep himself nncompromised, is satisfied if only something is spoken and written ?' I think differently. The Emperor, it is true, takes
little real interest in the fate of the Greeks he also has no hos- tile intentions, no treacherous designs against the Turks ; he sincerely desires peace with them, and would be happy if he could restore the old relations that existed before 1821. But he is, at the same time, penetrated with the feeling that he cannot with honour get out of the business without having obtained some decisive improvement in the condition of the Greeks; and what is worse and most dangerous, he lives in the hallucination that this object he will and must obtain through co- operation with the Allies, by an imposing attitude, by persistence, by threats, and by creating fear. Now herein lies the source of all future ruin. For what will happen when the Porte, as is to be foreseen well-
nigh to a certainty resists with stubbornness ? In this case, a second rupture with Russia seems to me almost positive.
Should, then, the Turks prove in this campaign more able and lucky than in previous ones, then I already hear the screams about cruelties and massacres with which their victories will be accompanied, as if barbarians ever could assert their right over barbarians in any other manner ; and if at last they do yield, and were to acquiesce in a scheme which gives them at least only a semi-death, no one will feel disposed to force the Greeks into its acceptance; but the end will be the recognition of their actual independence—perhaps as an unavoid- able evil—and thereby the sentence of total death against the Porte,— for such an event it could survive barely a couple of years."
There is much in this letter which, with slight modifications in terms, might have been written quite of late by a confidant of the present Austrian Chancellery. But leaving this aside, we would point to the observations on Prince Metternich's mode of dealing with political questions. Though himself prone to dissipa- tion, Gentz never allowed it to distract him from business, and it was a conspicuous characteristic of his nature that he threw himself always with a fever-heat into the prosecution of political interests. Not so Metternich, whose nature was marked with an aristocratic nonchalance, and had not the strength of fibre that, even in earnest moments, could resist being drawn away by frivolous attractions. Of this weakness there are remarkable notices in the Diaries of Gentz during the Napoleonic period, which have been published by Varnhagen's literary executor. But in this corre- spondence we have also strikingly characteristic evidence under Metternich's own hand, of the shallow self-complacency and supercilious vanity with which he viewed himself and others. Here is his own explanation of the policy with which he contem- plated paralysing Russia in the St. Petersburg Conferences :- "' Si via pacem, pare bellum,'every one understands. Why ? Because the sentence is old and classical. Now this sentence, and nothing else, have I employed, but in the way of negotiation throughout the Greek business. But this, people do not take in. I have filled my diplomatic arsenal, completed and reviewed my armaments, not to come to blows, but to prevent them. To make an end of this absurd question, I say, Very good, let us sit down together ; let us examine ; this,—that,—is at stake, for otherwise there would be nothing at all in qnestion ; there- fore we will have it,—Russian Genius, go ahead ! Count Nesselrode, devise the means ; we know quite well, and say quite distinctly, what appertains to the Greek Utopia, Now, then, make this possible?' When, now, a man like Strangford comes forward and seeks to prove to me that nothing is possible, I do not know whether to cry or laugh. The best answer woulcrsurely be the well-known Pia ce gue je vous disais!' of the great Giroux. The Emperor Alexander never again spoke any more of marching to Spain, after I said to him, We are with you,—tho idea is a glorious one, but how shall we do it ?'" This mode of dealing with matters of State is what at whist is called finessing a card, and there is too much evidence that in this trick Metternich saw the be-all of statesmanship. When Nes- selrode in the Conference proposed measures of coercion against the Porte, Metternich wrote :—" The opinion, or rather the ban- kering of the Russian Cabinet after coercive measures should not make grey hairs grow on any one. It is so thoroughly unprac- tical as to be incapable of being put into any, even half-intelli- gible formula. Whenever matters get to be as they are now, one must never give oneself the trouble of proving the impossibility of things, but, on the contrary, leave the proof of their possi- bility to the party advocating them, and this I shall do in the pre- sent case." At this conjuncture Metternich more or less covertly sought to push forward the French Government, then in the full tide of the Villele Ministry, into prominent antagonism to the advance of the Greek Christian element in regions where France con- sidered herself to be the traditional champion of the Latin faith. To draw the bonds more closely, the Prince proceeded himself, in the spring of 1825, to Paris, and the climax of radiant self-satis- faction is evident in the following account he wrote to Gentz of the position in which he stood to the ruling influences in France. The extract is somewhat long, but will well deserve perusal, for its vivid traits of this statesman's nature :-
"I am sending to-day my despatches for St. Petersburg, and tell St. to show them to you. I anticipate you will sincerely share all the views developed in them. Were I myself in St. Petersburg, I would take up the fight in many respects differently. But from a distance matters must be conducted otherwise, and the direction having to be given over to third parties, I am driven to confine myself to principles. My main purpose is to acquire the diplomatically strongest position, and this is on all occasions the defensive one I beg of you to consider the English messages of the Gth. Canning must have discovered that it is easier to poke fun with maxims at the Powers and the Right-minded than at a revolutionary Republic. I am engaged in elaborating a good article on this quite delectable state of affairs for a newspaper here. But how I come to this is amongst the signs of the times and of my position. On this I could write a volume, but as I shall see you before long, I shall not give myself this trouble. And the time would also fail me. This much is positive, that did I stand in nood of more than my own inner consciousness to know how I occupy a position in the world wholly singular, quite distinct, and shared in by no one, my present stay here would have sufficed to teach me the fact. My relations to the Ministry and the King are, of a certainty, without example People look at me as a kind of lantern, which they draw near to in order to got light in a more or less dark night. I cannot otherwise describe my daily experiences. Villele and Damns are for over running in and out to ask me questions which, God knows, are easy enough to answer. Whenever I speak my saying, they find it stupendous, though it is in cases where I would be ashamed of my own self if it could bo different. It seems those good folks are accustomed to hear, instead of a solution of questions, the very easy ' I don't understand.' I never become guilty of the sin of such a sentence, and therefore they take me to be a lantern that gives light,—amongst all the duties of a lantern, forsooth, the most common-place ! So much is plain to me, that the Ambassador—of any Court—who knows himself to have right, i.e., who is bout on good and understands how to speak it clearly, must play hero a groat part ! Pozzo, for instance, would have admirably played this part, bad he rested on its fundamental condition. But he always was in the wrong, and let that once become evident, then a man sinks below all those who stand around. That is the case now with Pozzo. If over by chance he speaks without personal motives, no one believes him. His avarice has most of all done him harm ; he has become as rich as Crcesus, and the sources of this wealth are known to all. Thus be had a largo share in the loan for the Cortes. Now just think how his voice must be considered in the question of Legitimacy ! What has for me the highest interest, is the very close connection that has sprung up between me and the pure party. This will have consequences. The men who are its leaders press themselves with confidence to me, and I now see through their actions, their schemes, and their hopes, just as if I had boon here for years. This much must suffice to you for the moment, namely, that here, in the centre of all evil, there has formed itself another centre of genuine good, and that it is thriving vigorously and practically. Action is peculiar to the French, and they never let mat- ters rest with a hollow flourish of words. I see Bonald a great deaL He pleases me much, and is far more practical than I had thought. At the same time, in many things he is of a crass ignorance to be found only in France. He stands in a kind of dumb wonder at everything I say, and if 1 were to stand before the tribunal of the Almighty, so is it true that not one single case has turned up between us to have been unknowing in reference to which would not have been to reduce me to downright stupidity. Tho reason why Evil so easily makes enormous progress is simply that it is enough to be an ignoramus to be able to figure as a hero therein. Tho other day Bonald said a pretty sentence which is very generally applicable. Ho said, 'Lep:Ill/culler des sots—et ils ferment la majorite dans la societe- c'est leer propension decouvrir les difficulas Bans lea bonnes choses, et lee faciliteS dans les mauvaises.' This sentence is quite true ; it fits, for example, exactly the course taken by the English Ministry. In the Alliance it finds everything difficult, in the relations with the Liberals, on the contrary, everything easy."
With this extraordinary piece of self-complacency we close this notice of a volume which abounds in matter of interest, for who- soever is engaged in studying the politics of European States in the early years of this century.
Previous page
