TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE step announced by the Government on Saturday last is significant, even after Lord Carnarvon's speech, as showing the bias of those at the head of affairs, but taken by itself is of very little importance. The Sultan, who pro- bably hears in one way or another more of what is going on than is believed in Constantinople, has been for some time alarmed at Russian progress, and his alarm has been deepened by a report from his brother-in-law Mahmoud, whom he despatched ou a tour of inspection to Adrianople. He, therefore, either of his own motion or under the advice of Mr. Layard, who labours persistently to make the war resultless, signified to the British Government that he should be pleased if the British Foreign Office intimated to the Czar the readi- ness of the Turkish Government to enter into negotiations. The motives of such an announcement are of course obvious. Negotiation could do Turkey no manner of harm, and might do her good, the Oriental notion, not altogether inaccurate, being that time is always on the side of that which exists, that great catastrophes seldom or never happen slowly. Every month gained would be a month for energetic recruiting in the depths of Asia. If Russia listened to the offer and stated her terms, she would have shown her hand ; and if she did not listen, then England, in her position of intermediary, would be more or less irritated and disposed to make common cause with Turkey. The same ideas probably induced the Turkophile members of the Cabinet to welcome the project, which, again, it would be difficult even for those who desire the benefit of the world, and not of Turkey, heartily to resist. A mere announcement that Turkey would treat, could injure no one, while the reception of that announcement might yield important political informa- tion. The announcement was therefore made, in a despatch quite unobjectionable in form, unless Lord Augustus Loftus, who on the Eastern Question is altogether upon the Turkish side, accentuated its meaning. The experienced Russian Chancellor had expected the situation, and made, according to nearly unanimous accounts, precisely the reply which was to be expected from his mouth. If the Turkish Government desired peace, its Generals in the field must first of all request an armistice. That armistice would be granted, of course upon conditions, if the bases of a desirable peace had pre- viously been accepted. This is one at least of the regular courses, if not the regular course, followed in great wars, and was adhered to so late as 1870, in the negotiations between M. There and Prince Bismarck. It rests, therefore, as it rested before, with Turkey to decide whether she wants peace, and whether, wanting it, she is ready to make for its sake the sacrifices necessary to secure it. No good whatever has been obtained by this action of the British Government, but only this amount of harm has been done, that every show of friend- liness towards Turkey is interpreted in the capital as proof of readiness to come to Turkey's assistance. That is a great evil, but it may, in the present position of parties and in face of the Tory desire that the war should end, have been almost unavoidable. The notion that England has sustained a rebuff at the hands of Russia, or as the Telegraph tries so hard to prove, an insult, is almost silly. Unless every step of the affair has been misrepresented, this country did not appear at St. Petersburg in any character as mediator or ally of Turkey, or enemy of Russia, but simply as a peaceful bystander, willing to smooth the way for the approaches between the com- batants necessary to stop war. And the Russian Govern- ment, in its reply, neither rebuked the British Government nor resisted it, but gave the plain and straightforward answer that if Turkey wanted peace she must ask for it direct, and acknowledge first of all that she had been beaten in the field. What less the Russian Government—which, be it remembered, is always obliged to consult the feeling of its Army—could have done to annoy England, or even Turkey, in its answer, we are unable to imagine. Was it expected to be sincerely grateful to Turkey for allowing it to leave off fight- ing? It might, no doubt, have formulated its terms of peace, if anxious to do so ; but it was not anxious to do so until con- vinced that Turkey was not only ready for peace—which of course any Power, even the Ottoman, is always ready for— but ready to offer satisfactory terms. At present, not only is there no evidence of this, but there is strong diplomatic evi- dence telling the other way. Prince Gortschakoff does not forget, though English journalists do, that Turkey has within a fortnight offered terms of peace, and that her statesmen's.
notion of a " base " is the last proposal of the Conference, with. a guarantee,—a base which is absolutely preposterous. The- Russian Army would say, and say with justice, that it had lost one-fourth of its best men in order to secure an end which when secured, was absolutely worthless,—in order, in fact,. that Bulgaria might have a decent but entirely power- less police force maintained out of her own taxes. Before she can grant an armistice, which will be used to move up troops from every corner of Asia and sweep all remaining healthy Mussulmans into the ranks, Russia must be sure that the Sultan and his Government are in a very different frame of mind. from this, and very different, too, from the one in which the. Grand Vizier was when, on December 30, he held his inter- view with the agent of the Telegraph. Throughout that inter- view he was urging British intervention, and expressing his resolution to grant no concessions, declaring even that his. Government intended to make Batoum a free port and grant the Russians " privileges " there,—a remark which, if seriously meant, shows either an utter inability to realise the facts of the situation, or a resolution to continue the war to the bitter end. It is a refusal in advance to grant the one thing that Russia is certain to - demand. The Russian Court has no information before it that the Porte is willing to cede any- thing, or give any material guarantee for its good-faith when the armistice expires ; and until it has, proposals to negotiate- are meaningless, and can only be rejected, even although the- messenger by whom they are conveyed is an important person, whom it is essential not to offend.
The Government has not yet spoken as to these negotiations, and probably will not now speak until Parliament has assembled ; but its friends are speak- ing everywhere, and we confess we find it difficult to under- stand their speech. They say in one breath that the Govern- ment of Russia is very cunning and very treacherous, and in the next that it has in its reply intentionally insulted and. humiliated Great Britain. In other words, they say that a very clever and very unscrupulous Government, while engaged. in a very great undertaking, is anxious to provoke the only enemy who can render that undertaking nugatory, so anxious indeed, that it offers provocations entirely unnecessary for the pleasure of offering them. Russia, it is asserted, insults Great Britain in order that Great Britain may be sore, and disposed to assist Russia's enemies. That is trash surely, if political trash was ever written. It is opposed to. the common expe- perience of mankind, to the whole course of Russian diplomacy, and to the common-sense which dictates to every statesman that with a great war on hand, the fewer new enemies he makes the better. The effort to represent Russia's demand that Turkey should submit before she negotiates as an insult to Great Britain is, in fact, nothing but an effort to rouse Englishmen by taunts to engage in war,—the effort of a duellist to make men fight who have no grievance against each other, but one of whom the duellist hopes will be wounded, if not mortally, at least sufficiently, in the contest.. These writers all affirm, without a shadow of proof, that Russia hates England, and that the main object of her diplo- macy is to lower English reputation. Why should Russia hate England, any more than any one Power hates any other? We hate Russia because we imagine that she wants India, but why, if she wants India, should she hate us for possessing it Does the burglar want to kick the gentleman because the gentleman owns plates It is pure folly, or rather it is a new evidence of the old delusion which always blinds those who hate as to the actuating motives of those who are hated. And finally, will these writers explain why from their point of view they all want peace just now, and peace with as little " injury ". to the Ottomans as may be ? We should have thought that from their locus standi, which is that no nation ought under any circumstances to think of anything but its own interests, a patched-up peace would have been the last thing they would wish for. Such a peace would leave Russia suzerain of Turkey, but without responsibility for her action. The Russian Ambassador would be the real Sovereign in Con- stantinople. The Sultan, visibly beaten, with his best army destroyed, with his Mussulman subjects worn out with useless sacrifices, with his best supporters, the true Ottomans, angry at the peace, and his Christian subjects more embittered than ever, with his treasury so empty that unbearable taxa- tion will seem a necessity, and with the recollection that the Western Powers gave him no aid, can do nothing but accept his orders from St. Petersburg, and forget his independence in a new sense of security. He will be able and willing to open .the Dardanelles to one Power only, and that Power Russia ; able and willing to aid Russian projects in Persia ; able and willing to worry England, if bidden, about the Suez Canal. We should have said that was the very worst termination of the war of which the devotees of English interests could even conceive, yet this, the patching-up of a peace which will reinvigorate nothing, but leave Turkey a vassal State, is what they evidently and indeed openly desire. There is but one possible explanation of such folly, and that is the one which they all resent, namely, that they support Turkey for Turkey's sake ; that they prefer the brave, barbaric Mahommedan Power to any Christian successor it could have ; and are at heart sore and irritated that Asiatic rule should terminate in the last corner of Europe of which it keeps possession. Like their leader, they prefer Bagdad to Islington, a preference which, the welfare of humanity once set aside as of no importance, is perfectly intelligible. Only then they should not be so loud about the " Baish interests " which, if peace is patched up now, are certain to be sacrificed.
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