THE LIBERAL LEADERS AND THE WAR.
MR. FORSTER is to speak to-night at Bradford, and Sir William Harcourt is to speak next week at Oxford, and we hope that others of the Liberal leaders will make an occa- sion for declaring their views deliberately and clearly on a crisis which is probably by far the most important through which the country has passed for twenty years. We see with great regret that Lord Carnarvon's important reply to the deputa- tion which waited on him on Wednesday has induced some of the local leaders of the Liberal party to postpone or discard - their purpose of calling together the supporters of the policy of strict neutrality,—on the ground that while the Government can speak as it spoke by Lord Carnarvon there is no danger to avert. This is a great mistake. In the first place, every one knows that there are two parties in the Cabinet, and that nothing is more important than to strengthen the hands of the party favourable to neutrality. In the next place, Lord Carnarvon's speech,—even if it fairly and adequately represented the policy of the whole Cabinet,—does not touch many of the points on which it is now most important that the leaders of the Liberal party should tell the country gravely and unmistakably the policy they intend to support. It is high time to define more clearly the points so ambiguously touched on in Mr. Cross's speech of last year respecting the English interests which we will not allow Russia to injure. And on two of these points especially,—the policy of this country in relation to the opening of the Dardanelles, and its policy in relation to the possession of Constantinople,—the country ought to insist on knowing the real mind of those of its leaders who are not bound by official obligations to the neces- sary and wholesome reticence of Ministers responsible for the English nation.
We say it is too late now for men like Lord Hartington, or Mr. Forster, or Sir William Harcourt to content themselves with declaring that they are for a policy of provisional neu- trality, and that they do not see any reason to apprehend an emergency requiring us to break through neutrality. That might be well enough eight or nine months ago, but we want more now. Every one knows that there is a party in this country— loud, not large,—which day after day shrieks out that our interests imperatively require of us to keep the Dardanelles closed against the Russian Navy, and Constantinople safe in the hands of the Turks. And now, with discussions as to the terms of peace daily going on, with General Gourko across the Balkans, and Sofia, as far as can be judged, in imminent danger, with the British Government playing the part of go- between, and asking Russia what she intends to demand from Turkey as the conditions of peace, it is high time that all those who do not wish to see the country drifted into war should define their views, and say precisely what they mean, and what they do not mean, on the subject of the Dardanelles and Constantinople. We desire to hear the leaders of the Liberal party declare, in so many words, that so far from being willing to go to war in order to keep the Dardanelles closed against the Russian Navy, they would see the Straits opened to the Russian, as to every navy, with as little concern as the Straits of Gibraltar, and that they will resist with their whole might every attempt to drive us into war for the purpose of enforcing any longer this restriction on Russia. We desire also to hear from them precisely what they think right in relation to Constantinople,—whether they would or would not recommend the nation to fight for the purpose of preventing it from falling into Russia's hands,—whether they would or would not think Turkish hands any less dangerous to the interests of this country than Russian hands, in case a treaty of peace should be concluded between Russia and Turkey which left Turkey practically under Russian in- fluence ; whether they would or would not be satisfied to see Constantinople in the hands of Greece, or made a free city,—or finally, whether the fate of Constantinople would affect them at all, or if so, in what way, whether as making it necessary for England to take a strong naval station in the Mediterranean, like Mitylene, or as rendering it essential that we should secure at once our position in Egypt. We think that the statesmen who are now not in office, are bound to make up their mind on these matters at once, and to try to guide the public by expressing their mind. Of Mr. Forster we know at least this much, that he would gladly see Constantinople in the hands of Greece, and that is more than we know of any other of the Liberal leaders. But we do not know whether Mr. Forster thinks that war on the part of England would be justified in order to prevent any conceivable destiny of Constantinople, and if so, what destiny. Nor do we know how far he would go in opposing any diplomatic action on our part intended to debar Russia from virtually breaking up the Turkish Empire, and recovering her own freedom of egress from the Black Sea.
The real danger is this,—that a great many Liberals who have hitherto been strongly opposed to a pro-Turkish policy, spear with favour of Lord Derby's reserved points, and talk of a "moderately British" policy as one which they would support. Now nothing can be more dangerous than such vague language, especially in relation to reserves most vaguely indicated by both Lord Derby and Mr. Cross. What is a " moderately British " policy to mean ? Is it to mean that if Russia advances at all beyond Adrianople—if she proposes to herself to dictate the terms of peace from Constantinople—this country would go to war on behalf of Turkey ? If it is to mean as much as that, we do not hesitate to say that a "moderately British " policy is a bad policy, a policy mischievous to the future of Eastern Europe, to the moral influence of Great Britain, and to the solid and permanent solution of the question which has most interest for us in relation to our Indian Empire,—how best to secure our communica- tions with India. Certainly they will not be secured by keeping Turkey at Constantinople as a vassal of Russia, any more than by allowing Russia herself to keep Constantinople. Probably they can be secured only by some step which shall give us a firm hold on Egypt, whether that be the occupation of Egypt itself,—the wisest and boldest step,—or the occupation of some adequate Naval station from which the Suez Canal could be effectually protected. And moreover, if a " moderately British " policy requires us to forbid any advance of Russia beyond Adrianople, then a moderately British policy is at least violent enough to plunge us suddenly into a most dangerous war, for which we are not in the least prepared, for it is quite on the cards that Russia may think it essential to dictate a peace this time from Constantinople, rather than from Adrianople, and this without any intention at all of retaining Constantinople as her own,—a policy for which, as we believe, she is not prepared, indeed one which she has every reason, at present at least, to avoid. It is the extreme vagueness and expansibility of this " moderately British " policy, the unde- fined meaning which attaches to it, the ease with which it may be interpreted to mean either a most sensational and danger- ous policy, or no policy worth the name, that makes it so essential that our leaders who are free from any official obligations should discuss plainly the points which it may or may not cover, and get much nearer to the essence of the matter than either Lord Derby or Mr. Cross has, publicly at least, ever got hitherto. A "moderately British" policy may mean war for the closing of the Dardanelles, or war for the prohibition of any Russian advance beyond Adrianople, and we maintain that in either case it would mean a war of a most dangerous, costly, and exhausting kind, for an object not need- ful, and very far indeed from being imperative on us or even in itself salutary. We quite admit, and have always admitted, that to secure our route to India by the Suez Canal is not only incumbent on us, but essential to us, and we should not call it a " moderately British " policy to take any step necessary for that purpose, but a thoroughly British policy, and yet one by which none of the European Powers need be alarmed, and which would produce in Egypt a change relatively far more- beneficial than our Indian Empire has itself produced in India. But as for any of the other points included in what is called a moderately British policy, we have no faith'-in them at all, and strongly believe that to risk war in support of them would be to risk a portentous wrong to Europe, and a great national sin.
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