THE POSSIBLE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA. T HE Transvaal was not
annexed a moment too soon. The defeats suffered by the Boers from Secocceni have obviously inflamed the imagination of all the natives of South Africa, and the Cape and Natal are menaced by entire tribes who have procured good arms, who are restless with ambition and discontent, and who may think because some Boers and half-breeds ran away that their hour has arrived. The Secre- tary for the Colonies admits that the situation is most grave, and we do not feel certain that it is not even graver than he believes. It is not the movement of the Galekas, Gaikas, Pondos, and other tribes between the Cape and Natal, which alarm us so much as the temper shown by the great Zulu Chief who rules the people north of the latter colony. The people of the Cape, assisted as they will be by the despatch of her Majesty's 90th Regiment, by the heavy pay offered to volunteers—Cs. a day—and by the energy of Sir Bartle Frere, will be able, we do not doubt, to give a good account of any force which may threaten them in Kaffraria. But the Zulu King, as Lord Carnarvon, in his frank and courageous speech of Wednesday, told the deputa- tion of Colonists, has 40,000 warriors at his command, has reduced them to some rough discipline, and is well supplied with rifles and other firearms, and it is not certain that he is not moved by a dangerous ambition of conquest. He claims just now only a border territory, but it is doubtful if we can assign him that, and still more doubtful if he is not making this claim a mere excuse for an incursion into Natal or the Transvaal. Our territories there lie at his mercy, and even should Sir T. Shep- stone contrive to overawe him for the moment, that is not a state of affairs which can be permanently endured. It is in- dispensable, if we are to hold these two fine provinces, that settlement should not be checked by fear of barbarian invasion ; and how security is to be obtained without troops and fortified posts, and above all, light artillery, we altogether fail to see. A single illustration will give our readers a clear idea of the endless difficulty of the task. The Zulus are at least as brave and as well armed as the American Indians; they are, for fighting purposes, twice as numerous, and with their allies, or possible allies in Kaffraria, they occupy at least as defensible a country. Yet the Government of Washington is compelled to employ 15,000 regulars in keeping the Indian frontier quiet, while if South Africa can easily dispose of 2,500 men, Regulars and Volunteers, it is as much as it can do. It seems to us almost indispensable to send another regiment at once to Natal, and even when that is done, decided steps ought to be taken to organise a permanent measure of military defence.
The experience of India and America shows that there are but two measures which in circumstances of this kind ever permanently succeed. One of these is to disarm the dangerous tribes, and this, in the existing circumstances of the Cape seems nearly impossible. We might by great exertions disarm the Kaffirs, but that is only half the work to be performed. The Zulus are independent, they will sacrifice anything for arms, and the port nearest to them does not belong to us, but to the Portuguese. The temptation to foreign traders to sell arms is almost irrestible, and there is no time to bring pressure to bear at Lisbon, even if a Treaty,—which we greatly doubt,— would secure the object. The other expedient is to strengthen the one force which natives, however brave, cannot face, which they cannot procure, and which, if they could procure it, they could not effectively use. Artillery is the true weapon of civilisation. A light battery is worth a regiment, and does not cost a quarter as much, or use up a tenth of the men. We cannot see why in such an emergency two or three batteries of the lightest kind, such as are employed on the Indian frontier, should not be despatched at once from Kurra- chee to Natal, to serve as a model for the force which ulti- mately the South African Dominion must consent to keep there. Two steamers would convey them there in six weeks, and they would be absolutely invaluable. If the Cape will not bear the expense, then we must; and we do not know how the Empire could do its share of military defence better than in providing the scientific aid which cannot be improvised, and cannot be readily manufactured by a colony. With all that Lord Carnarvon says of Sir Bartle Frere we heartily agree. He is not a good financier, and he has the Indian confidence in the ability of his pen to supple- ment every deficiency ; but he is resolute to obstinacy, he is thoroughly accustomed to frontier troubles, and he has the true Indian energy, which knows nothing about distances, difficulties, or compromises. But no man, however qualified, can charge an army alone, and we do not see in any direction the force which is to enable him to smash two or three up- risings at once, which is the immediate apprehension. The country need not be afraid either of great or of protracted ex- pense. The minerals in the Transvaal will soon bring a popu- lation before which all apprehension from natives will disappear, but for the moment there is, we greatly fear, a necessity for just so much speedy, energetic, armed precaution as will stop a war. That Lord Carnarvon is thoroughly awake his speech conclusively shows, but we dread the excessive optimism of a British Government in dealing with dark races. If Cetewayo is going to stockade himself, on our territory or his own, all is well, for we have time to act ; but if he is going to move, there should be light artillery and plenty of it at hand. And we object to leave the decision of that doubt to Cetewayo himself.
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