. Relative Absolutes Foresight and Understanding. By Stephen Toulmin. (Hutchinson,
18s.) WHAT is science for? With great success Stephen Toulmin has failed to answer the intended ques- tion of his book, based on a series of lectures given at Indiana University in 1960. His failure is brilliant and assures him his place as an historian of science, as the 'failures' of Galileo and Newton assured them permanent fame as scientists. This success of failure is in a sense the theme of the book, for the author is throughout at pains to emphasise that the scien- tific image of other ages formed by the in- tellectual spectacles of our own age is not a clear one. For him the results of the objective techniques of science are governed by the 'pre- determined notions' of the intellectual clime. Indeed, his final sentence concludes that the ex- planatory techniques of science must be accept- able—for the time being at any rate—as 'absolute' and 'pleasing to the mind.' That science should depend on such a vague variable as pleaSantness to the mind is the fascination of this book, and Dr. Toulmin, with great dexterity and precision, turns this fascination into com- pelling argument.
Starting with the aim of finding a single property characteristic of the whole of science, the author begins by examining the supposition that the purpose of science is to predict. Fore- warned of the impossibility of finding a com- mon aim and purpose to all sports, we are not surprised that his search proves unsuccessful. Even so, in this chapter his arguments become difficult to follow and rather tedious. Probably this is inevitable in detailed analysis of word- meanings, probably it is intended that we should emerge with a great deal of negative knowledge of prediction; nevertheless, it is a relief to arrive at the meat of the book—the examination of 'ideas of natural order.'
'Derivations,' anomalies' and 'irregularities' are so much a part of modern scientific jargon that it is easy to forget that they mark off events which can be described as phenomena from those which are not. These latter are our ideas of natural order: the fact that we recognise an event to be a deviation means that we recog- nise a regular course of events from which it deviates—a course, that is, pleasing to the mind and undemanding of further explanation. For Aristotle, the most natural form of motion was absolute rest; for Galileo, it as motion in a circle; and for Newton, rectilinear motion. This is only one of the intriguing sets of examples provided to illustrate ideas of natural order.
The author manages to put over the idea that the conclusions of any age were not only logical, but also often the only possible ones. For in- stance, Aristotle is presented as being the kind of man unlikely to speculate about impossible notions such as the case of unopposed motion. Understandably, therefore, he formulated a law which applied to all the motions known on the earth. It was left to Newton to speculate on the impossible and imaginary case of unrestricted movement—a speculation, as it turned out, which was 'to have far more important implica- tions, but one not necessarily immediately sug- gested by observation. Just as interesting is the pattern traced in the other sciences—the studies of alchemy, biology, physiology, genetics and chemistry have all affected each other to varying degrees. Where once chemistry was explained by physiological change, now physiological change is explained by chemistry; where once cooking was compared to ripening, now ripening would be compared to cooking. For those com- mitted exclusively to the methods of science, these ideas of transience may well cause one or two uneasy rumblings of the philosophical stomach.
Dr. Toulmin is right up to date in calling his ; last chapter 'The Evolution of Scientific Ideas.' In the past year Darwinian parallels have been drawn between such things as bodily organs and religions, and it seems that the once all- explanatory cry 'It's psychological' may shortly be replaced by a similar but superior 'It's evolu- tionary.' The evolutionary analogy is being pursued far too enthusiastically—in the present book to the extent of showing the parts which natural selection and chance mutation have played in the evolution of scientific thought for one would rather have been left to think ot the fundamental ideas of science as being in a constant state of flux—an idea of natural order quite sufficiently pleasing to the mind. But this the author will not allow : he insists firmly on illustrating most of the details of the evolutionary analogy, though he frequently points to theories long since discarded which have subsequently been brought again to positions of importance —hardly a characteristic of biological evolution.
But it is not this last chapter by which the book must be valued, for in it the author records his failure to answer the question he started out to answer. Its merit lies rather in the manner in which this failure is realised. It would be a pity to miss the fascinating picture of the changing concepts of science—all made to look plausible and laudable—which the book pro- vides.
ROBIN CLARKE
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