The destruction of the president
The war in Vietnam has entered a new, critical and alarmingly dangerous phase. It began some time after the failure of the series of efforts in the new year—the short truces, the extension of the bombing pause, Mr Kosygin's talks in London—to get negotiations going. Somewhere along the line the fragile system, of communications between Washington and Hanoi broke down. The publication of the Johnson-Ho letters, in which the two men were revealed to be as far apart as ever, can now, in fact, be seen as the moment when hope of early negotiations was finally abandoned.
But if the situation is now more serious, it is also more starkly simple. American policy stands clear. It is to continue to pile on the military pressure, in both North and South, until the South Vietnamese elect a president in September. One by one the list of hitherto forbidden targets in North Vietnam. is being reduced Now it is the bombing of Viet- namese airfields, next perhaps the mining of Ifaiphong harbour. As the Americans shed their inhibitions, actions previously regarded as out of the- question become real possibili- ties. The crossing of the demilitarised zone, invasion of the North itself, the bombing of supply routes within China can no longer be dismissed as the wild talk of Republican hawks. For there is a kind of inescapable logic in American policy; the enemy must be punished until he capitulates; if he fails to capitulate, the punishment must increase.
To what end? The Americans. say it is to encourage the South Vietnamese, to work towards the holding of free erections which will be held up as a triumph of American policy. ft is diflicult to see how.
Few would doubt that the elections will see an impressive turnout—they will be herd, after aff, in daytime when the Vietcong are not operating; and the Vietnamese will he conducted to the poll S in special trucks by 'reliable' village headmen. It is better in these circumstances to vote than not. And the im- position of a facsimile of American dem- cracy might conceivably convince a few- waverers at home that America is stilf, d'espite• the. napalm, on the. side of the angels.
Yet the elected president will have no power. He wilt still be absolutely dependent On the American presence for his survival. The only way indeed he could make a posi- tion for himself would be to reach his own settlement with the- Vietcong, and the only result of that would be to make nonsense of American policy.
Nor is the holding of elections likely to have any inffuence on the Vietcong them- selves, nor an Hanoi. Both have successfully resisted the American stick; they are unlikely to fall for what will appear to them, and to many others besides, no more than an ex- pensive exercise in public relations. In real terms the Americans will be left at the end of September in exactly the same position as they were before. Only they will have ex- hausted &number of their options. There will be fewer targets left untouched. The alterna- tives then will be even more stark than they are now; either they risk full-scale engage- ment with China, and perhaps Russia as well, or they find some way of getting out.
On the other side the options open to Hanoi remain constant, if they have not actually increased. The recent signing of an accord between the Russians and Chinese to allow Soviet supplies to pass freely over Chinese territory was a North Vietnamese triumph. They have won their argument that it is more important for the Russians and Chinese to resist the Americans than to quar- rel among themselves. Their supplies are now assured; if the Americans wish to attack them they will have to attack China itself. And. if this happens, fears of a Chinese counter- action must become very real.
Ninth Vietnam stilt has a large standing army. much- of which is still not yet involved in the war. It could be used, and the Chinese could help, to make more trouble all over South-East Asia. In the past two years, for instance, Laos has remained strangely quiet, yet it would take- very little effort by the North Vietnamese to. step up the fighting there and thus divert America from her action. in Vietnam. Since the Americans stilt have by no means enough troops to pacify South Vietnam, the chances are that they would he totally overwhelmed if the- fighting spread etsewhere. It is hard to pin the whole responsibility for this situation on President Johnson. The germs of the- situation were inherited, and the dift-turna of the. President now is real What is he to- do? Perhaps for him there is no way out : either he abandons the struggle or he steps it up: either would lead to his political destruction.
That is why the document on the war pub- lished this week by members of the Repub- lican. party is so- impoitant. If the Johnson administration is too cominitted to be able to contemplate the admission of failure, hope must conic from elsewhere. The Republican white paper, with its frank realisation that victory in Vietnam is out of the- question-, be- gins to provide it. More and more it' rooks' as if it will require a new administration to change policy. Thus the really important date on the Vietnam calendar is that of the Ameri- can. electiowe in November 1.96h and the hest hope for peace a Republican victory.
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