The struggle for Iran's soul
Edward Mortimer
Ever since the Iranian revolution triumphed on 11 February a desperate struggle for its soul has been going on. That was foreseeable, and generally foreseen. But the battle lines have not been quite those which were busily being drawn in the first week after the insurrection. I reported then from Teheran on the surprising breadth of support for the Marxist Fedayin-i Khalq and their campaign against the newly installed Bazargan government, which they accused of applying a brake to the revolution and even stoking up the counterrevolution by trying to preserve the old armed forces. They even believed at that time that they could use the name of Khomeini. the 'anti-imperialist' symbol of the revolution, to undermine the authority of the government which he had appointed on his return.
It is now clear that the left at that time had both overestimated its own strength and wrongly identified the main source of danger. By mid-March it had swung round to give grudging support to Bazargan in his struggle to impose a civilised, liberal course on the revolution, against the Muslim fundamentalist extremists who had emerged as the main coercive power and who were acting in the name, and with at least the tacit approval, of Khomeini.
So the battle has not been between a dynamic, pushing left and a group of moderates driven to rely on the support of right-wing Muslims and recuperable elements of the old armed forces. It has been between an integralist Muslim interpretation of the revolution and a liberalprogressive interpretation. The former is implacable towards the officials and luminaries of the old regime, intolerant of any values or institutions derived from non-Muslim sources, and draws its strength from the fervent, simplistic piety of the uneducated Shi'i masses. The latter is rooted in the professional and technocratic class which also played an essential role in the revolution and whose co-operation is still very much needed for the reconstruction of the economy and the state. For this school of thought the revolution is above all political and social, whether its aims are expressed in religious terms or not. In the name of Islam it demands national independence, individual freedom and social justice, rather than the strict imposition of a formal and anachronistic Islamic jurisprude nce.
The line of division between these two schools does not correspond to that between government and opposition, or even between Yes-voters and abstainers in the 30 March referendum on the Islamic republic. Such open divisions reflect differences of tactics or emphasis, not fundamental disagreement. The true division clearly runs within the government, and even within the religious leadership. The leaders of the liberal camp within the regime, as at present constituted, are Bazargan and Ayatollah Taleghani. The leaders of the Muslim integralist camp include Ibrahim Yazdi, whose recent transfer from the post of 'deputy prime minister for revolutionary affairs' to that of foreign minister is generally seen as a demotion, and therefore a victory for the liberals; Ayatollah Beheshti, leader of the 'Islamic Republican Party'; Sadegh Ghotbrzadeh, director of the radio and television; and probably Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, who was Khomeini's economic adviser and is now said to be in command of the Mujahidin-i Islam, a Muslim paramilitary organisation which is being gradually integrated into the regular police force. (These should not be confused with the Mujahidin-i Khalq, a Muslim guerrilla movement of leftist sympathies which is now finding itself pushed into alliance with the non-Muslim Fedayin.) Yazdi, Ghotbrzadeh and Bani-Sadr are at first sight surprising leaders for a Muslim fundamentalist movement, since they all spent long periods of exile in the West and became known as leading advisers to Khomeini only during his stay in France. Inevitably their opponents suspect that their Muslim convictions are mixed with a strong dose of political opportunism (by no means an unknown mixture in other Muslim countries). Nor is anyone quite sure how far they are faithful spokesmen for Khomeini or how far they are manipulating him to promote their own policies and careers. All the evidence suggests that Khomeini's own interpretation of Islam is indeed a fundamentalist one, and his political writings while in exile were quite unashamedly theocratic. In the last two months a number of his public statements have given clear encouragement to the Muslim extremists. Yet he has not allowed Bazargan to resign, and has been willing to call a halt to some of the Muslim excesses when Bazargan has directly appealed to him. His personal respect for Bazargan is evidently genuine, and perhaps reflects a certain instinctive sense, contrary to his proclaimed views, that there are areas of modern government for which no recipe is to be found in the Koran or the example of the early Caliphate and whose workings he himself does not fully grasp. The hope, or the illusion, persists that he is somehow more liberal than he is made to appear and that he can be brought to dissociate himself from the 'reactionary forces' surrounding him. Meanwhile one has to suppose that within the religious movement the liberals are fairly heavily outnumbered. Their Main support lies outside it. There is the National Front, whose leader, Dr Karim Sanjabi, has now relieved his supporters of considerable embarrassment by resigning as foreign minister. The Front is still represented within the government by Daryush Foruhar, minister of employment, and Assadollah Mobasheri, who as minister of justice fights a losing battle against the ever-encroaching canon lawyers. (Khomeini himself is above all an expert in, and upholder of, the Holy Law.) But Sanjabi 's resignation clearly marks the end of its close alliance with the religious movement and its assumption of the role of champion of secu lar liberal ideals, which most of its supporters cherish. Sanjabi has let it be known he intends to run for president of the republic, if and when an election is held. (It is still not clear whether the proposed constitution will first be subject to revision by a constituent assembly, as the liberals would like, or submitted directly to the people by referen dum, as Yazdi and his party would prefer.) Sanjabi would have no chance of beating the candidate of the religious movement — at present still expected to be Bazargan — but his candidature would provide a rallying-point for the opposition to show its strength.
Further to the left is the National Democratic Front led by Hedayat Matindaftari. the Young, British-educated lawyer who led the campaign to expose human rights violations III the last two years of the Shah's rule. Matindaftari is a grandson of Mosadegh, and formed his movement in March at a time when the old National Front seemed either unable or unwilling to stand up for its founder's ideals against the growing Muslim tyranny. The NDF reflects the views of much of the younger intelligentsia,. and the difference between it and the NF is essentially one of generation. The young men and women of the NDF are contemptuous of the 'tired old men' who lead the NF, but would Probably swing behind Sanjabi in the presidential election if it comes to that.
Another group with a very important stake in the success of the liberals is Iran's ethnic minorities: not so much the TurkishsPeaking Azerbaijanis, who are themselves %IN and apparently well integrated into the religious movement, but the Turkmens of the north-east, Baluchis of the south-east, Arabs of the south-west, and above all the Kurds. The events of the past two months have shown that the mainstream of the religious movement has little sympathy for or understanding of the aspirations of these minorities, .and is quite prepared to combine with what is left of the old forces against them. Only Taleghani seems to have understood that for them the revolution is above all an opportunity to assert their right to cultural and administrative autonomy, and that if it satisfies these aspirations it has a chance to integrate them durably into the nation. He it was who negotiated a temporary settlement in March with the Kurds of Sanandaj, and proclaimed its applicability in principle to all the national minorities. But much of his good work has since been undone by the fighting in Western Azerbaijan, where the army went to the assistance of Shii Turks attacking Sunni Kurds, and drove the latter out of their villages towards the Iraqi frontier.
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