The undeclared war

Timothy Garton Ash

Managua is a city without maps. spent hours on my first day there, cruising in a dilapidated Buick through the fantastic earthquaked wasteland of the city, searching for a map. At the airport there were none. And at the Intercontinental. At the Tourist Office they said 'we may have some next month', The Esso petrol station: `Try Shell'. Shell: 'Try Esso'. 'Mapa, mapa!' my driver forlornly cried. Finally, two miles out of town, we hit gold with Texaco: a small, out-of-date tourist map with pre-revolutionary names — Puerto Somoza not Puerto Sandino — and a sketch of the capital.

Then I discovered why nobody in Managua bothers with maps. The streets have no signs and they are in a different place anyway. Addresses are given thus: 'In the Los Robles district, five hundred metres up the hill from the new supermarket', or `the large white house two blocks east of Esso', or, best of all, 'on the corner where the little tree was'.

So it is with the Nicaraguan revolution. If you go there with a prepared map — a Washington map, a Moscow map, a Cuban map or a Texaco map — you are sure to get lost. 'You are confused?' a bright young Nicaraguan asked me a week later. `Ah, then you begin to understand.' It is not that the Sandinistas themselves have no maps rather that they have several, but none ex- actly fits. So they are making things up as they go along.

I was taken to the Sandinistas' public relations showpiece, a 'Face the People' session, in which Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega and a team of ministers Faced the People of one of Managua's shanty suburbs — the barrios — at dusk, under television arc-lights. There was no doubting Ortega's popularity amongst those who turned up. He was mobbed by little children. Ques- tions were taken from anyone who raised his hand, and although one woman wondered aloud 'whether I should say these things ... I'm afraid of being put in prison', most were quite outspoken about the shortages of food and water. They com- plained at length about one particular old woman who got up at dawn, illegally pur- chased sacks of food from the local `Popular Store', and sold it for a huge pro- fit in the 'Oriental Market' (where you can buy anything, at a price). Ortega, who, with his tousled hair and stylish combat uniform, is the Parisian student's dream of a Latin American guerrilla, took notes throughout. At the end he answered the questions point by point — this Ministry will study the suggestion of putting in a new traffic light, that committee should plant a brake of trees against the choking dry season dust. Coming to the Old Woman Issue he asked, rather desperately, 'What do you think of that woman who runs the Popular Store?' It was somehow touching — but what a way to run a country!

The Nicaraguan revolution is a genuine revolution, not a pseudo-revolution impos- ed by a foreign power — as in eastern Europe. The overthrow of Somoza in 1979 was experienced by the vast majority of Nicaraguans as a national liberation, and the Sandinistas' first slogan is still Patria fibre o morir — a free country or die. No one I talked to in Nicaragua was prepared to deny that things are better than in Somoza's last years — although the opposi-. tion argue that things are potentially worse.

The Nicaraguan peasant is in a better position than his Salvadoran counterpart. The Salvadoran campesino is still liable, any day, anywhere, to be tortured or murdered by the security forces — in or out of uniform. The Nicaraguan is not. Im- prisoned, perhaps, but not killed. That is progress. Proportionately more Nicaraguan campesinos have acquired a stake in the land through land reform (although to be fair El Salvador suffers from an unique overpopulation problem), and their cooperatives are generally working less bad- ly than the Salvadoran ones. All progress is relative. There is no Salvadoran equivalent to the Sandinistas' impressive national health programme. In these matters of life and death 'totalitarian' Nicaragua is cur- rently better than 'free' Salvador — and would be better still if the US stopped wag- ing an undeclared war against it. The pro- portion of the population who can now read and write in Nicaragua is nearly double that in El Salvador. I have before me an American one cent stamp which says 'The Ability To Write. A Root Of Democracy'.

When I consider these achievements I can find only one word for President Reagan's assertion that 'The Sandinista revolution turned out to be just an exchange of one set of autocratic rulers for another, and the people still have no freedom, no democratic rights and more poverty.' The word is humbug.

However, other revolutions have begun with great leaps forward, with the fulfil- ment of basic social and economic needs, with a tremendous sense of recovered digni- ty and freedom, with infectious youthful elan. In fact most revolutions do — and degenerate into tyranny. One of the most depressing sights in all Nicaragua is that of the bright-eyed young idealists from Europe and North America who, like Sartre in Cuba, like the Webbs in Soviet Russia, believe they have found the New Jerusalem. `You know the commandantes (of the The Spectator 5 May 1984 Revolution) send their wives and children to be educated in the United States so they can come back and serve the revolution better, one told me. What is to prevent the San- dinista revolution thus degenerating? Are there any new forms of democratic control in the Sandinista system, as opposed to existing socialist systems? The Sandinistas claim that their revolu" tion is distinguished by 'non-alignment, mixed economy and pluralism'. The last is perhaps the most important, being the nlY effective guarantee of the first two. It is also their least convincing claim. To be sure, there is a plurality of political parties. Some of them are represented in the Council of State and some even in government. After the November elections they may emerge in a stronger position to criticise the regime 011, individual policies. But if you ask the vita' Power question — Lenin's question: who holds power over whom? — then the answer is: the Sandinistas, over everyone else. The arms and security forces, for ex- ample, are answerable to nobody except the FSLN (the Sandinista National Liberation Front). All the most important decisionsf are taken by the nine `Commandantes ° the Revolution' in the National Directorate of the FSLN. This is still a collective leader; ship — but a collective leadership is n°. pluralism. At the moment their Power severely circumscribed by Nicaragua s, economic straits and their own lack 01 trained cadres. But in the political system 3 which they are trying to build I can find T1 institutional mechanisms for the dev°1tv tion, separation or transfer of powers' They claim that they have trade un" pluralism. It is true that there are a nurrib.dee of trade unions, and that in the country t they play a fairly independent role. But he least one independent trade union, l Christian CTN, has been quite systematica, IwyhpoewrsaescudteetdainIedtaflokrefdoutor rnaoCars waetdivalytsets of that incommunicando) under the `S?. _ of Emergency' imposed in 1982 (and still In force). He was accused of Ideologie_ai e 3 diversionism'. When foreign visitors ITI CA to to the prison, he said, 'We were asked play volleyball, while the visitors took asked

pictures ... '. Moreover, when askt; Commandante Tomas Borge, two or three most powerful members of the National Directorate, about trade lirl!..ua pluralism he replied that the bourge0!",,I.

only finds it necessary to have one organol',

I, The to represent their interests, so why tion (the private enterprise confederau

the working class have one of employers demand 'trade uniomn°frre:ednjilii'' he said, but this is a manoeuvre aimed:rt. 'dividing the working class'. It was n0_,5 da prise to learn that Sandinista Pr°Pagrents condemned Solidarity in Poland as ae, . it ,d of imperialism — and then cornPa`" top wfreitehdothme. of to CTN. So much for trade tin They claim that there is freedom Jeri, nperewsssp. apBeurt, Lthaeproennesareally indePeri"

th.t

daily new' average 20 per cent of tethllesirYdial n - coverage is censored. The Sandinistas say this censorship is necessary to protect sen- sitive military information. But La Prensa shows you photocopies of censored pieces: a report on a Church-State conflict over a Christian school, and an attack by a turbo (a Sandinista-organised 'spontaneous' mob) on the headmaster, a story about the misuse of expropriated land, photographs of the Salvadoran elections. Vital military Information ...? Moreover, most Nicaraguans get their news from the radio, and. only a few Sandinista-approved radio stations are allowed to compile their own new. s bulletins. The Catholic radio station, which would be an alternative source of news, and opposition views, is punitively censored. So much for freedom of the Press.

They claim that their own mass organisa-

tins trade union, women's movement, Sandinista Youth, and 'Sandinista Defence Committees' — provide a new kind of par- ticipatory democracy. The mass organisa- tons 'are not sheep', Borg& told me. In a short visit such claims are very difficult to test. There is a Sandinista Defence Commit- tee. (CDS) (modelled on the Cuban Corn- nutte for the Defence of the Revolution) for i almost every residential block, and one is toled they vary greatly. I can only report that th borough meeting of CDSs which I at- tecnd,ed M Managua reminded me horribly I.,— me mass organisation meetings which I gave attended in eastern Europe. In front of the Socialist Realist murals, the FSLN the laid down the Party line for slowly month. Then the local CDS chairman ,t3w1Y dictated 'tasks' for the week. Only men, after an hour and a half, could people ,13.11t a word in from the floor. Their sugges- pns were noted, but all the orders came democratic above. This looked to me like _1?etriocratic Centralism' as Lenin conceiv- e:1i it. In the barrios of Managua, several der People deplored the CDSs as organs t`.)0 Police and Party control. 'To get a job, , get a licence, for everything you need a letter from the CDS ... If you want a tooth elt,.;,,d You have to get permission from the Others praised the CDS for local vigil works: preventing crime by mustering sagdantes round the clock, improving sorlitation, organising polio vaccination and se forth. Chilling praise came from frventeen-year-old who had just returned fin', two months fighting the contras in the he'tto. The CDS 'works in the community', tit enthused, 'so the enemy can be detected 'DO by block'.

I,Must repeat that the Nicaraguan system allis still more open, responsive, provisional s d iMProvisatory than any I have seen in a a°tcialist country. Those maps don't fit. But oh the moment I cannot see any internal terms and balances which, in the longer thr:19 might prevent this revolution going

Way ° all previous socialist revolutions:

sl30 n t • ay

degenerating into bureaucracy,

T,ip_enness into secrecy, idealism into self- oterest emancipation into oppression. '"as Borge justly observes that 'construc-

ting a new state is like erecting a new struc- ture on the ruins of an old building which has been struck by a cataclysm. In Nicaragua we have to change everything down to our very mental concepts, since (under Somoza) this was a country ruled by indifference, corruption and selfishness.' But unless they build democracy into the foundations, those old habits will return like rising damp. Faced with this criticism, the Sandinistas' friends fall back on human nature. Look at the selfless idealism and honesty of these people, they exclaim. Where else in Latin America do you find that? But God knows human nature is no guarantee. What suc- cessful revolutionary in history has not, sooner or later, succumbed to the corrup- tion of absolute power?

This pessimistic analysis might seem to be contradicted by the conciliatory and 'liberalising' moves of recent months and the announcement of elections for 4 November this year. But the contradiction is only apparent. Given the forms of polit- cal control — through the mass organisa- tions and mass media — which I have men- tioned, and given the disarray of the op- position parties, the Sandinistas are taking no great risk by bringing forward the elec- tions. When 1 asked one shopkeeper if there would be election campaigning in her barrio, she said, '1 expect the CDS will organise some campaigning.' (Comrade Ortega, you play the Liberal!) My guess is

that the Nicaraguan elections will be about as technically free and fair as the Salvadoran elections — and as irrelevant.

Furthermore, everything which I heard in Managua suggested that the elections were brought forward mainly in response to ex- ternal rather than internal pressures. The turning-point seems to have been a Euro- pean tour by Tomas Borge, whose mind was apparently changed by the urging of West European governments and the Socialist International. In our interview, Borge admitted this advice had been a 'fac- tor'. The Contadora group and other Latin American elections have also pressed for early elections. And then, perhaps US pressure also helped? .Perhaps the invasion of Grenada frightened the wits out of them?

Every discussion about Nicaragua becomes a discussion of US policy. You try to examine the Sandinista revolution for itself, but the Yanqui factor is inescapable. Last year nearly one thousand Nicaraguans were killed by the contras operating from Honduran and Costa Rican territory, financed, armed and often trained by the CIA. War damage in 1983 may have cost as much as 20-25 per cent of Nicaragua's hard currency earnings, which anyway barely ex- ceed this year's debt service obligations. The Reagan administration has squeezed the credit lines as hard as it can, and impos- ed a virtual economic blockade.

What is the Reagan administration trying

to do? What has it achieved? What should it be doing? I received some very clear answers to these questions in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Sitting in the centre of Managua, just a few hundred yards from the seat of government, a leader of the con- servative opposition told me: `The Americans have no alternative but to throw the Sandinistas lintel !,the sea. The San- dinistas' project is not "socialism in one country" but "socialism in one region" ', he explained, and there will be no peace in central America until they are overthrown. Sitting by the poolside in a discreet San Salvador club, an American-educated Salvadoran businessman agreed. When I objected that this might be difficult for the United States to justify, he said: 'The CIA will have to fabricate a reason.'

In Washington I found no such clarity. Can the United States live with a Marxist- Leninist government in Nicaragua? I asked senior officials. Oh yes, they replied, so long as it isn't Marxist-Leninist. The mines which the CIA laid outside Nicaragua's har- bours, and which have exploded on Capitol Hill, are also an expression of this confu- sion about what the administration is trying to achieve by political pressure, economic blockade and undeclared war. Seemingly prepared neither to overthrow the San- dinista government nor to live with it, the US ends up with the worst of both worlds.

The undeclared war is morally indefensi- ble. When even Senator Barry Goldwater describes what the United States does as 'an act violating international law . an act of war' there really can be no doubt. By precipitately withdrawing its conduct in central America from the judg- ment of the World Court, the United States appears to plead 'guilty' in advance. Many of the rank-and-file contras are former members of Somoza's notorious National Guard. Fine soldiers for Democracy. If the United States had itself consistently pressed for democracy, pluralism and respect for the rule of law in Nicaragua, then it might have some historic right in the war. But in fact for almost half a century it has sup- ported a revoltingly brutal and corrupt dic- tatorship — on Roosevelt's principle that `he may be a sonofabitch, but at least he's our sonofabitch'. Most important, this undeclared war violates the principles of na- tional sovereignty and self-determination which the United States claims always to uphold. A foreign policy is truly democratic when it respects the wishes of the majority in the nation conducting the policy and in the nation which is its object. The fact that the majority of Grenadans welcomed the Marines is central to any democratic justification of that invasion. I have no doubt whatsoever that the majority of Nicaraguans deplore the United States' undeclared war against their country.

Now Mr David Watt has recently sug- gested in the Times that a moral defence of the kind advanced by Mrs Jeane Kirkpatrick need not be adopted by wiser Europeans. Instead we should say 'Yes, it is wrong, but it is necessary — the end justifies the means'. But is it, and does it? US officials list four main 'ends' of their policy towards Nicaragua: externally, the Sandinistas are to be persuaded to cut their ties with the Soviet Union and to stop sup- porting 'subversion and terrorism abroad' (i.e. Salvadoran guerrillas); internally, to reverse their military build-up, and to move towards pluralism, free elections, respect for human rights etc.

On the two internal points, the undeclared war is not merely ineffective it is counter-productive. Naturally enough, in response to increased contra aggression the Sandinistas have increased, not reduc- ed, the militarisation of their country. The war, far from encouraging 'liberalisation', has brought in its train more suspensions of civil liberties, more censorship, more repression — all 'legalised' by a 'State of Emergency' introduced when the contras blew up two major bridges in early 1982. It is possible that the Sandinistas would have done these things anyway — but the war has furnished them with a most plausible justification. Insofar as the National Direc- torate is still divided between Leninists like Borg& (who have a clear idea what they want to do) and advocates of a 'Third Way' like Daniel Ortega (who have a rather vague idea what they want to do) the war has given arguments to the Leninists.

If the war was meant to erode the San- dinistas' support, it has strengthened it. If it was meant to destabilise, it has stabilised. True, the Sandinistas' support is stronger in the countryside, where peasants have gain- ed land, than in the towns, whose in- habitants bear the full brunt of shortages and rationing. But the Sandinista represen- tative at the CDS meetings says, 'We have no beans — no powdered milk — no toothpaste — and all this is the fault of the US government'. Their support is stronger among the young than among the old. But two thirds of the nation is under twenty- five, and youth haS been swept along in the patriotic fervour which Reagan is helping the Sandinistas to sustain. By keeping their professional army in reserve, and sending raw recruits to be killed on the frontier the Sandinistas have made it a people's war. Uncle Sam would have been the bogeyman anyway — the Sandinista hymn describes the `Yanquins 'the enemy of humanity' —

As for the external factors: clearly the United States has a legitimate and vital security interest in preventing a Soviet military build-up in Nicaragua. So far the Soviet commitment to Nicaragua has been cautious — disturbingly so, for some Sall: dinistas. When Defence Minister Numb Ortega rashly suggested that SS-20s ring' be stationed in Nicaragua, the Soviet any bassador in Washington hastened to deg)! that there was any such proposal. But thei Soviets are obviously delighted that Centro' America has become such a nuisance for the United States, and (at least while their own relations with Washington are P°°r' are happy to send ammunition to El 13111,:e (Nicaragua's Altantic port) to keen t'ci foreign fires burning. Yet it can be argue that here, too, the undeclared war 5 counter-productive: the greater the presttr from the contras the more the Sandinistas ne9d Soviet and Cuban arms, and the Ill? ri dependent they become. But I do not thla that the Sandinistas want that depertcler,,eef

,i Independence is what they have fighting for.

But aren't they trying to 'export' tf,11rq revolution, specifically to El Salvador Their support for the Salvadoran guerrillas is certainly explicit and passionate. TheY f historic allies: Farabundo Marti, the FM °tit the Salvadoran guerrillas' FMLN, f°1•1,1 with Sandino against the Americans ha' EI century ago. 'If Nicaragua w°11',..-ps Salvador will win,' they chant at the in meetings. FMLN leaders are based Managua. The Sandinistas would obviouspit be delighted to have a friendly goverrulle4 up the isthmus. But Nicaragua's direct r",, in supporting the Salvadoran guerrillas

greatly exaggerated in ashington., In W a

Salvador I asked an American officer ulof position to know, what evidence he 1.1, Nicaraguan arms supplies to the `I've been worrying about that since 19''ce. he said — but he still had no hard evidell,s In fact, the FMLN probably get more aro'm from the United States than they d° frtbis Nicaragua. The military answer t° in Nicaraguan 'export', such as it is, lies °Iirlcal Honduras and El Salvador; the 13.,. answer, in San Salvador and Washingtolthe ,is If the export of arms is contained, w there left to export? 'Our example': ocl- oh cyat Sandinistas. Is this what the Reagaa edy ministration fears? When John F. Ku.iltive launched the last great American initia,,`,0_ grfoersscenintra1916Art:heericsaai,dthe Alliance for r`

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... our unfulfilled task Is that demonstrate to the entire world for man's unsatisfied aspiration economic progress and social justiclg best be achieved by free men wo.m;0., Asvtiitthnittitnraisframework of democratic eAndd i n23 Eyears l s alaterSalvador, dntrh, the and i Hs soon little tut rl ea 5 _at iriscit Guatemala, that the United States Terit, fear the 'example' of this bunch of staa.,,u? guerrillas and their hotch-porch revolutw