BOOKS.

THE LANDING OF JIILITIS ersi.n.• Mn. LEwm has produced an interesting little volume entitled The Invasion of Britain by Julius Cesar. Projected as a lecture to be read before a literary society in Sussex, but soon found from the minuteness of detail which it involved to be little suited to a general audience, the author has submitted the result of his labour to the judgment of the public. The Essay is in part a discussion, and in part a descriptive narrative ; the first relating to the Passage, the second to the Campaigns and general operations in Britain of the "most complete character of all antiquity." Various hypotheses have been formed as to the port from which Caesar's expedition sailed. "From the Rhine to the Seine there is scarcely a harbour or roadstead," remarks Mr. Lewin, "which has not at some time or other had its zealous advocates." Eleven publications are enumerated in favour of Boulogne ; five in favour of Wissant ; the same number of Calais ; two of Etaples ; one of Mardick ; and one of Authie. The theory adopted by Mr. Lewin is that the port from which Caesar sailed was Boulogne ; the place of debarcation Lympne, near Hythe. This theory he opposes to that of the Astronomer Royal, originally published in the Atheneum for 1851, March 29, and defended in that of September 10 of the current year. Professor Airy maintains that Caesar set sail from the estuary of the Somme and landed at Pevensey. The opposition theories are briefly characterized as that of the Bou- logne-Lympne, and that of the St. Valery-Pevensey passage. Mr.

Lewin unreservedly accepts the Astronomer Royal's demonstra- tion of the impossibility of Caesar's having landed at Deal. To this extent they are agreed ; and thus one popular port of debarcation may be regarded as with good reason eliminated from the list.

From the hypothesis that Caesar sailed from the estuary of the Somme Mr. Lewin dissents toto ccelo. The Professor's error lies, he thinks, in an unlucky interpretation of some passages in the Commentaries, which we subjoin.

1. Ipse cum omnibus copiis in Morinos proficiscitur quod inde erat brevis- simus in Britanniam transfectus. B. G. lib. iv. 21.

2. Dam in his locis Caesar navium parendarum cause moratur, ex Inagua parte Morinornm ad eum legati venerunt. B. G. lib. iv. 22.

3. Atque omnes ad Portum limm convenire jubet quo ex portu commodissi- mum in Britanniam transjectum ease cognorerat, circitermillium passuum xxx a continenti. B. G. v. 11.

The " ipse in Morinos proficiscitur" in the first of these passages the Astronomer Royal contends, means " Caesar sets out for the Morini "; but he thinks that Caesar never entered their country; that the port of embarkation was not " within their borders "; though he suggests as a saving hypothesis the supposition of the Morini in the time of Caesar stretching south-west of the Somme. Mr. Lewin, on the other hand, contends that " ipse in Morinos proficiscitur" means "Caesar goes to the Morini"; and holds that the port from which he sailed was within their territory, and that it could only be Boulogne. We quite agree with Professor Airy that the primary and usual meaning of " proficiscor " is " I set out," and that it permits us to suppose that Caesar did not enter the country of the Morini. In the second passage Mr. Lewin con- cludes from the words " dum in his locis Caesar moratur" that Caesar had evidently arrived in the country of the Morini. To us his arrival is far from evident. The expression appears, as Profes- sor Airy remarks, studiedly indefinite ; and we think with him is rendered in English with perfect precision, " While Caesar was (is) in this part of the country." The reception of the dele- gates, too, who came from the Morini, may be so understood as to favour the Professor's view ; while the order given by Caesar, on his second return, for a legion to march from the Portus Itius into the country of the Morini, seems only compatible with the supposition that Caesar was not in their country. In the third citation Mr. Lewin and the Astronomer Royal are again at variance. The latter maintains that the " ex porta commodissimum transjectum," and the " cerciter minium passuum xxx a conti- nenti," refer to two things,—one to the traverse from Portus Itius; the other to the distance of Britain from the Continent generally ; while the former considers them both to apply to Portus Itius. Now the construction of the sentence is certainly peculiar ; and the opinion that it originally terminated at " cognoverat," and that the rest was an interlineation; is more than plausible. Airy's notion that if Caesar had intended to refer doubly to the same thing the words "a continenti" would not have been written de- serves consideration. Professor Anthon, in his edition of the Commentaries, without either endorsing or rejecting the inter- pretation supported by Mr. Lewin, in a note on " a continenti," explains the disputed passage thus :—" From the continent of Gaul to the island of Great Britain, or as we would say, from land to land."

On exegetical grounds, then, we think Airy's hypothesis per- fectly admissible. It is not inconsistent with the historical data.

But Mr. Lewin has other objections to this hypothesis. The dis▪ tance of the Somme to Pevensey is fifty-two nautical, or sixty statute miles ; whereas Caesar declares the distance from the Continent to Britain to be about thirty miles. His opponent replies that Caesar's measure was only an eye-estimation, and adds: "Before the triangulation of the year 1787, it was a fair and insoluble question whether the distance from the Continent

• The Invasion of Britain by Julius arsar. By Thomas Lewin, Esq., of Trin. Coll., Cam., M.A. Author of " The Life of St. Paul." Published by Longman and Co.

to Britain was less than twenty or greater than forty miles." On the other hand, Dion states the distance from Gaul to Britain to

be fifty miles, which more nearly accords with the known distance of the Somme from Pevensey. To Mr. Lewin's objecting interro- gation how it could happen that the Britons expected the landing at Pevensey ? the Professor replies that Pevensey is known now, and probably was known many generations before Caesar's time, as the weakest point in the whole circuit of Britain. The question, Is it not strange and unaccountable that Caesar should

have landed in the heart of the dense forest of .Anderida ? is met by the counter question, Is it not also strange and unaccountable that William of Normandy should have landed in the heart of the dense forest of Anderida ? Again, " Mr. Lewin thinks it a capital objection to the landing at Pevensey that the chieftains of Kent, instead of Sussex, were directed to attack the naval camp." But " the reason for calling on the men of Kent instead of those of Sussex is obvious : the greater part of Sussex was occupied by the Andred forest, and the population of Kent was probably many times as numerous as that of Sussex." Thus much for the con- troversy on the St. Valery-Pevensey hypothesis. That of the Boulogne-Lympne passage, which Mr. Lewin opposes to it, must now be briefly noticed. There are, argues this gentleman, four principal reasons in its favour. 1. The evidence of Caesar that he sailed from a port in the country of the Morini, only Boulogne in that country fulfilling the required local conditions ; 2. That the distinguishing mark of the Portus Itius, that it was thirty miles from the shores of Britain, is also a distinctive attribute of Bou- logne, which is thirty miles from Folkestone ; 3. That in the haven of Ambleteuse, eight miles from Boulogne, we find the port in which Caesar's transports were detained by contrary winds, eight miles from Portus Itius ; 4. The circumstance of Napoleon's selection of Boulogne for his port of embarkation is a strong argu- ment for referring Caesar's expedition to the same spot. As regards the historical evidence we have already shown why we consider Mr. Lewin's interpretation of Caesar's words as unestablished ; and

not only unestablished, but even contravened by the order respecting the distribution of the troops on the second return of the Roman invaders to Gaul. The argument drawn from cor- respondence of distance has been shown to be inconclusive, as regards Boulogne and Folkestone ; while if the Astronomer Royal's measurement be correct, the distance between the centre of the entrance to Boulogne and the centre of the entrance to Ambleteuse, instead of eight, is not quite five and a half Roman miles. There seems no force in the argument drawn from Napoleon's selection, for with him, as Airy remarks, everything depended on the quickness, that is, shortness of the passage. With Caesar any moderate delay was unimportant. Neither is it likely that Caesar followed the usual and frequented track. "This is not the manner of attempting debarcation on a country possessed by an enemy." It seems more probable that Caesar took the same course as the Norman invaders, who sailed from the mouth of the Somme, and debarked on the beach of Pevensey. The ports on the mouth of the Somme and that of the Authie may very well renre- present. the Portus Itius and Portus Superior of Caesar. Topo- graphically the strong point in favour of Mr. Lewin's hypothesis is the express statement of Caesar that he set out with the inten- tion of sailing from a port in the country of the Morini, and that his abandonment of that intention, if abandoned it was, as Mr. Airy maintains, is not recorded or accounted for. His weak point lies in the impossibility of proving that Caesar actually executed his purpose. The Professor's hypothesis, on the other hand, has no such topographical testimony in its favour, but Caesar's order relating to the distribution of the forces, while it negatively fortifies his own view, seems to us to militate against the view of his opponent. For to say that when Caesar was at Boulogne in the country of the Morini, he sent a legion into the country of the Morini, is very like saying that when Cromwell was at Worcester he sent a battalion into Worcestershire. In- dependently, however, of this portion of the historical evidence, and supposing it to be equally inconclusive on both aides, the value of the rival hypotheses must be estimated by their greater or less general probability, and by their correspondence, or want of cor- respondence, with the other historical and local data.

The second part of Mr. Lewin's little volume furnishes an ani- mated and picturesque account of Caesar's Campaigns in Britain, with a sketch of the island and its inhabitants, such as Caesar himself found them. Britain, observes our author, was at this time unquestionably occupied by two very different races, the Beige and the Celiac, the Southerns and the Northerns. The Celtic were, perhaps, but little elevated above the condition of

barbarians. Caesar describes them as clad in skins, and sup- porting themselves from cattle rather than from tillage," and Mr. Lewin refers to an oak coffin of a Celtic chieftain in the mu- seum at Scarborough containing "a skeleton more than six feet in stature, which had been wrapt in the hairy skin of some animal," and had arrow heads of flint at the side, as a genuine relic of the earliest inhabitants of our island, when still in a savage state. The Belgse, on the other hand, "had attained to a very considerable degree of civilization." The population was dense ; in literary attainments the Britons were in advance of the Gauls ; a partial trade had existed from very remote times between Britain and more distant nations ; the commercial inter- course between our island and Gaul was extensive ; the country had been cleared of its forests and was under the plough ; some mechanical skill too must have been attained, for after his defeat Cassivelaunus still retained about him four thousand war chariots ; and when Caesar " made war upon the Veneti to the west of Gaul, the Britons sent a fleet of ships to their assistance." The first invasion of Caesar was rewarded " with none of the usual fruits of victory—no territory, no tribute, no booty. Dion remarks that he got nothing by the campaign but the barren honour of having landed in the island." In the following year, B.C. 54, Caesar al- leging that the greater part of the hostages promised by the Britons had not been sent, and " stimulated to the enterprise by the solicitations of an exiled British Prince," a second time in- vaded Britain. The British army was almost entirely dispersed. Caesar marched to the northern bank of the Thames.

" Cassivelaun, meanwhile, at the head of his 4000 charioteers, watched from day to day the Roman line of march, and when he was least expected, sallied forth from the wood and fell upon their rear, or intercepted their stragglers.. . . By whatever route Caesar moved, the country was de- populated : stores were carried off, and the cattle driven into the woods. . . . If the cavalry went out to forage, they returned in diminished numbers, and if they remained with the legions, the army wanted support."

Mr. Lewin is of opinion that Caesar's cavalry were beaten by the British charioteers. The very name of " essedum," or war-car, now became a bugbear to the Roman troops. Cicero, writing to a young lawyer who had failed at the bar, and who, recommended by him to Caesar's notice in Britain, had lost heart and remained in Gaul, banteringly observes,- " Had you gone to Britain, you would have been the best lawyer in all the island. But (to have my joke as you invite me) you seem in the camp to be less forward than inthe forum. You who were so fond of swimming, had you no stomach for swimming on the ocean ? You who were so cun- ning of fence, could you not face the essedarii ?" (charioteers.)

Closing round the doomed capital of Cassivelaun, with its freedom of space, its trees and pastures, " Caesar dividing his army into two bodies, delivered the assault at two different points." The Britons were driven from the city. The fortunes of Cassivelaun fell. Overtures for peace were made, Mr. Lewin thinks at Caesar's intimation. The British Prince agreed to give hostages for his good faith, and Britain was nominally to pay a fixed annual tribute. The Britons, however, retained their freedom, and did not become tributaries of Rome. Caesar, as our author shows from Tacitus, rather made the discovery than the conquest of Britain. Our stout progenitors contrived to hold their own even against that consummate general. Still, while in- dulging the honest pride of ancestry inspired by the prowess of our "rude forefathers," we must allow to the "bald first Caesar" the merit of having first carried the Roman army thither beyond the civilized world,—of having shown the road to conquest to his more fortunate successors. That great man formed the first link in the chain of action by which Britain was ultimately brought within the circle of the world's noblest military Empire.