TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE SITUATION DT SOUTH AFRICA.
WE refuse now, as absolutely as we refused in the dark days of Colenso and Spion Kop, to take a pessi- mistic view of the ultimate result of the war, and we cannot but feel a sense of contempt for a great deal of the newspaper hysterics because we lose a few hundred men anfrget the worst of it in this or that petty skirmish. Those who indulge in gloomy forebodings because of this or that unfavourable episode would be much better engaged in insisting that the commands at home should be placed in the hands of competent soldiers, and never in the hands of the incompetent, be the excuses for the breaking such a rule never so great. The war, we know, can only have one end, because the British people are absolutely determined to see it through, even if they have to spend another £100,000,000, to lose another ten thousand men, and to go on with it for another two years. If the Boers like to Make an Inferno of South Africa for another two years, we are quite prepared to meet them. If they and their friends think that we shall get weary of the war before they do, or that we shall give in because business people will put pressure on the Government to stop the war in the interests of trade, or that for any other reason we shall recoil from the disagreeableness of the last and hardest pull on the rope, they are utterly mistaken. The British people—we do not mean the restless and excitable people of the London clubs and a but the real British people—will not be moved a hair's breadth by any fears as to injury to trade or by the loss of blood or treasure. The whole financial and business world might put on all the pressure at its disposal without in the least affecting the result. We do not mean, of course, that the business world is in the least likely to do any such thing, for business men are not less patriotic than other men ; but even granted that the hopes which Pro-Boers rest upon them were true, the effect would be nothing. Punch has once again rightly expressed the will of the nation in making John Bull's one demand to be that he shall be told what more he can do, and what more sacrifices he can make to carry the war to a successful end. Never since the war began was the nation more confident of ultimate success, and more abso- lutely determined on fighting to a finish. If a prophet were to tell the nation that we must either give in at once or wage a twenty years' war, a twenty years' war it would be.
But though we condemn the feeling of pessimism shown in certain quarters, we by no means condemn the sense of irritation and annoyance that is felt in regard to the 'dragging of the war. The indignation at the want of pur- pose and tenacity which seems to exist in the conduct of hostilities is most wholesome, especially when it is directed against the want of mobility in our troops. It is very greatly to be desired that public opinion here should insist on greater vigour in the conduct of the war. Between such stimu- lating, even if angry, criticisms and helpless depression there is all the difference in the world. For ourselves, though we refuse to howl over the state of the nation and the war, and so encourage the enemy when just at their last gasp, for so, we believe, they in fact are, we realise that the time has come when the nation must insist upon the war being prosecuted with greater earnestness. That is the point upon which the energies of the whole Empire must be con- centrated, and the Government must be made to feel that no excuses will be accepted, and no pardon extended to any person, however high his station, who is not at this moment co-operating with all his might and all his strength in the work before us. But it is of little use to generalise and then leave the question. The problem is— what is the best way of securing the vigour and energy in the prosecution of the war which we all desire ? We note that most of the newspaper writers clamour for more men and regard reinforcements as the main thing needful. Now, we are not in the least against sending more men on the ground of expense, and would gladly press for the despatch of another thirty thousand if we thought they were needed. Again, we absolutely refuse to give any countenance to the statement that the men could not be got. In spite of the shocking mismanagement and waste displayed by the War Office in raising troops— they kept no register of the names and addresses of the thousands of good men who applied at the first enrolment but could not get taken because the corps were full—ana in spite of the stupidity shown in the matter of arrears of pay, we believe that a properly organised appeal would easily obtain thirty thousand men on the basis of a year's ment on the Yeomanry terms. The spirit of the country is as sound as ever. But we do not believe that what is wanted is more men. We have two hundred and fifty thousand men already in South Africa; and we gravely doubt whether there are not too many there rather than too few. What we believe to be wanted in South Africa is more brains, more grasp of the military situation, more intelligence, and more mobility, and not more men. we cannot believe that a general with a really compre- hensive mind would not have been able to use the quarter of a million men under his orders so as te beat down the Boer resistance. We do not wish to write anything harsh as regards General Kitchener, and we realise that in certain particulars in the pro- fession of arms he is unrivalled. He is a great astir/ organiser and a great driver of the military machine; can produce the material of war in men and things with superb success ; but we greatly doubt whether he has the kind of mind that enables him to use his material to the best advantage when he has to think in blocks of ten thousand square miles, and when his chessboard is half a continent. To put it specifically, we believe Lord Kitchener would be an almost perfect Commander-in- Chief at home, but we doubt whether he has the qualities that win success when he is cormannding in so vast a theatre of war as that in South Africa. There we need those qualities of imagination, of instinctive decision, of geographical eyesight—in a word, the higher political strategy—which belonged to Napoleon and belong to Lord Roberts. The lightning calculators tell us that they are not conscious of the multiplications and divisions which must go on in their brains, but that the answers seem to rush into their minds ready made. The great generals solve their strategic problems in some analogous way, and are able to grasp the strategic possibilities of a continent as an ordinary man can grasp those of a hillside. As long as Lord Roberts was in South Africa one felt that he had a comprehensive grasp of the whole geographical and military situation, and that nothing aimless and pur- poseless would ever be done. ' When Lord Roberts left South Africa we were told by the military quid- nuncs that it was high time he should be gone, that he was not the man for the job, that he was too old and too amiable and without sufficient energy, and that what was wanted was a stern, hard man, who would take an iron grasp of the situation and hold all South Africa in the hollow of his hand. Now we do not deny for a moment that Lord Kitchener has done excellent work, and that he has shown great energy ; but can it be said that he has shown a really comprehensive grasp of the situation as a whole and of it strategic possibilities ? On the contrary, it seems to us that he has never had. such a hold, and has simply trusted to hard hammer-strokes to beat down the Boers. We do not say that this is not a possible, way of doing the job, and if you have only a hammer-man you must use him and his methods, as the Americans were obliged to do in the ease of General Grant; but we do assert that it is not the best way, and we do not believe it would have been Lord Roberts's way. At any rate, from the moment Lord Roberts left South Africa we seemed to lose our strategic grasp of the country, and this though Lord Kitchener as been absolutely unfettered in the exercise of his authority, has had the whole military and civil services at his disposal, and. has been stippled from home with everything he asked for without dint or complaint. He has been nearly a year at his task, rand it is hardly an exaggeration to say that he has accomplished nothing except by means of the process of attrition. True, he has done a very great deal by this means—we do not deny it for a moment—and has brought the war much nearer a close, but his successes have been due solely to hard pounding. That strategy which is a form of statesmanship, which helped General Lee so greatly, and belongs, as we believe, to Lord Roberts, has not given Lord Kitchener a single success. Strangely enough, too, Lord Kitchener, strong man as he is, has not even been able ta insist upon real mobility in his columns. The despatch published this, week shows that our so-called mobile columns have been trekking with every sort of impedimenta. We hear of furniture, kitchen ranges, pianos, and harmoniums being dragged about by the men who are supposed to be "riding down" De Wet. And here we may remark that it would have been very much more to the point if Lord Kitchener, instead of giving the caricaturists so good a peg for their work, as he did by publishing his General Order, had sent home one or two highly placed officers for permitting such things in their columns. If Lord Kitchener had disgraced the Brigadier of every column which had been made immobile by carrying any of the impedimenta just mentioned, he would have done an immense deal for the mobility of his armies. Every one from general to private would have realised that the Commander-in-Chief meant business, and did not intend that mobility should be regarded as a sort of natural quality belonging to the Boers and not to be hoped for in their opponents. There would have been nothing unfair in doing this with- out warning, for no general could possibly say that he thought a kitchen range the kind of thing which is generally taken when a brigade moves "light." We are not so foolish as to think that we have a right to say how the functions of the Secretary of State for War ought to be exercised, nor do we claim to have any exact knowledge of the military situation in South Africa. [That is never revealed in the telegrams, possibly because no one either there or here has any general and compre- hensive idea of the real state of things.] We shall, there- fore, refrain from urging directly and specifically on the Government the conclusions which arise from what we have just written. This, however, need not prevent us stating them hypothetically. If we had the power to take action, as has the Secretary of State for War, and if we were able to know that the facts are what they seem, we should appeal to Lord Roberts—and no appeal to Lord Roberts made on • the ground of patriotism ever has or ever can fail—to go back to South Africa for six months in order to establish our South African strategy on a sound basis. At the same time, Lord Kitchener should either return to England to take up the post of Acting Commander-in-Chief pending Lord Roberts's return, or else should, act under him once again in South Africa as Chief of the Staif. Whether this course of action would be agreeable to all the persons concerned we neither blow nor care. The only question we should care to ask is whether it would be for the good of the country. If it would be, it would be worth while sacrificing the feelings and the amour propre of a wilder- ness of Lieutenant-Generals. The matter is too serious for personal feelings to enter into it even in the slightest degree. And in reality no stigma would be placed on Lord Kitchener. It having been found that he did not prove the most suitable tool for the purpose required, another would be employed. That Lord Roberts would be able to give us a better and more efficient system of strategy, and. that things would change with his appearance on the scene, as they changed in January, 1900, we do not doubt. If .Lord Roberts went out to finish the war he would, we believe, finish it, and finish it by making the best possible use of the material in hand.
But what chance is there of the present Government taking • any course that involves so much boldness and originality ? Unless the country should give them an un- mistakable hint, they are far more likely to do nothing, but to let things go on as they are. But even if they do, it will not be any the less the duty of the Spectator and of those who agree with us to continue to do all that we can to ensure that the war shall be pressed with vigour, and that all dream of compromise shall be rejected. If one sees a waggon stuck in the mud one tries to get the men who are in charge to use the best means of getting it out ; but if they cannot or will not change their methods of action one does not merely scream at them from the pavement, but does one's best to lend a hand. It is best that the waggon should be moved in the right way, and as quickly as possible, but it is better to move it in the wrong way, and after a delay, than not at all.
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