POLITICS
If Jehovah were an estate agent,
he would have been sued long ago
BRUCE ANDERSON
A group of us had come to the Middle East for a New Atlantic Initiative confer- ence. As one of our number, the Shadow Foreign Secretary Michael Howard, was quick to agree, it is easy to understand why the local Israelis are reluctant to see the Golan return to Syrian control. But, as Mr Howard pointed out, that approach is based on an outmoded concept of warfare and an outdated attitude to security. If the Syrians wanted to harass Ein Gev these days, they have no need to get within rifle range. It could be done by shells or rockets fired from miles away. The Israeli occupation of the Golan may make the citizens of Ein Gev feel better, but does it make them safer?
Although much of the conference was dominated by the region's well-rehearsed intransigences, there was one novel feature. Our proceedings took place in Amman and in Tel Aviv. This was the first time that sev- eral of the Jordanian and Israeli delegates had had such a sustained exposure to the other side's arguments; the first time, in some cases, when they had visited the other side's country. On both sides, there was plain-spoken courtesy, but also a profound impatience with the sterilities of the Arab- Israeli conflict.
This was most evident among the Jorda- nians. The Jordanian political and adminis- trative elite, recruited over many years by King Hussein and his brother, Crown Prince Hassan, is hugely impressive, and constantly frustrated. The frustrations arise from the very nature of Jordan: a small and poor country, at the mercy of external forces. Its governing class would be perfect- ly capable of running an advanced, prosper- ous, peaceful society; but that does not make it any easier to transform Jordan into one. Inevitably, they see Israeli intransi- gence as the major obstacle between them and a benign future. They have sincerely accepted the permanence of the state of Israel and are fully prepared to acknowl- edge Israel's legitimate security concerns. But they do not believe that Israel can base its security on indifference towards its neighbours; they argue that true security must mean peaceful coexistence.
The Israelis are equally frustrated. There have been great changes in Israel over recent years. The old Israeli Labour party ethos is dead. Gone are the days when Israel was ruled by open-necked dons who had become heavily subsidised fanners, deter- mined to create a command economy based on collective values. The Likud govern- ments have transformed the economy. Ben- jamin Netanyahu's enthusiasm for privati- sation out-Thatchers Thatcher, and these days, the Israeli stock exchange is dominated by high-tech companies, while the GDP is at Western European levels and only three per cent of it comes from American aid.
The Israelis also insist that there is a new diplomacy in the Middle East, and they are right, thanks to Turkey. The Turkish officer corps, that Ataturkist legacy which really determines policy, has always been pro- Israeli. This is partly because the Turkish elite has always rejected anything which might encourage the West to conflate Turkey with the Arabs, and partly because of Ataturkist suspicion of militant Islam. Now, and partly to compensate itself for repeated snubs from Europe, the Turks are looking eastwards, but they seek prepon- derance, not assimilation.
In broad terms, the Middle East is divid- ing itself into two teams. On the one side there is Turkey, Israel, Jordan, Azerbaijan and most of Soviet Central Asia, with the Americans as ultimate sponsors. This squad also includes Turkish Northern Cyprus, and has links with Bosnia and India. The other team is Syria, Iran, Sudan, Armenia and Pakistan, with links to Greece and Greek Cyprus, and to Russia. Iraq and Afghanis- tan would both be natural members of that quasi-pariah XI, but the Iranians regard them both with suspicion; there could easily be armed conflict between Iran and Afghanistan.
This is not a comprehensive list. Egypt and Saudi Arabia are both too weak domestically to have much of a foreign pol- icy, and in both cases, the leaderships are suffering from exhaustion. But this new configuration has practical consequences. Israeli pilots can now train in Anatolia, while the Turks cast covetous eyes on Israeli hardware, and the Turkish Prime Minister will shortly visit Israel.
All this has boosted Israeli self-confi- dence. Any visitor who assumes that Israel is friendless in the region and dependent on the Americans for day-to-day survival is quickly informed that he is many years out of date. Hence the Israelis' irritation with those who insist on dragging the conversa- tion back to the Palestinian question. But the Israelis are also overestimating their success in redrawing the diplomatic map. Turkey may be important to Israel; it is not Israel's neighbour.
The closest, most troublesome neighbour is, of course, the Palestinians, and one can- not help feeling that the Israeli's interest in wider diplomacy is in part a displacement activity. The Palestinians are not natural fundamentalists. Most of them would like to be farmers or traders, not fighters; if there was a state on the West Bank in which they could take pride, a new Pales- tinian civil society could gradually emerge. There would still be irredentists, some of whom would turn to terror, but there would also be an anti-terrorist majority.
But the present Israeli government is still reluctant to use the term 'Palestinian state'. It seems happy to consign Palestine's politi- cal destiny to Mr Arafat, who is imposing a corrupt and oppressive regime on his fellow countrymen. The Palestinian National Authority is not a state but a mere Bantus- tan — and an ill-run Bantustan at that. Under such auspices, Palestine will remain a terror-genic society; by choosing such methods of enforcing their security, the Israelis are condemming themselves to per- manent insecurity.
The Israelis live in a dangerous neigh- bourhood, but it has always been thus in the Promised Land. If Jehovah were an estate agent, he would have been sued long ago for issuing a wholly misleading descrip- tion of the property. The Israelis still have to live in it, however, and that means a modus vivendi with the Palestinians. There is no easy answer to the Palestinian ques- tion, but that is why the Israelis must tackle it, not duck it.
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