No doubt this announcement leaves a loophole for Parlia- ment
in the end to use the surplus neither for the Navy nor for the reduction of debt. This, we have no hesitation in saying, would be a grave dereliction of financial duty on the part of the Government. Considering, however, the very strong terms in which the Chancellor of the Exchequer spoke of the possible needs of the Navy, we are bound to assume that the money is earmarked for our naval needs, and that, if it is not required for those needs, it will be employed for its legitimate—nay, legal—purpose, the paying off of debt. Here we may note that the way in which the Chancellor of the Exchequer dealt with the supreme need for naval insurance was eminently satisfactory. " So much," he declared, " depends upon securing the actual inviolability of our shores that if we err I think we ought to err on the safe side." It has always been our opinion that this is the true way of considering naval expenditure. In ordinary matters if too little is spent on any particular department, the harm done can be put right. If, however, too little is spent on the Navy, and we find some day that our naval force is not sufficient to secure the command of the sea to protect us from invasion and ensure our food supplies, the ruin will be irreparable. The Empire must perish and go down in shame and misery. In these circumstances the benefit of the doubt must always be given on the side of naval security and of the error that can be made good rather than of the error from which there is no recovery. No wise man walks on the extreme edge of a parapet which may be rotten ; he walks in the middle and allows a margin of safety.
