The Maltese Maze
BY CHRISTOPHER HOLLIS IN many ways the most important speech in the Maltese debate in the House of Commons shortly before Easter was that of Mr. Robert Mellish. It is not necessary to go through again the all-too-familiar arguments for and against what has come a little oddly to be called integration. It may well be that the Round Table, the Government and Mr. Mintoff have all been a little too precipitate—or it may not be so. In any event all that is now past history. The present position is that the Britisli. Government and all British political parties are pledged to accept integration provided that the Maltese show themselves to want it at a new election. The round figures about Maltese opinion seem clear enough. At the last general election, when integration was the main but only one of the issues and when there was no clear statement of ecclesiastical opinion, 80 per cent. of the electorate voted; of those who voted 57 per cent. were for the Labour Party, which supported integration, 40 per cent. for the Nationalists and 3 per cent. for the Consti- tutional Progressives, who were against it. At the referendum both the Archbishop and the Nationalists advised abstention. As a result the total vote dropped from 80 per cent. to 60 per cent., and of those who voted 75 per cent. voted for integration and 25 per cent. against. The number who voted for Mr. Mintoff and integration at the general election and the number who voted for it at the referendum were almost exactly equal— on both occasions slightly less than half the electorate, count- ing in both opponents and abstainers.
Therefore it would seem inevitably to follow that the British Government could not possibly accept the referendum as an expression of the opinion in favour of integration of 'a sub- stantial majority.' They would have no right to admit the Maltese members to Westminster until the Maltese people had given a further verdict at a general election. On the other hand. the notable fact is that, in spite of the Archbishop's interven- tion, the votes for Mr. Mintoff at the general election and at the referendum were almost exactly the same. There would seem to be only two possible explanations of this. Either no supporter of integration paid any attention to the Archbishop's request that he refrain from voting; or integration was in itself so popular that every elector who out of deference to the Arch- bishop did not vote for it was balanced by another elector who Was normally a supporter of another party but gave his vote for integration. Of these the second is the more probable. From that it would seem to follow that, though prophecy is notori- ously rash, it is probable that integration will win at an election even if the ecclesiastical authorities are opposed to it, and almost certain that it will win with a substantial majority if the religious complication can be eliminated and the matter treated as a purely political one.
Therefore the British Government seems to have put itself into the position that, if the Archbishop should maintain his opposition and the proposal should nevertheless be carried at an election, it would be under an obligation of honour to put through the scheme even in face of his opposition. No one, I think, whatever his own religious opinions, would deny that that would be very undesirable, and should, if it possibly can, be avoided. Therefore it would be very much the best plan that the British Bill should contain a clause, as generously worded as possible, guaranteeing all the existing privileges of the Roman Catholic Church, and in return for such a clause the Archbishop should declare that the issue is now a purely poli- tical issue on which the Church has no occasion to take sides.
It can hardly be believed that the ecclesiastical authorities would not wish for such an arrangement. At the general elec- tion, when there was no ecclesiastical issue, 80 per cent. of the electorate voted. At the referendum, when both the Archbishop and the Nationalists called for abstention, 60 per cent. voted. Therefore it is clear that at the highest only one in five of the Archbishop's flock is willing to take directions from him on such a matter. Now, whatever anxieties there may be about the Personal religious faith of Mr. Mintoff and a few individuals, it is certain that the vast majority of those in Malta who vote Labour and vote for integration are pious practising Roman Catholics. On the other hand, they think—and on the whole rightly—that it was clerical interference twenty-five years ago, When the clergy used to ask penitents in the confessional whether they were going to vote for Strickland, which lost them their former constitution. Therefore they are particularly reluc- tant to accept clerical advice on how they should vote. If there should be an open issue between the Church and the new scheme of integration, no one can prophesy in what propor- tions those who now vote Labour would divide their loyalties. 13ut no one can doubt that some people who are now loyal 'Catholics would be lost to the Church and that we should get in Malta a condition of anti-clericalism similar to that in other Mediterranean countries. Therefore it is clearly to the interest of the Church to avoid such a conflict unless it should be necessary.
Now, what is it that Archbishop Gonzi wants, and what is he afraid of'? It is perfectly reasonable that he should want assur- ances that the traditional rights of the Church will not under integration be jeopardised by any action of the Imperial Parlia- ment. Had the Imperial Parliament wanted to impose anti- Catholic legislation on Malta at any time over the last hundred and fifty years, when Malta has had colonial status, there was never any legal obstacle to prevent it from doing so. The British Government promised to respect the rights of the Church a hundred and fifty years ago, and good sense and honour have caused it to keep its word. Nevertheless, it is reasonable for the ecclesiastical authorities to have a prudent anxiety about the future. But Mr. Mellish is. I am sure, quite right in saying that any controversies that there may be in the future about such matters as education in Malta will have to be fought out in Malta itself. It is one thing that the British Government should promise that it will not interfere with the relations of Church and State in Malta. It is quite another that it should give a promise that it will not at any future time permit any Maltese Government to interfere with such rela- tions. Happily there seems no constitutional way in which it could give such a promise. Under the British constitution Parliament is sovereign. Parliament can reserve to itself the control of education in Malta, or it can, as it proposes in this instance, specifically delegate that control to another body— the Maltese Parliament—but no Parliament under the British constitution can bind its successor to interfere so as to prevent the Maltese Parliament from exercising a power that has been delegated to it. It is indeed a happy thing that it is not practically possible for .the Imperial Parliament to guarantee the rights of the Church against the Maltese Parliament. For of all the sugges- tions that have been made this would surely in the long run be the most dangerous for the Church. It is quite reasonable for the Church to be concerned about anti-clericalism in Malta as elsewhere. Doubtless she can survive such attacks there as elsewhere if she keeps her own house in order. She would have a great deal more to fear if ever it were allowed to appear that the Church in Malta were maintained in her privileges by an external, non-Catholic organisation against the wishes of the Maltese people---;that the British Government was required to protect the Archbishop from his own people. That would be the fatal danger.
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