THE TURN OF THE SCREW
By STRATEGICUS
HE elimination of Mussolini is already beginning to wear the appearance . of history, and the sequel which was expected as not developed. It is this that provides the explanation of the esumed attacks by air and sea on the Italian mainland and the eneral offensive in Sicily. It would be wholly normal and reasonable or the new rulers of Italy to bargain for better terms if they had any substantial counters in their hands. In fact, all they can offer s to cease resistance and open the mainland to the Allies without further loss of men or time. As against this, however, they have full assurance that if they attempted to put the opposite policy into practice they would suffer more casualties than they inflicted and would see their countryside ruined. They have to face this prospect with the reflection that the Allies, who for the most part have had the bitter task of meeting the enemy mainly in the countries he has enslaved and of being compelled to add their destruction to his, would naturally prefer to transfer the destruction to enemy soil.
For the rulers of Italy, however, the choice may not seem so easy. Hider cannot defend the whole country and, indeed, he regards it merely as the outlying bastion of Germany ; but it is certain that he will not allow Italy to be thrown open entirely to the Allies as long as he can help it. It will be his desire to maintain some kind of glacis in advance of Reich territory and he may hope to do so, at least for the bulk of the campaigning season. In the event of capitulation, therefore, Italy may have to face a period of fighting in the north, since the Germans will there give battle to the Allies ; and the alternative is to fight it out throughout the country. The alternatives need not take quite this colour ; for it is ..not certain that the Germans could maintain themselves' very long. They have had little opportunity to move the numerous divisions which are said to be "flowing in," though every day's delay improves their chance to create suitable defensive dispositions. Neither reinforce- ment nor withdrawal of troops is very easy, and it is unlikely that they will even attempt to hold the line of the Po—the longest line that could be drawn—even if it were adopted to cover the door into France.
The mountainous barriers on the north and east may prove very useful defensive positions, and with, or without, some outlying defensive points they will be held with the greatest obstinacy. But that situation need not prove very onerous to the Italians. It is understood that they have had enough of war and wish to get out of it. At the worst, it is probable that at some points north of the Po the Germans would stand and fight, and as far as they can they would raid the country from the air. The one certainty is that this position will not be improved by delay, whatever the reason. The Italians have nothing to gain any more than the Allies, except, of course, to add a thin varnish of loyalty to a tarnished reputation.
It is because the position has become increasingly ambiguous, and in*pite of the common advantage of a speedy decision to the Allies as well as Italy, that General Eisenhower has resumed the offensive against the Italian mainland at the same time that the United States and Eighth Armies are attacking all along the line. The delay of over a fortnight before Catania has not been wasted. The general offensive could not be opened before the United States Army had completed its successful cleaning-up operation across the west and centre of the island, and the Germans had dug themselves into position which called for the use of artillery that could not be landed in the first phase of the campaign. This delay, however, has been one of the causes of the temnorising policy of Badoglio. The Germans have been attempting to persuade their dupes that even the small number of divisions they can afford can hold up the Allies indefinitely. General Alexander's Fifteenth Army Group is now sweeping away that illusion. Any attempt to describe the position is certain to be overtaken by the event. What we can at least make clear is the great difference beween the position between Catania and San Stefano and that through which Alexander broke in his great victory in Tunisia. Between the position in the Cape Bon peninsula and the north- eastern tip of Sicily there is a definite similarity, and fortunately the Sixth Armoured Division broke the enemy resistance before it had time to fall back on Cape Bon. The Catania position could only be held safely while the centre was maintained ; but, at the very beginning of the general offensive, the Allies began to move through Troina and Centuripe towards the communications between Catania and Randazzo. The centre was beginning to give way. I have pointed out earlier that the Catania position, south of Etna, is extremely strong, but the coastal road is not an easy route for withdrawal. When the road and railway that circle Etna are cut about Adrano the elements of a German disaster may begin to appear.
There is no Majerda valley here ; but there is the gap between the Etna position and the mountains to the west. Both the northern and southern coast roads are open to bombing from the air, and bombardment from the sea. The retreat inland will be almost as difficult once the roads are cut. If the prospects of a complete and clear-cut defeat do not seem to be so obvious as in Tunisia, they are nevertheless latent in the very features that have made the defence so formidable. For the comparatively roadless, mountainous country does not lend itself to an organised withdrawal in the face of so heavy an attack under complete air mastery. In any case, the Germans cannot claim that they can hold up the most severe of Allied attacks and at one and the same time retreat to the main- land. General Alexander has no intention of allowing the enemy to slip away if that can be prevented, and in this respect the position of the defence can only grow steadily worse by delay. The im- perative need of the moment is to crush the enemy resistance in the shortest possible time and to prevent the Germans from escaping. The possibility of landing on the mainland in their rear has no doubt been considered. There must be every evidence that the Allies intend to strike with their full force at once. Only when the screw has been turned fully will it be possible to hope that Italy will at length see reason.
It seems that there have been considerable inducements already. In Crete the Germans have begun to disarm the Italian troops. In the occupation of the Istrian peninsula up to the Julian Alps the Germans suggest their determination to place themselves in the rear of the Italian units in the Balkans. It is estimated that there are about 25 Italian divisions there, and Hitler will be placed in a very uncomfortable position when they are withdrawn. It is, how- ever, difficult to imagine how to' coerce a considerable-sized army into continuing to fight, particularly in so inflammable a country as the Balkans. There can be little doubt, indeed, that the mere withdrawal of the Italian divisions will be a heavy blow to Hitler, since however much we have tended to underrate their fighting quality, they have been a valuable, perhaps a necessary, adjunct to Hitler's legions.
The position might not be so dangerous if he were in full control of the situation in Russia. It is obvious that it is Stalin and not Hitler who holds the initiative there, and the position about Orel has already become critical. Hitler presumably recognises that he cannot hold this fortified centre, and the troops are already being withdrawn. The German reports of bitter street-fighting are merely another manifestation of the ingenuity of the propaganda depart- ment in creating victories. For it is certain that the Germans have no mind for another Stalingrad. They will, therefore, fall back when they feel that the loss is most disproportionate ; and, if they can, they will leave nothing but ruins behind. They will be moved to this. course all the more by the• sacrifice they must make in abandoning •Orel. It is not that the position can offer an inducement as a springboard any longer ; but evacuation will not ease, so much as increase, their danger. When the northern part of the Kursk salient is thoroughly cleared and Orel returns to Russian hands, the railway between Moscow and Bielgorod will
soon be in use again and the Russian striking-power will be accord- ingly strengthened.
But just as the Russians struck farther to the west from Stalingrad after they had completed their immediate encirclement, there can be little doubt that they will strike nearer to Briansk as Orel totters to its fall. The Germans may be able to escape the pincers ; but they must increase the peril of their position about Briansk and Kharkov. The counter-attacks about the Ilonetz bridgehead are a further manifestation of Hitler's nervousness about a - Russian acivttnce. He has not the divisions now to deliver a great offensive in Russia even if Italy had not decided to cut her losses. With that withdrawal his position has become critical.- There is no need to say that the Wehrmacht is a most powerful machine still. What is becoming increasingly obvious is the evidences of the limits to its strength. If there were no other reason, this at least should impel the Allies to hasten their offensive. The enemy begins to waver. Now is the time to press with every element of our strength.
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