BOOKS.

FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES.* EVERY student of French politics must have noticed that in the last year or two—we might say since the Algeciras Conference, to give an exact date—the Temps, most powerful of French newspapers, has adopted, a more critical and exacting attitude than its fellows towards Great Britain. It is true that in the Temps, as in all other French organs, the value of the Entente Cordials, and the loyalty with which its conditions have been observed on the British side, have always been graciously acknowledged; and the Entente was held to be more fully vindicated than ever before at the moment when the German policy of hectoring France broke down at Algeciras because it commanded no sympathy in Europe. It might have been thought, then, that all French public men would have been content to leave the understanding with Britain in the exact form in which it had worked so :beneficently. But temperaments are acted on differently, and the effect of the success of Algeciras—for such it was from the French point of view, compared With what had gone before—on the temperament of the Temps was a desire to add strength to newly acquired strength by making more sure than before that British help would be always forthcoming, and, above all, would be more adequate. Pursuing its argument, the Temps has followed with minute interest the progress of Mr. Haldane's Army scheme; and having decided that the scheme is insufficient in itself, and likely to be inadequately carried out even for what it is nominally worth, it virtually demands of Britain that a larger and more powerful Regular Army shall be produced in order to operate on the Continent in the event of a European war. The existence of such an Army, at least, is made the con- dition on which Britain can alone qualify for a drawing tighter of the present ties into an Alliance,—if Britain desires an Alliance with France, she must prove that she is in a military sense worthy of it. The book before us deals with all the Alliances and understandings which affect the European problem; but the chapter on the Entente Cordiale is so much the most important from the British point of view that we do not hesitate to take it out of its chronological order for special examination.

This chapter is a restatement of the political arguments with which readers of the Temps are familiar. Indeed, we recognise in this book the English version of many of the exact phrases which we have read in the Temps. And this is very natural, for M. Tardieu, the author, is the same as "George Villiers," who controls the foreign policy of the Temps, and contributes long and documents articles over that signature. We can the more easily deprecate the arguments which the Temps has been using for a long time (but lately with increasing urgency) because we do not believe they are shared by many Frenchmen. M. Ta.rdieu is, in fact, much less wise than he is well informed and strenuous. Most Frenchmen do not ask us to toe any particular line ; and we, for our part, have no desire to transform our agreeable friend- ship with France into an Alliance. As we do not desire an Alliance, it follows that we do not want to create an army worthy of it,—an army suitable to take its place in the field alongside a modern Continental army. Our true military policy is to have a Home Defence Army or Militia on the Swiss model, capable of thrusting back anynumhibned e r of invaders who might slip through our naval line and we now possess. If France were yinstiNevhhicalsi our shores, and a small but efficient Regular Army we felt bound in honour to support her, that Regular Army " Francs and ths Alliances: tho Struggle for the Balance of Power. By Andre Tardieu, honorary First Secretary in the FrendiDiplomatic Service. London I

brAtunillau and C. fee. 6d. net.]

would be, so far as was humanly possible, at her disposal. But there is no thought in this country of enlarging our Regular Army with the express purpose of making it

suit- able for Continental service with conscript armies. We are an insular Power, and do not feel called upon to sacrifice the privileges of that position. When the Entente Cordiale came into being, we were well known to be the greatest naval Power, but not a great military Power. So we remain, and so we are likely to remain. M. Tardieu remarks that Napoleon's career was ended at Waterloo, and not at Trafalgar. We believe that be underrates the influence of naval power in every respect ; but even if be did not, we should say that our own circumstances require us so plainly to be predominantly a naval Power that any foreign policy is at Once condemned which calls for a disproportionate expenditure on our Regular

Army. We need compulsory military training for the pur- poses of home defence, but for our oversea army we must in the future, as in the past, rely solely on the voluntary principle. A conscript army, comparable with the great conscript armies of Europe, is just what we cannot aim at having. Upon this point it is best to be quite frank. We might ultimately put on the Continent a force as large as we had in South Africa—say three hundred and fifty thousand men—but that number is never likely to be exceeded. At the same time, we cannot admit that it is, from the military point of view, in any sense une pantile negligeable.

M. Tardieu's book is extraordinarily interesting as an illus- tration of the way in which an able and wideawake French journalist can possess himself of the intimate details of Foreign Office work. No secret of the French Foreign Office remains a secret long. It is soon a secret de Polichinelle. M. Tardieu can tell you the very words with which one statesman closeted with another introduced a subject of the first importance to their countries. When M. Loubet a few months after the memorable visit of the King to France in 1903. returned the visit, M. Delcasse accompanied him to London, and Lord Lansdowne, we are told, opened on M. Delcasse with the words : "Now we are going to have some conversation." Quite in the same manner is such a passage as this, rather too personal, in our view, but a proof of the intimacy of the information which M. Tardieu has at his disposal:— " I was at Compibgne in 1901, at Tsarskoie-Selo in 1902. And the impression they have left upon me is, that it is neither necessary nor profitable to celebrate alliances with the help of protocol and ceremonial. One is exposed in so doing to incidents comical or painful. Was it indispensable to Franco-Russian politics for the Czarina Alexandra to hoar at Compiegne,—with- out any pleasure,—the repeated, 'Oh! oh! c'est U703 impdratrice' with which Mr. Edmond Rostand had thought fit to greet her ? Was it opportune to offer a certain Russian diplomatist, at the time belonging to the Russian Embassy at Paris, the occasion to behave discourteously towards the Republican Government, and then to put ourselves forward in order to secure him a pardon that was not justified? Ought we to have given our guests the spectacle of ridiculous quarrels between the wives of our Ministers and those of our Ambassadors ? And later, could it be thought an edifying sight, when a Secretary of the French Embassy at Saint Petursburg,—who claimed to possess President Loubot's entire confidence and that of Mr. Delcass6,—entered into open con- flict with his hierarchic superior, the Marquis de Montebello ? " We feel somehow as we read that M. Tarlias narrative is frequently too ingenious to be real. We cannot admit that nods, snubs, gaucheries, and smiles, though they may be significant symptoms, have the ultimately controlling influence upon European affairs which M. Tardieu seems to assign to them. Under his direction the foreign policy of the Temps has become less representative of moderate French opinion than it used to be, and, if we may judge from a recent debate in the French Chamber, it hold e no longer the "semi- official" position which used to belong to it. It is difficult to judge what sort of following the Temps has in its treatment of the Entente CordiaZe ; but as its reputation and ability are very great, perhaps we should give the exact words in which

Tardieu formulates his demands:—

" In the present situation, England's diplomatic cooperation, before a war, would be of infinite service to us. When once war were begun, this coOperation would be but of small avail. Great Britain's naval victories would not hold off a single Cannon or a single man from our frontiers. They would render us none of the services Which Russia, and Russia alone at present, is able to render us. In a word, a Franco-English alliance would mean for us, in the military domain, a minimum of profit. And for things to be different, it would be necessary for the British Army, thoroughly reformed not only in its organisation, but in its

manner of recruitment, to become capable of taking energetic action on the Continent, for it to be able to create on land an effective diversion, for it to be ready to lessen the shock our own army would have to support; in fine, it would be necessary for Groat Britain to be, as far as France is concarned, a second Russia."

Upon this passage our comment must be to advise M. Tardien to study the question of sea power. If France alone were

at war with Germany, and Germany held the command of the sea, as she then would, Britain being neutral, France might have the fruits of victory on her Eastern frontier taken from her by a coup de main in the West or South. Imagine France holding back the German attack all along the line between Belgium and Switzerland. Then Germany puts a quarter-of-a-million men in transports and lands them in the rear of the French near, say, Mont St. Michel. The fear of such an incident would haunt the French General Staff under the conditions we have supposed, and go near to paralyse their action. With British co-operation, and the command of the sea secured, the situation is completely changed, and the Power which would be using transports for a flank attack would be France, not her antagonist. A little later M. Tardieu goes on, with marked inconsistency as it seems to us, to what is known as "the hostage theory " :—

"Here conies in, it is true, the too famous hostage theory : Germany, while at war with England, attacking France in order to have guarantees on the Continent. Once more, with regard to this, a clear understanding is necessary. The hostage theory may well have been menacing, at a time when, France being dis- organized and Russia vanquished, neither Power was able to make use of the alliance between them. This time has gone by. If Germany were to attack France now, she would set in action the chief clause of the military convention signed between France and Russia in 1892, and would have on her back not only the French but the Russian Army too."

Englishmen do not contemplate an attack on Germany in any circumstances. All our forces are for defence, not for offence. If we become engaged in a war in company with France, it will be because France is attacked, and in that case the Russian Army will also be on her side. That considera- tion alone deprives the demands for increased British military

power of most of their urgency.

We have found M. To.rdieu's book so interesting, though

not always in a pleasant sense, in relation to ourselves that we have no space to write of the chapters which treat of French relations with other Powers. We agree that the Franco-Russian Alliance is a manage de raison, and that it is in a fair way to resume an importance which was temporarily modified by the Russo-Japanese War. M. Tardieu holds that that war was a kind of disloyalty to the Alliance on Russia's part. She had no right to weaken herself in adventures far away from Europe. It is well known that such criticism as this is reciprocated in Russia, where it is often argued —falsely, we think—that the French Army is not so strong as it ought to be. Recriminations of this kind are as good a warning as we could wish to have against the oppressive- ness of European alliances. When the King and M. Falli6res spoke last year of " strengthening " the Entente and making it "permanent," we believe that Englishmen simply took the words as meaning, not an alliance, but a more firmly established friendship. Long may we enjoy it with France! But if the knots are drawn too tight, pleasure may turn into pain. Though this is not understood by M. Tardieu, it is, we believe, fully realised by the wise statesmen who constitute the Government of France.