GIBRALTAR, SPAIN, AND MOROCCO.
S we said last week, we hold Lord Selborne to have shown great wisdom in refusing to be rushed into a decision in regard to the Gibraltar docks. The question is one which had better soon be settled definitely one way or the other, but there is no desperate hurry, and the greatest possible care should be taken before the nation is committed to a vast expenditure on docks on the eastern side of the Rock. On the whole, we believe that the balance of argument will be found to incline most decidedly against the proposal to spend a sum which may be £20,000,000, and cannot be less than £10,000,000, on making the eastern docks. But though this is our view, we perfectly well understand, and so far sympathise with, the desire of our chief naval men to try to obtain a dock and dockyard at Gibraltar which shall be secure from fire from the land,—a place where repairs can be done in safety, and where the Mediterranean Fleet can always feel as secure to refit as it can at Malta. To gain such an advantage it might be worth while to spend even £20,000,000. For example, if there were an American firm which supplied islands fitted with first-class dock and harbour accommodation at schedule prices—islands which could be fixed in mid-sea as required—we would buy one to-morrow at £20,000,000. But, remember, even if we spend £20,000,000 and take ten or twelve years in making a harbour and docks on the eastern side of the Rock, we shall not have gained a harbour and docks in an island out of reach of land. No doubt the harbour would be less exposed to fire from the land than the present harbour on the west, but it would still be exposed to fire from the land, for Gibraltar remains as before a peninsula. Even if gun-fire does not increase in power during the next ten years, the eastern harbour would be exposed to a certain amount of land fire. If, however, as is extremely likely, the next ten years see a couple of miles added to the effective range of heavy artillery, the eastern harbour may be quite as vulnerable as the western. We say this quite apart from the other prime consideration as regards all naval expenditure. That consideration is expressed in the phrase " naval expenditure should float." If you are going to spend £20,000,000, or say £10,000,000, it is better to spend it on ironclads which can carry your guns and your sea- power wherever they are wanted than to lock it up in stone and cement at Gibraltar. Of course this view must not be pushed too far, for you will soon have nothing to float if you have no means of repairing your ships ; and, therefore, money spent on repairing places is often in reality money spent for sea-going purposes. At the same time, it is a sound principle that the money spent on fixed works must never be allowed to grow out of proportion to the money spent on ships. It is a question of degree. You have already got, or very soon will have, on the western side complete arrangements for repair. That being so, this part of the problem resolves itself into the question : " Is it better to spend a vast sum on getting a better place for doing repairs, or to run the chances of a risky place for doing repairs and to keep your money for battleships ? " Though we note that the matter can be put thus, we do not wish to discuss it, because we hold that the problem is really governed by the consideration, previously expressed, —namely, that you cannot make a really safe harbour even on the eastern side. -Unless you can do that you had most certainly better spend your millions on other things.
But because it is not possible to make a safe harbour on the eastern side, and because the harbour on the western side has been pronounced to be assailable by gun-fire from the land, are we to assume that therefore we must " write off " Gibraltar as a place where our Fleet can be repaired, and regard all the money spent on the western side as practically thrown away ? By no means. That is a panic view entirely inconsistent with the facts. To begin with, the western harbour is in no danger whatever if Spain is not hostile to us, or has not been invaded and conquered by France at a time when France is at war with us. As long as there is no enemy in possession of Algeciras, the western harbour is actually more secure from attack than the eastern. Let us, however, assume that through bad luck or bad management Algeciras has come into the possession of the enemy. Even then we do re, believe that the western harbour would be useless. In the first place, though our experience in the Boer War has shown us the mobility as well as range of heavy guns, it has also shown us how very little actual damage is done by bombardment. Ladysmith, Kimberley, and Mafeking ought to have been a heap of smoking ruins after the first week of their bombardments, but we know as a matter of fact that they were nothing of the kind. No doubt ships at anchor or under repair and dockyard buildings cannot be risked as lightly as tin houses, but still the fact remains that bombardments are always far more destructive in pamphlets than in actual war. Again, it must be remembered that our batteries on the Rock would be able to give a very good account of themselves, and ought to be able to do a good deal to keep down artillery fire. Lastly, it ought to be possible by raising high ramparts on the new breakwaters to give a good deal of protection to ships lying under them. We do not wish to go into details here, but merely to point out that big guns on the Spanish coast opposite Gibraltar would not instantly make Gibraltar Harbour a mere death-trap in the way that, say, Trafalgar Square would be made a death-trap if a hundred machine-guns were placed on the roof of the National Gallery.
Though we do not think that we need adopt the attitude that all would be lost at Gibraltar if Spain were at war with us, we hold that there is no kind of reason why we should not be able to reckon on Spain not being hostile. In our opinion, we have it in our power to guarantee the goodwill of Spain, or rather to guarantee that Spain should not lend herself to any attempt to destroy our docks and shipping at Gibraltar. The way to guarantee the neutrality of Spain is to find out what are the aspirations of Spain in the Western Mediterranean, and to do our best to satisfy those aspirations. Now it is, or should be, well known to our statesmen that what Spain desires above all things is not to be ousted from Morocco. She at this moment owns settlements on the Moorish coast, she has great historic claims in regard to Morocco, and at this moment every party in Spain is intensely anxious that, if and when the Empire of Morocco breaks up, Spain shall have what she considers to be her fair share of the Moorish Empire. That share, it is clear to all Spaniards, should be that portion of Morocco which borders Ceuta and Melilla, and is opposite the European coasts of Spain. Spain looks to some day acquiring Tetuan and the whole of the blunt-nosed peninsula which juts out into the Straits, and includes Tangier and Cape Spartel. Spain has already many thousands of white inhabitants in this region, and we are not exaggerating, we believe, when we say that there is not a Spaniard who would not do everything in his power to prevent this region falling into the hands of any other Power. But that being so, why should we not make a treaty with Spain pledging ourselves to support her claim to this territory in the event of a break-up of the Shereefian Empire? Such an arrangement would not merely satisfy Spain and make her unwilling to lend herself to any schemes for injuring us in Gibraltar, but it would also be the first step in the direction of settling the Morocco question on sound lines. At the same time that we made the suggested arrangement with Spain, we should let France understand that we should not interfere with any action she might take in regard to the rest of Morocco. If France would agree to respect what we considered to be the Spanish right of reversion in regard to the district we have described above, we might promise her a free hand in the rest of Morocco. There would, of course, be no call for immediate action in Morocco. If Morocco could reform itself, and if internal order could be secured, then the whole question might sleep. If not, and if—which seems, how- ever, far more probable—the status quo could not be main- tained, then the problem of the division of the sick man's property would be solved. It is true that we should not gain anything territorially, but we do not want territory. and if we did could not have it in Morocco. Europe would not tolerate our holding both sides of the Straits, and Tangier is the only place in Morocco that we could possibly want. At the same time, we could not well tolerate France in possession of the African shore of the Straits. Spain, however, considering everything, would be just the Power to hold both sides of the Straits. She would probably not be unwilling to agree not to erect fortifications on the African side, and not to make any attempt to close the Straits. In any case, we should have taken away from Spain the sense of grievance which she now imagines she has in regard to England. Spaniards are apt to think that we mean to keep them out of what they consider to be their just rights in Morocco. If we make it clear to them that this is not so, but that instead we mean to back up their claim in the strongest possible way, our fears as to Spanish hostility at Gibraltar may disappear. Satisfy Spain in regard to the Morocco question, and we may gain a safety for our docks at Gibraltar not to be gained by an expendi- ture of £20,000,000.
It will be said, no doubt, by those who dislike our pro- posals that Spain would find it impossible, even if the Empire of Morocco broke up, to secure her share owing to the fierceness and courage of the Riffian tribesmen. Our answer is that that is Spain's affair and not ours, that, in fact, we do not believe Spain would find the task beyond her strength, and that at any rate it is foolish to incur the enmity of Spain in order to keep her out of a risky adven- ture. Other critics will ask us " How about Germany P " Our answer would be, " Let France arrange things with Germany." We should, in effect, tell all the Powers that we wanted nothing for ourselves in Morocco, but that we were pledged to Spain in regard to certain territories. If those were secured to Spain, we were indifferent as to what arrangements France should come to with the other Powers. As for Italy, Tripoli, not Morocco, is her concern. Of course, this scheme is open to the objections that can always be brought against the projects of an amateur diplomacy, but for all that we believe that if our Foreign Office could be persuaded to take the initiative, we should not only free the Admiralty from their anxieties in regard to the harbour at Gibraltar, but should also promote the peaceful solution of the Morocco problem,—a problem with which sooner or later England is bound to be confronted. Being civil and considerate to the Moorish Mission cannot save the Shereefian Empire, and it is useless to pretend that it can.
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