AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND SERVIA.
SINCE we wrote last week on the dangerous dispute between Austria-Hungary and Servia, Russia has taken a step in the policy which, we explained, would be extremely difficult for her to take,—the policy of putting pressure on Servia. The fact that M. Isvolsky has advised the Servian Government not to persist in the demands for territorial compensation from Austria-Hungary, or for the autonomy of Bosnia and Herzegovina, is its own tribute to the deep desire of Russia for peace. It was not easy for M. Isvolsky, representing the nation which has been traditionally the protector of the Southern Slays, and which is always ready to boil over with Slavonic sentiment, to blow cold on the ambitious of the little State which is standing for the Slavonic idea in the Balkans. Yet M. Isvolsky has taken this bold and wise course, and Europe still waits with some anxiety to see the result. The response of Servia, though tentative, and dependent on the attitude of Austria-Hungary, is so far favourable. For our own part, though no man can predict with confidence what will emerge from the bewildering changes of the situation which occur every day, we think the result will be peace. But even if peace be preserved for the immediate future, the Southern Slav problem, which is the danger-point of European politics, will remain untouched. We desire to make this quite clear : that though the special crisis may be passed in safety, the normal grievances of the Southern Slays will not in any sense have been removed. Rather the fact that the Slavonic idea has suffered in a trial of strength with a powerful Empire may load to a still more inconsiderate treatment of the Slays in Hungary and elsewhere, and put a now edge on what we have called the normal (because long-standing) grievances of the Slays. Whatever optimism we feel justified in exercising, therefore, refers to the present, not to the events which lie beyond it. For a real settlement of the Southern Slav question, which is so intimately bound up with all the alterations of the map of South-Eastern Europe, the best means, so far as we can see, would be a European Conference, It is possible to admit the probability, as we do, of numerous difficulties in the employment of a Conference, and yet to believe that it encourages more hope than any other solution. The meeting of a Conference would in itself testify to the fact that there is a public law of Europe ; the delegates would be instructed to re-establish that which was shattered by the anti-European acts of Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria. And the feelings and intentions of Europe towards Servia and Montenegro would be declared as definitely as the opinion of Europe on the Moroccan question was declared at the Algeciras Conference. A large part of the present peril consists in the ignorance of those small, angry, and desperate States of what they can " get out " of Europe, or rather out of European authority, working on the recalcitrance of Austria-Hungary.
Nothing could be a more pressing invitation to Austria- Hungary to shape a peaceable course than M. Isvolsky's pronouncement—for such it is in effect—that the Russian Government does not mean pugnaciously to support the Servians. There was an ugly risk that Austria-Hungary would goad Russia into the attitude of a thick-and-thin champion. Russia evidently does not mean to be goaded. That is a good sign; she accepts Slavonic displeasure at home and abroad in order to fill the role of a level-headed parent. We can hardly believe now that Austria-Hungary will whip Russia into some frenzy, for which the cause does not yet exist, and that is chiefly why we inoline to believe in peace. At the same time, we fear it is impossible to escape the conclusion that Austria-Hungary does not shrink from a certain steady provocation of Russia in her desire to teach Servia a lesson. She behaves as though she attributed to " cheekiness" in Servia what every one else can see is due to desperation. And she will make a terrible mistake if she assumes that, though the Southern Slays may be held underfoot for some time to come, Russia can be forced into effacing herself permanently as their natural protector. She is the " head of the family." She has reluctantly adopted a moderating policy because she is concerned for the peace of Europe ; but even the peace of Europe cannot be pre- served on intolerable conditions, and it is certain that millions of Russians would regard a still further or per- sistent jockeying of the Southern Slays, as intolerable. The prospect we have sketched was made to appear very real a few days ago by reckless and intolerant speeches in the Hungarian House of Magnates. Those speeches were not made by irresponsible Chauvinists, but by men who hold or who formerly held the highest positions. Servia, it was said, had no basis of argument, not even a right to be heard. What business was it of hers whether Austria-Hungary did or did not annex territory ? She must know her place, and if she wanted concessions she must ask for them with proper humility, pleading directly with Austria-Hungary, and not referring a matter of private concern to the whole of Europe. All that was only the counterpart of Baron Aehrenthal's method, which is not more palatable to Servia, even though it be, as we admit, more urbane. It, too, laughs out of court the Berrien demands, which, if they have not a legal force, have the force which belongs to all national aspirations. In the relations of one country with another such aspirations are not things which can be ignored as though they .did not exist ; they are sure to be carefully, and perhaps dangerously, cultivated if their authors have any resources and vitality, as we are convinced the Serbs and the Southern Slave generally have in a much greater degree than is usually suspected. Even if Benda should fully consent to do as she is asked to do —abandon her plea for territorial compensation, simply " knuckle under " and trust to the benevolence of Austria- Hungary to give her some delectable, but as yet quite undefined, commercial pickings, abandon the demand for the autonomy of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and bind herself over to be of permanent good behaviour, while Austria- Hungary on her side does not even demobilise her army— even then the dispute could not be treated by Europe as though it concerned only Austria-Hungary and Servia. Europe cannot without continuous misgiving leave them alone in the ring. A fight between them could not be carried out to a finish. The seconds, and even some of the remotest spectators, would soon be drawn into a general struggle. We pay Baron Aehrenthal the compliment of supposing that he has no wish whatever to see all Europe fly to arms. But he is too hard on Servia. Even the Temps, Ihich has watched his policy with a good deal of Ympathy, has turned to words of warning. If Servia is to have a place in the sun publicly denied to her, she wishes at least to hear the judgment fall from a European Court, and not from the mouth of a partial and highly interested Magistrate who is virtually trying his own case. We are quite in the dark as to what military risks Baron Aehrenthal supposes himself to be running. He may think that Servia, could be easily crushed, that Bosnia would not rise, and that Montenegro could be detached from Servia by military or diplomatic means. There ie the danger that his speculations may be all ill founded ; but there is the still greater danger that the nerves of Servia, held too • long in suspense, will surprise him by giving way unexpectedly, and everything will be staked on a gambler's throw. If many Serbs seriously believe that absorption into the Austrian Empire would make their association with their Slavonic kinsmen so close that a Slavonic regeneration would be ultimately advanced by it, Servia, is almost in the position of one who says : Heads I win ; tails you lose ! " She would require little more temptation in that mood to let war loose. Russia has already gone farther than was expected in the way of restraining Servia. Let us not deceive ourselves by thinking she can go farther still. Too much chilly advice from Russia would force Servia into the arms of Austria-Hungary—some Servians perhaps already half consenting—and Russia would lose the leverage in the affairs of South-Eastern Europe which she has struggled for generations to get and keep. We are justified, we think, in laying that Russia will not face, because her Government would not be allowed to face, such a, prospect. As for pressure on Austria, we can hope little so long as Germany, in support of her ally, tilts the balance to the side of loyalty rather than of reason. We come back, then, to the necessity of a Conference, and in desiring it we look to it as an instrument for the simplification of the Southern Slav question. A Conference could not create a new dispensation for the Slave of Hungary, but it could generally define the limits of Slav ambition. Meanwhile the Southern Slav question remains, and will even be increasingly troublesome till it is settled on intelligent and humane lines.
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