LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
DIPLOMACY AND ECONOMICS
SER,—In your issue of February z7th Mr. Richard Krammer has contributed some interesting observations on economic training for diplomatists, to which subject he has evidently given much careful thought. May I be allowed to answer some of the questions, which, not unnaturally, seem to puzzle the writer?
I will begin by saying that though I agree with Mr. Krammer that some economic training is desirable, especially as regards the more modern developments such as the general mechanism and organisation of industry, &c., I would most emphatically deprecate any attempt to convert the diplomatist into an expert economist to the detriment of his political vision. Diplomacy is far more concerned with the strategy than the tactics of foreign policy. Strategy is the formulation of policy on broad lines and does not call for specialised knowledge. Tactics come into play in the execution of policy. It is here that the services of the expert become indispensable. Now, since the strategic or political aspect must dominate the tactical or economic it would be most unwise to staff the politico-economic department of the Foreign Office with expert economists. On the other hand an expert economist In a purely advisory capacity, but not as an executive officer, should prove a very useful, not to say necessary, adjunct. Holding as I do these views very strongly I feel that the economic training of the diplomatist should not go beyond the inclusion in the entrance examination of political economy as an obligatory subject. The test should be fairly stiff, if only because political economy Is one of the few subjects that make a man think for himself.
You, Sir, in your leading article in The Spectator of February 6th, alluded to the Ottawa policy and the fact that it had been embarked upon without due regard to its political repercussions in the domain of foreign affairs. You could hardly have singled out a matter of more transcendent importance or given a better concrete illustration of the risks and dangers to which this country is exposed if we are to continue to regard politics and economics as things apart.
In the absence of proper investigatory machinery it is of course quite impossible to gauge the consequences of the Ottawa policy with any degree of accuracy. It must largely remain a matter of opinion, since we can only judge by the scraps of information to be gleaned here and there and from hearsay. Nevertheless they were not entirely unpredictable on this account, for there have always been certain obvious facts which should have put the Ottawa statesmen on their guard. It is well known that the British Empire has at all times been a source of envy to hungry nations and that it has been tolerated on account of the liberality of its institutions ; which in other hands would have disappeared. Before Ottawa Great Britain took one-sixth of the world's exports and the Empire as a whole nearly one-third. It was therefore quite certain that any attempt, however mild, to divert the enormous purchasing-power of the British Empire into domestic channels would not remain without serious political reper- cussions, especially at a time when economic nationalism was already rampant nearly everywhere. If further we take into account that in the case of Germany a disproportionate amount of her production (see Germany's Commercial Grip of the World, by H. Hauser, page 51)—it was stated to be between 6o per cent. and 7o per cent. before 1914—is destined for export it is clear that Ottawa was merely adding fuel to the flames. And yet, as you say, the Foreign Secretary was not even present at Ottawa to voice these facts.
It has been alleged that hundreds of thousands of workers were thrown out of work in Central Europe as the result of Ottawa, only to swell the ranks of the followers of political hotheads who clamoured for rearmament as a means of restoring plenty to poverty- stricken peoples. Further, Ottawa is said to have encouraged France to intensify her economic nationalism in her colonial empire. Referring to the Balkan States a correspondent of The Times (see issue of March zist, 1938) wrote: " So long as other countries, particularly Great Britain and France, shut out their products, they are bound to trade with the only willing buyer—Germany—as the one alternative to economic disaster."
Denmark, too, was hard hit, with the result that Germany was enabled to drive hard bargains with Danish farmers for cattle under the Commercial Agreement of 1936 and to force her to accept German- manufactured goods in payment for Danish exports. But worst of all it is highly probable that Ottawa has done much to stimulate the lebensraum idea not only in Germany but in Italy and Japan as well, for which we are paying so dearly today. Was it not the intention of Ottawa to make the British Empire the greatest lebensraum in the world?
I mention these considerations not in a spirit of dogmatic assertion of facts that I can vouch for, but merely to show that, whatever the truth may be, these allegations are sufficiently serious to constitute a strong prima facie case for systematic study before taking leaps in the dark. Haphazard economic information pumped into the capeciont craw of the Foreign Office at random serves no useful purpose. To be of value it must respond to political ends, and this implies systematic direction.
The primary functions of a politico-economic department should bye twofold: (t) investigation under specialised direction, and (z) the collection and collation of material for the formulation of policy: such as, for instance, the economic integration of Europe in the interest of peace which is likely to confront us after the war.
The political direction of such a department can hardly be left in the hands of a body of economists. But however constituted and however perfect the machinery may be it will depend for its success on the vision, imagination and directive capacity that lie behind ir. Nor, I may add, is such a department the only reform needed for the efficient conduct of foreign affairs under modern conditions.—
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