THE EUROPEAN SITUATION.
THOUGH we adhere to the belief expressed by us last week that Germany has no deliberate intention of altering her policy in regard to Morocco, we fear that the German Press is only too likely to create an uneasy, and con- sequently dangerous, feeling between Germany and France. It would seem, too, that this attitude of hostility and mina- tory criticism will be taken up by the official as well as the unofficial Press. In other words, the German Government may be expected to adopt a policy which, unfortunately, it is well versed in—the policy of encouraging the creation of a menacing public opinion in Germany, in order that it may the more easily deal with France, and obtain striking diplomatic victories which can be paraded as proof of how potent and how vigilant is the nation "in shining armour." The German Foreign Office is always inclined to think it advantageous to take advantage of the temporary embarrassments of other Powers to make them acknowledge Germany's preponderating position in Europe, a position due to her mastery of the big battalions and of the strong alliances. The men who control German state-craft like to make it clear to all the world that, as her statesmen have actually said, no European Power can ignore Germany or act without her knowing the reason why.
The fact that the right of France to a special and privileged position in Morocco was in effect acknowledged at the Alge- ciras Conference will not, we fear, be allowed to interfere with the carrying out of the policy of reminding France and the world that Germany has always to be reckoned with. Again, the fact that the agreement of 1909 stated that the German Government recognised " that the special political interests of France are closely bound up in that country [i.e., Morocco] with the consolidation of order and internal peace," and that it declared that Germany " was resolved not to impede those interests," will again be ignored in spirit, if not in the letter. For example, the North German Gazette, which may be regarded as a semi-official organ of the Government, warned France in effect that, though she could not be blamed " for taking all appropriate measures for the security of her officers," she must remember that she " carried responsibility for the consequences of the measures that she applied to the situation.'
In menacing tones the German paper went on to express the hope that the French Government would be able to maintain its assurances that an occupation of Fez did not lie within the scope of its intentions, and that it would be able " to stick to its programme " :— " Procedure beyond the programme would be out of harmony with the Algeciras Act, for the reason that an essential part of that Act is an independent Moroccan ruler. A breach of impor- tant provisions of the Algeciras Act, even if the breach were brought about by the force of external circumstances and against the will of the Power concerned, would restore to all the Powers their complete freedom of action, and might, in this way, lead to consequences of a kind which cannot at present be seen. We can, however, only repeat that there is at present, in view of the cautious attitude of the French Government hitherto, no occasion to look for so far-reaching a development of the present state of affairs."
The Cologne Gazette is equally minatory, and declares that the advance on Fez makes the situation critical, and opens the door to " all kinds of developments and incidents." Commenting on the remarks of the North German Gazette in regard to the Powers recovering complete freedom of action if France were, for example, to occupy Fez, the Times correspondent at Berlin declares that certain in- fluences which ought to be working for the consolidation of the status quo upon the basis of the Algeciras Act are tending to popularise the notion that it might be well to tear up all the paper obligations and start afresh. He goes on to point out how extraordinary is the theory that this or that event in Morocco would lead to the nullifica- tion of the agreement between France and Germany. As he says, only two years ago—i.e., in the case of Germany's coercive action in forcing Russia to agree to the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina—" the suggestion that breaches of an International treaty restored freedom of action was denied by Germany at the point of the sword." To-day freedom of action is said to be re- coverable through the effect upon treaty arrangements, not of any wilful breach of the treaty, but of the force of external circumstances. " It is as certain that the promulgation of this doctrine can serve no good purpose at the present moment as that its application would lead to conse quences of a kind which cannot at present be foreseen." Though the adoption of such an attitude as this by responsible German newspapers cannot but cause very grave anxiety, we cannot suppose that the German Govern- ment would go so far as to order the French out of Fez should they be forced by events into a, temporary occupation, or to put pressure upon Paris such as was put upon Petersburg in the spring of 1909. It is not too much to say that pressure of that kind would be almost certain to lead to a European conflagration, for we may be sure that France would not—nay, could not—yield to any peremptory and humiliating demands from Germany. France, we are certain, is not bent upon a policy of con- quest in Morocco, and, indeed, desires nothing less than an adventure of that description. She must, however, protect the lives of her people, and must also, lest she fall into greater International complications through negligence, do her best to carry out the mandate of Europe to enforce the main- tenance of order and reasonable security in Morocco. But beyond this there is not the slightest risk of her proceed- ing. She does not wish to endanger either her finances or her military resources—foreign expeditions on a, large scale ruin mobilisation arrangements—by long and difficult operations in Africa. At the same time she could not, as we have said, submit to diplomatic coercion of a kind that would humiliate her.
That Germany has any real intention of using such coercion we do not believe for a moment. She knows very well that if she were to push matters to the point of war, Russia and Britain, notwithstanding their intense desire to maintain peace, could not leave France isolated. They are bound by every motive of self-interest to come to her assistance. Even the party in Russia which dislikes the alliance with France and tends to be under German influ- ence would realise that, if the Triple Alliance were allowed to attack France in isolation and destroy her, as presumably they would, the position of the rest of the Powers of Europe, after such a German victory, would be absolutely intolerable. Here the feeling of responsible statesmen, however pacific and however friendly in feeling towards Germany, would be the same. " It will be our turn next." That would be the feeling in all men's hearts, whether Liberal or Unionist, Imperialist or Pacifist.
Therefore we may be assured that Germany would end— in truth she knows it already—that the Powers of the Triple Entente could not allow the coercion of France.
The way of peace will be to stand by France at all costs— unless, of course, which is unthinkable, France were to deliberately provoke war with Germany. Though we are afraid that the Bismarckian tradition is at the present time very strong in the German Foreign Office, and Ger- many might like to threaten war for diplomatic purposes, and in order to increase still further that prestige which undoubtedly she did obtain by her coercion of Russia, Germany at heart does not at all want war, and certainly does not want it while her fleet is confessedly not as strong as it will be in four years' time. Bismarck in his " Con- versations " tells us how before he attacked Austria he made absolutely certain that the military strength of Germany had reached the highest pitch which was then attainable. Germany will not, if she can help it, go to war at a time when she is not as strong as she will be within a comparatively short period. The only answer that we have seen brought forward to meet the argument we have just stated is one which is, in our opinion, much too subtle. It runs as follows : Ger- many realises that we shall not allow her to make her fleet equal, or nearly equal, to our own, and that in fact she is beaten in the competition for naval supremacy. That being so, it is argued that a land war, at a time when she would have a good excuse for not risking her fleet, might afford reasonable ground for abandoning the expensive bids which she is now making in the naval auction-room. That, though ingenious, is, as we have said, too subtle. Germany would like, no doubt, to secure a great diplomatic triumph without war, but she does not want war in the year 1911. Beyond and above this is the fact that the German Emperor himself is almost certainly averse from war.
It may be urged, perhaps, that if these are our con- clusions, why should we trouble to write in what will be declared to be an "alarmist" spirit. Our answer is easy : Though we do not believe that Germany wants war, we believe that she is preparing to make diplomatic trouble, or perhaps it would be fairer to say diplomatic capital, out of any difficulties which may arise through France's per- plexities in Morocco. But when a nation enters upon a. policy of that kind, especially when dealing with a Power like France, which, though anxious for peace, is essentially nervous and excitable, there is necessarily a danger of grave troubles arising. Germany, always meaning to draw back at the last moment, may, through an inept diplomacy— we must never forget that German diplomacy is not now controlled by a master mind like that of Bismarck— discover that she has gone too far and cannot draw back. It must be remembered also that a German general election cannot be very long postponed, and that the German Government are exceedingly anxious as to the results. They fear great Socialist successes at the polls. One of the ways, they hold, of preventing such successes is to give no cause to the grumblers to say that the Government is not worth supporting because it is feeble and does not look after national interests. Hence there are great temptations for the Government to prove that they are specially vigilant guardians of such interests and have made Germany the arbiter of Europe. When a Government is advised by its political wire-pullers to talk big and act big for home con- sumption there is always danger. Louis Philippe is reported to have said to Lord Palmerston that talking war and making war were very different things. Unfortunately, history shows that those who talk war without any inten- tion of making war not infrequently blunder into a situation out of which there is no escape but war.
In any case, the duty of British and Russian statesmen, and of public opinion in both countries, is to maintain the most vigilant attitude, and to make it absolutely clear to the Germans from the beginning that though Russia and Britain will neither encourage nor tolerate any aggressive action on the part of France, or any action which goes be- yond the loyal and explicit declarations made in regard to her intentions towards Morocco, they will also not allow any unfair coercion of France by Germany. If Germany once understands that Russia and Britain will stand by France to the uttermost in the case of undue pressure, such undue pressure will not, we are sure, be applied. Again, if Germany knows that no toleration will be extended to the policy of finding excuses for saying that the settlement of Algeciras and the agreement of 1909 have come to an end, and that the whole Morocco ques- tion can be re-opened, she will not adopt that policy. The situation, in fact, is one which will be made less, not more, dangerous by frankly and openly facing the facts and making them clear to all concerned.
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