THE CAUSES OF PUBLIC SYMPATHY WITH TURKEY.
TO any one who is really anxious to explain the tendencies in English public opinion on the War, the last week or two must have offered new symptoms of considerable moment. It was often said at first that the cheek to the Russian advance in Asia would be beneficial to the state of opinion in this country, by dissipating the panic concerning Russia, and showing that her arms are not so much to be feared as Englishmen, fearful of her invasion of India, had supposed. But if this panic were really at the root of the anti-Russian feeling, the tree has so far out- grown its root that we can trace very litie vestige of it now. The panic has quite died away. But the hatred which was attributed to the panic has grown as rapidly as its assumed cause has died away. For instance, the Standard, which is a comparatively moderate paper, and is to the Daily Telegraph, on this subject, what a rational man with strong prejudices is to a wild fanatic given up to the proclamation of a furious crusade, has been becoming steadily more hostile to Russia of late, on the ostensible ground that she is not so strong as was thought, and has therefore raised a bloody issue which she is not able to decide. Now, of course, all miscalculation in matters of such transcendent im- portance are mischievous, and all avoidable miscalculations are blameable; but it is hardly possible to admit that a party which urged it as so strong a reason against the active interference of Europe, that Russia must not be aided to do what would be so likely to run on into a great overbalancing of Russian power in the East, ever really wished Russia to have the power to settle the issue peremptorily and speedily, or is disappointed at the result. The change in feeling is certainly not due to disappointment at the revelation of Russian weakness, so much as to the gradual vanishing of the restraints imposed by the doubtful anticipation of a sudden display of Russian strength. We have all seen how when a man conjectured by some to be enormously wealthy, turns out to be rather poor, the complaints against him, formerly suppressed, are apt to come to the surface with a kind of rush,—not that any one intends to be really ungenerous, but that as the respectful attitude which discourages social criticism is relaxed, the natural cavils of human nature increase and ixtultiply. We believe that exactly the same thing has hap- pened with respect to Russia. Those who hated her on account of her supposed antagonism to England, but respected her as a most powerful antagonist, hate her still, but, no longer regarding her as a very powerful rival, entertain their ani- mosity with more freedom and express it with much less reserve. A rival of doubtful strength is usually treated with much less forbearance than a rival of unquestionable strength. Nay, where there is no question of ,rivalry at all, the pettiest opponent is often far more virulently attacked than the most powerful. For example, we can to a certain extent endorse the attacks upon Servia for proposing to break through the terms of the Treaty by which, in her hour of need, she prated, but what right-minded man can help feeling utterly ashamed of the virulence with which the Greek preparations for war are denounced ? With regard to Servia, we cannot hold that a promise deliberately given even to a brigand, and kept by the brigand on his side, one, moreover, the advantages of which have been already enjoyed, can lose its validity only because the time comes when it is no longer profitable to abide by it. That seems to us a cynical hypothesis, which would justify Turkey in saying that as morality is at an end in all the dealings of Europe towards her, morality shall be at an end (as, indeed, for the most part, it long has been) in all her dealings towards the rest of Europe. But these considerations have no application to Greece. It is true that the guarantee of Greek independence clearly entitles the guaranteeing Powers to protest against any disturbance by Greece of the peace of Europe. But it is not to Turkey that Greek independence is due. It was extorted from her after she had done all in her power to crush the Turks, and, in the border provinces, Turkey has habitually shown so cynical a contempt for Greek tranquillity, that Greece must feel, and ought to feel, that the cause of the oppressed Slays is also the cause of the oppressed Greeks. It would be as childish to complain, on moral grounds, of Greece for de- claring war against Turkey when Russia gives her an oppor- tunity of success, as it would have been m 18G6 to complain on similar grounds of Italy for declaring war against Austria, when Prussia gave her an opportunity of success. Nevertheless, the tone of scorn and hatred towards Greece lately adopted in the pro-Turkish journals is quite as bitter, though not quite as plausible, as the tone of scorn and hatred towards Servia. For instance, a few days ago the Pall Mall Gazette wrote thus of Greece :--" It is true that the Times has taken upon itself to say that if Turkey attacks Greece, our diplomacy, and perhaps our Fleet, must intervene. But the people of this country have not yet agreed to keep the back-door of the Sultan's dominions open for mannikin invaders, while the Czar is thundering at the main gateway." That represents very fairly the virulent contempt with which Greece is treated, when there seems to be any sign of her doing her duty by joining Russia. Evidently, then, it is not the fear of Russia which makes the attacks on Russia so bitter, for they are be- coming more virulent as the fear of Russia diminishes ; and they are quite as virulent on Greece, who is not feared at all. So far as fear entered into public opinion, it seems to have been rather a restraining than a stimulating power. It was said last year that Servia was so savagely attacked in England because she was but the cat's-paw of Russia. But Greece, at all events, is quite free to decline the Russian alliance. If she acts, she acts on her own account, and neither from sympathy with the Slays, whom the Greeks do not love, nor from fear of Russia, against whom she would be protected, Yet now we see how passionately Greece is decried, whenever there appear to be signs of her declaring war. Nevertheless, Greek ambition is certainly not very formidable, nor can "British interests" suffer severely at the hands of Greece.
We suppose that, in part at least, the growing sympathy with Turkey is due to the mere tendency of hesitating opinion to veer towards the side which displays the greatest amount of unsuspected strength, but in part also to that hatred of the humanitarian cause as such, which seems to grow in bitterness with every fresh statement of it. As the anonymous author,—we have not a guess who he may be,—of a curious and very eloquent little pamphlet on the Eastern Question, printed for private cir- culation, called "Action not Acting," well says,—" The cause of the shelter and countenance afforded to the Turk lies in the deep-rooted love of tyranny in the human heart ; in a hatred and contempt in a certain class of minds for all so-called popular movements ; in the worship of power, simply as such, however brutally exercised." This "hatred and contempt in a certain class of minds for all so-called popular movements" is a very strong and imperious feeling indeed ; and we sincerely believe that it explains a great deal of the passionate loathing expressed for all the allies of the Christians of Turkey. Had Russia invaded Turkey as she did in 1854, solely and almost expressly for political and aggressive purposes, we should, of course, have had the popular feeling against her a great deal more unani- mous than it is, but there would not have been half the bitterness and loathing in the language of the anti-Russian Press. Of this certainly a very large element is due to posi- tive fury against the humanitarian feeling of last year,–,- to angry contempt for it, as if it were one half feeble fanaticism, and the other half Pharisaic hypocrisy. And with this feeling at the kernel of the hatred, of course it in- creases rapidly in proportion as the fear of Russian power decreases. You may think a very strong man a hypocrite, but respect for his strength in a very large degree attenuates the desire to cry aloud against his supposed hypocrisy. But the less his strength appears to be, the more odious his professedly virtuous sympathies appear. The motives of the strong are seldom dwelt on at all as are the motives of the weak. When Germany, in business-like fashion, "came, saw, and conquered" France, the discussion of motives was almost forgotten in the discussion of consequences. In presence of an overpowering force, people think comparatively little of the moral origin of that force, and very much indeed of its tendency and goal. But when the purpose, instead of being promptly executed, is arrested in mid-career, and no one can predict the result, the hostile observer turns spontaneously to the task of cynical criticism, and,—especially if the professed aim be noble,—soon finds occasion to let his contemptuous scepticism harden itself into virulent disgust. Certainly in all the more conspicuous pro-Turkish journals, the hatred of the humanitarian motive of Russia has been far more conspicuous than even the fear of her political ambition. There is, indeed, a certain popular shame of being supposed to sympathise with the people which appears to us to be spreading rapidly amongst our middle- classes ; and the disposition to brand popular sympathies as "humbug," is obviously one of the main features of the Con- servative revival of the last few years. The Turks of course represent the very climax of cold-blooded contempt for such sympathies. And that is, we suspect, no small part of the secret of the increasing popularity of the Turkish cause amongst the middle-classes of England.
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