THE TREATMENT OF AFGHANISTAN. T HE Afghan papers are very painful
reading. They show the Government proposing from the first to subvert the independence of Afghanistan without the courage to acknow- ledge to the English nation,—we will not say that it did not ulti- mately acknowledge to the Government of Afghanistan,—what it was really about to do. They show it too deliberately advising the adoption of insincere pretexts for the attainment of ends to which it well knew that the Afghan Government was keenly opposed. They show that it contemplated from the first that the result of all its disguised threats might well be to irritate the Afghan Prince into open hostility ; and they show that it was not in the least averse to that result,— that, though on the whole it would have preferred, no doubt, the pliancy which would turn Afghanistan into a subordinate and protected State, doing our will, and adding to our power, yet failing that, it was well aware that its policy might lead to a rupture, and that it greatly preferred such a rupture to leaving to Afghanistan its true independence. The policy adopted with Afghanistan has been a policy of cajolery, bullying, and violence. While talking hypocritically of securing to this unhappy State its independence, the Govern- ment never failed to supply to all intelligent ears the gloss that by " independence " it meant, for this occasion only, complete dependence on the British Empire. But when the Afghan Government professed to be alarmed at this, and to understand it as it was really meant, it was severely scolded by the representatives of the British Government, who treated the keen sight of the Afghans as a new evidence of unfriendliness, and a new excuse for anticipating the rupture which has now happened.
We showed our readers in our last issue how plainly Lord Salisbury, almost on the first broaching of the new policy, indi- cated that it was so absolutely necessary to gain control of the external policy of Afghanistan, that if we could not establish British officials on the Afghan border by straightforward means, we must find some decent pretence for getting in the thin end of the wedge. In the second despatch in which this policy was pressed on the reluctant Government of Lord Northbrook, Lord Salisbury intimates very clearly that he is quite prepared for a final refusal and the consequent alienation of the Amer, but that such a result, though regrettable, would not, to his mind, be half so bad as leaving the Ameer alone. " That a refusal would illustrate the feebleness of our influence with the Ameer, cannot be doubted ; but I apprehend little evil from this dis- closure. It is not likely that either the Afghan Sirdars or the Russian Ministry are misinformed as to the true state of the case, or that any useful purpose would be served by keeping up, even if it were possible, an appearance of influence which does not correspond with the reality." And in the same de- spatch—as far back as November, 1875—Lord Salisbury care- fully directs that if the Ameer cannot be persuaded by care- fully-veiled pretexts to let us get in the thin end of the wedge, then he is to be politely menaced. The Envoy is to adopt an " amicable " tone, but " maintaining this tone, it will be the Envoy's duty earnestly to press on the Ameer the risk he would run if he should impede the course of action which the British Government thinks necessary for securing his independ- ence." That is the tone used to a thoroughly reluctant Viceroy, in 1875. In 1876, however, a Viceroy chosen for the very purpose of carrying out this policy is sent out, and Lord Salisbury in instructing him is much less reticent. Lord Lytton's instructions on the subject, dated 28th February, 1876, are concluded thus :—" The conduct of Shere Ali has more than once been characterised by so significant a disregard of the wishes and interests of the Government of India, that the irretrievable alienation of his confidence in the sincerity and power of that Government is a contingency which cannot be dismissed as impossible. Should such a fear be confirmed by the result of the proposed negotiation, no time must be lost in reconsidering, from a new point of view, the policy to be pursued in reference to Afghanistan." For the outset of a negotiation of alliance, that is a very meaning hint indeed, and one which Lord Lytton evidently understood as meaning that if the Ameer did not turn out to be malleable, he might turn out to be brittle, and that this might be not the least fortunate discovery of the two. Now let us see how Lord Lytton works out this agreeable hint. In his interviews at Simlah with his own Native Envoy to Cabul,—interviews the express object of which was that the Ameer should be in- formed quite frankly of the object of the Government of India in making its new proposals to him,—the Viceroy observes, on October 10th, 1876, that "whilst it was evident that his Highness believed he had good cause to resent the past policy and mis- trust the present attitude of the British Government," "it was equally clear that the Ameer very inadequately realised the gravity and imminence of the danger into which he is drift- ing, under the influence of these unfortunate impressions ; or the practical impossibility of maintaining himself in a position of independence, isolated from the protection, or exposed to the mistrust of the British Government." That is pretty well, by way of a preliminary to negotiation. We might imagine that graver menace could hardly be uttered by a diplomatist, by way of exhortation to a friendly and independent Power, were it not that in the course of the same address Lord Lytton so completely eclipsed himself, and found utterance for menaces so much more explicit and dangerous.
" It is true," he went on, " that if the Ameer proves himself our friend and loyal ally, not our interests only, but our honour, will oblige us to defend his territories and support his throne. But the moment we have cause to doubt his sincerity, or question the practical benefit of his alliance, our interests will be all the other way, and may greatly augment the dangers with which he is already threatened, both at home and abroad. As regards the former, the British Government can only assist those who value its assistance ; and the assist- ance which the Ameer seems at present disinclined to seek or deserve, may at any moment be very welcome to one or other of those rivals from whom he will never be free till he has our assured support. As regards the latter, our only interest in maintaining the independence of Afghanistan, is to provide for the security of our own frontier. But the moment we cease to regard Afghanistan as a friendly and firmly allied State, what is there to prevent us from providing for the security of our frontier by an understanding with Russia which might have the effect of wiping Afghanistan out of the map altogether? If the Ameer does not desire to come to a speedy understanding with us, Russia does ; and she desires it at his expense." Uglier threats can hardly be imagined. Lord Lytton threatens, first, to back up rivals to the throne of Afghanistan, if Shere Ali is not pliant • and next, to come to some understanding with Russia,—for he says, with an air of authority, that Russia is quite pre- pared,—by which the issues between Russia and Great Britain in the East may be settled at the expense of Afghanistan, and by wiping it from the map of Asia. He adds a little effective metaphor, for the benefit of the unfortunate Prince who was to be thus squeezed into compliance :—" The Vakeel had said that the Ameer was strong, but what .were the facts, admitted by himself ? His own son was his opponent. This son had been imprisoned, certainly, but was still so formidable that the Ameer could not leave Cabul, on his account. It was believed that conspiracies were rife in favour of this son ; that the people were discontented, on account of the conscription ; that the treasury was empty • and in fact, that the Ameer's position was surrounded with difficulties. This, said his Excellency, is the man who pretends to hold the balance between England and Russia, independent of either. His position is rather that of an earthern pipkin between two iron pots." After plain-speaking such as this, it is only wonderful to us that the Ameer was not much more panic-struck than he actually was. The truth we suppose to be that Lord Lytton overdid his part ; that by menaces so very loud and demonstrative, and equally ostenta- tious bribes, he showed the Ameer how great was the import- ance he attached to the willing consent of Cabul to become practically dependent on Calcutta, and how afraid he was of being set the task of conquering Afghanistan, as a preliminary to the invasion of Russian Asia. Probably the Ameer knew, —it was just before Mr. Disraeli's threatening speech at the Guildhall against Russia,—that any cordial agreement between England and Russia was, at that time, exceedingly improbable, and he may have thought, what was quite true, that if he had anything to fear from Russia, he had indefinitely more to fear from England,—nay, that independence would be a mere word, if ever he were once safe in the grasp of such an alliance as Lord Lytton proposed. In a word, Lord Lytton must have betrayed by his over-anxiety to bully Afghanistan into compliance with his wishes, that England had either no real wish to come to terms with Russia, or no immediate hope of doing so, and must have shown that he was far too eager to get his grasp on Afghanistan without war, than would be consistent with his being in readiness for war. Had England indeed at this time (October, 1876) broken with Russia, the importance to her of having a dependent and submissive ally in Afghanistan would have been unspeakable. To commence an attack upon Asiatic Russia by the difficult enterprise of an invasion of Afghanistan, would have been adventurous indeed. It was the clear perception of this, doubtless, which made the Ameer receive all Lord Lytton's proposals so very coolly, and say in so many words, that while England evidently wanted something fresh from Afghanistan,- Afghanistan wanted nothing fresh from England, but was quite content with the old engagements. Lord Lytton had said enough to warn the Ameer that if he yielded, 'Afghan independence was a thing of the past. But he did not say enough to convince him that under the circumstances Russia would not help him to maintain that independence. On the Afghan border, Russia was weak and England strong. And for that very reason Russia was much the safer ally of the two. She did not use such threatening language. She did not talk about the pipkin and the iron pots. Weak though she were, she might be strong enough to help Afghanistan to foil England ; and this conviction it was no doubt which induced the Ameer to hold out so long.
When the decisive moment came, the moment in March, 1877, when Russia made her peace with all the rest of Europe, and was about to declare war with Turkey, Lord Lytton knew that, for the present at least, England was not going to war with Russia,--Lord Derby's pacific policy having prevailed,—though Russia was going to war with Turkey,— and accordingly he abruptly broke off the negotiations, although he admits his belief that the Ameer was at last prepared to yield. The urgency of the occasion was over. The moment had passed when an offensive and defensive alliance with Afghanistan had been a matter of the utmost exigency. A standing quarrel with Afghanistan, which would enable India to rectify her frontier,—to use Sir Lewis Pelly's own words,—" without reference to the Ameer," became pre- ferable to an extorted alliance, and hence the abrupt close of the negotiations at a moment when sucoess seemed certain. And now, as we know, the standing quarrel, after keeping for more than a year, has been utilised for the purpose specified, namely, the rectification of the frontier, not only " without reference to," but at the expense of, the unfortunate State which stands like the earthern pipkin between the two iron pots.
The policy which we have now described on the evidence of the Government itself,—the policy of the last two years and a half towards Afghanistan,—seems to us to combine every element of ignobility and injustice. It began in the suggestion of deceit towards the Ameer, and it has ended in an invasion for which there is no justification. We do not doubt that had England decided on war with Russia in'the spring of 1877, the reluctant submissien'of Afghanistan would have been accepted, and an alliance been ceneluded with the Ameer which would have terminated his independence. As it was, the opportunity for quarrelling at any nroment was preferred to the more ex- pensive alliance which• had been offered, and which, for the moment, had become relatively unimportant. The quarrel would keep, and has kept, and has been used as the pretext for a war at our own convenience. But the origin of the war is in out own policy. We bullied the Ameer till he was• ready to yield, and then thrust him off contemptuously, to look for some other ally, —the Government telling Parliament all the while that he was fully as well affected towards us as ever, and that the policy had not been changed. Of course, the poor Ameer looked for help wherever he could find it from a foe so arro- gant and so threatening,• and for doing this we at once pun- ished him• by invasion. It is the old story,—first, browbeat and threaten a child till he hates you, and then beat him for not loving you better than any' one or every one else. But what- ever Lord Lytton has been, he, at least, has not been under- handed. Anything-more comically candid than his course all through cannot be imagined. But Lord Salisbury and Lord Cranbrook have• been underhanded. The one has deceived Parliament, the other has misled the nation. The one ' suggested Jesuitism, to the Government of India, and acted on his own suggestion to the Peers of England. The other has dressed up party imputations as authentic history. They have threatened abroad, and dissimulated at home; and the Afghan ' war is the result. 1
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