THE WAR SURVEYED: FOG OVER THE NEAR EAST By STRATEGICUS
THE events which have happened during the last week so far from clarifying the situation seem to have made it more obscure. Bulgaria has joined the Axis and opened her doors to the German troops who have been so eager to occupy the country that they have pushed along ice-bound roads, leaving at the verges the debris of vehicles which could not stand the strain. This fact should tell us something ; but it only discloses what we know: that the developments are con- sequences and not an initiative. The compulsion of the swift events of the African campaign has provoked its inevitable response. But beyond that the position is shrouded in a deeper gloom. The troops are in Bulgaria, and there they stand. Their number is not known. A first approximation would be of little service, since if the weather is as bad as it is reported to be, it seems incredible that many divisions have yet been moved. Only a week ago the country was in deep mow, and this is not the terrain to tempt an army under those conditions.
It is the next move that arouses interest and anxiety. There is evidence that the centre of gravity of the German troop- concentration, though it may be on the east, is not on the south-east. There are more troops on Germany's eastern marches than there were during the Polish campaign. The distribution over Europe has a virtuosity that lacks impres- siveness from the military point of view. The occupation ot so many hostile countries must rest a little heavily on the German mind ; but it seems not nearly so heavy a burden as the " alliance " with Russia. If, as seems probable, the enemy wishes to restore a converging attack upon Egypt the venture can hardly be devoid of risk ; and, indeed, it might have the effect of creating that two-front war which German strategy has been at such pains to avoid.
The main point of interest is the weight of the German con- centration in Rumania for use in the Balkan campaign. In this matter it seems that the estimates have been over- imaginative. It is easy to juggle with divisions and place them in vast numbers over the Continent. As I have suggested they are, indeed, spread about rather more widely than the German soldiers of the last war would have approved. But they do not appear to be in Rumania-Bulgaria in overwhelming strength. There are probably not more than twelve to fifteen divisions there, all told; and, if Germany is as trustful in her neighbour on the lower Danube as she appears to be in Poland, all these will not be withdrawn. It must be remembered that Germany stands on part of the northern frontier of Yugo- slavia and through Hungary over the whole of it. Until Yugo- slavia discloses her attitude, divisions will be maintained there which can threaten the last of the independent Balkan States by the six railways that run north from it Caution would suggest that no further move to the south should be made until that problem is cleared up. If the Germans were heavily concentrated in Bulgaria, it would appear that the problem had largely solved itself since Yugo- slavia would be almost helpless. Apart from the Adriatic, which is at least within some sort of Italian control, and the flank which is covered by Greece, she is surrounded either by the Axis Powers or countries controlled by them. But, if Hitler is playing the careful game at which he is now an adept, he must hope to secure his immediate, if not his remote objectives, without fighting. His practice is gradually to under- mine the strategic position of his victims until they must either accept his orders or give battle under conditions so disadvan- tageous that the result is a foregone conclusion. But it is the first he prefers; and in the case of Yugoslavia he has pushed the process to a point at which he is now ready to issue his com- mands. What can Yugoslavia do? The time appears to have passed when she could fight with a sound chance of success.
If that should be the case, if Hitler can make use of Yugo- slavia, he would naturally prefer to use that jumping-off ground against Greece, since it is connected by means of its railways with central Europe. He might also advance through the Struma valley. He might, indeed, threaten to march along the three other roads that connect Bulgaria to Greece; and in this way place the greatest strain upon the heroic nation which first challenged one of the Axis partners successfully. But why all this elaboration unless the Germans fear some allied inter- vention that might interfere with their plans? Here we are at a great disadvantage, since we do not know what plans hare been concerted with Turkey for assistance to Greece. It is hardly permissible to speculate upon them; and yet we have to assume that careful thought has been given to the various possibilities in the situation. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff does not travel some thousands of miles from his office merely for the sake of exchanging speculations. His business is to discuss and concert plans. But, at the moment, we have no knowledge of what is afoot. The most reassuring evidence that the situation is not wholly favourable to Germany is the fact that she has not yet abandoned manoeuvre and taken to weapons. If the position were perfectly clear and favourable there would be no special messengers flying across the Con- tinent to Turkey, and no furthet delay for discussions.
What misgiving we feel is due to the openness and obvious- ness of the German threats and the absence of any sign of our rejoinder. By preference, of course, we should take such action that the enemy would be faced with the necessity of finding the reply. That course we have exploited in Africa; but the Libyan campaign with its toll of 14o,000 prisoners and immense captures of war material is over, and the colony of Italian East Africa is fast ceasing to be Italian. That initiative has been so calmly pressed that Hitler has been compelled to tale action, to anticipate his spring campaign. But it is not obvious where we could develop another campaign with the same result. The enemy is fast being cleared out of Africa and, indeed, it seems likely that the Germans are using the same score and, with the requisite adaptations, attempting to repeat the original theme. Hitler is unlikely to abandon the attempt to threaten Egypt through Libya, as he has run his colours to the masthead so defiantly. At the moment it is incredible that there should be many German troops or much material in Tripolitania. The minefield must have simplifol the work of interception for our navy ; and we can be sure they will neglect no opportunity that is offered them to sink transports. Theoretically, and on paper, the task of reinforc- ing the Tripolitania garrison should be impossible. But who would have said that the German campaign against Norway, from Stavanger northward, was possible before it happened? Much may be achieved by an entirely resolute enemy who has no delicacy about the risk of human life. The other part of the converging attack could only corn: through Syria. Germany might hope to force her way through to Syria without touching Macedonia. The Maritsa valley leash straight to the Bulgarian-Turkish frontier, and the main rail way line points to Adrianople. But there the troubles aPPlar. to begin. When the defences of Turkey are discussed fl is customary to consider the Chatalja defence line; but to position is only twenty-five miles from Istanbul; and that does not offer much manoeuvring room. Indeed, it is not. al lines that anyone would now place his wholehearted faith What is pertinent to the question is the difficulty of crossuf the straits into Asia Minor against a skilful, stubborn end well' equipped resistance. From the allied point of view the Proat weakness of the position and of the whole Balkan situation 15 the appearance of the defensive adopted at second thoughts In the May campaign in the West, the allies were acted! on the line which Schlieffen feared most as the 'rallying 101 that might enable the Allies to constrict his attacking force' That they could not halt the actual advance was due to shell taking up the line belatedly. The peril of the doctrine of tt4 defensive is that it is taken to mean that troops have scirl particular superiority when they are on the defensive. Tb!, is untrue as stated. The defensive can be made so poN‘ zrit' that only a force superior in every way can break through
Previous page
