Forward With France
In the past forty years there has only been one real argument against an Anglo-French Treaty of Alliance, and that was that it was not necessary—that understanding between the two countries was so close that no treaty could make it closer. And there has only been one objection to that argument, and that was that in such circum- stances of close understanding if either party wanted a formal alliance it should have it. Today both parties want the alliance and therefore, quite rightly, they have it. The possible objection that the verbal interpretation of a treaty can foster differences ignores the underlying friendship which is the foundation of the treaty. The less worthy objection—in fact, the downright stupid one—that France stands to gain more than Britain is formally removed by the provision that either will come to the aid of the other. That provision has had its relevance enhanced by the fact that German aggression in future could take several more immediate and telling forms than a land invasion of France. The misgiving that the known differences of opinion between the two countries on the future regime of Western Germany may yet-split them has had its foundation knocked away by the signature of the Treaty before the Moscow Conference. If there had been any suspicion in France that the conclusion of the Alliance at this time could in any way have prejudiced the chances of a right and realistic settlement of Germany that Alliance would not have been concluded. It thus has, besides every possible foundation in reason and affection, the support of the most profound and justifiable self-interest, extending down to the earthy but essential roots of economics. All that is necessary now is that the Alliance shall be dynamic and forward- looking. The signature among the ruins of Dunkirk and close to its historic beaches must not obscure the fact that France and Britain have infinitely more in common than their defeats and their memories.
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