POLITICS
A slow-motion Cuba and the dangers that follow it
FERDINAND MOUNT
Well, perhaps not, though one can dream. On the whole, the shedding of blood appears to be a prerequisite for battle honours; there is little glory in averting or deterring and, I suspect, not many votes either. Indeed, there are often votes in being the deterree. To the ex- asperation of Western politicians, the acceptance of the 'zero option' (we'll re- move all our medium-range missiles from central Europe if they take away all theirs) is widely spoken of as 'Mr Gorbachev's initiative', when he is in fact responding to a Western proposal first made six years ago. The only Soviet initiative was to install their SS-20s in the first place.
The whole episode is, if you like, a slow-motion Cuba (and one should re- member how Khrushchev, and not Ken- nedy, was praised for his responsibility, statesmanship and other eirenic qualities, in spite of the fact that he started it). It is now nearly ten years since the Russians, on an expansionist high, began pointing their SS-20s at us and Helmut Schmidt nagged the Americans into responding by bringing over a quantity of cruise missiles. Since we spend so much time pointing out how badly we are governed, we should not miss this opportunity of remarking on the steadiness and persistence of Western governments in matching the Soviet challenge and in win- ning over or holding out against the softer patches of public opinion. With the excep- tion of the British Labour Party, most of the major parties in Western Europe pas- sed the Kennan Test with fairly high marks: 'a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies'.
Now we must also take to heart the harder message in the famous despatch which George Kennan wrote as US chargé d'affaires in Moscow and later published in 1947 under the pseudonym of Mr X. Both the teachings of Lenin and the lessons of Russian history emphasise the need for Soviet patience and flexibility: 'Thus the Kremlin has no compunction about re- treating in the face of superior force. And being under the compulsion of no time- table, it does not get panicky under the necessity for such retreat. Its political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is permitted to move, towards a given goal. . . if it finds unassailable barriers in its path, it accepts these philosophically and accommodates itself to them.'
What, after all, will the Soviet Union have lost if a deal on medium-range missiles should be signed in six months' time? Both sides would be back to roughly a pre-1977 position in central Europe, in which the Soviet Union possessed infinitely larger conventional forces and a great many more short-range missiles than Nato — well, relatively short-range. Scud, Frog, SS-21 and SS-23 apparently have ranges of up to 350 miles. I fear that Mr Denis Healey's slurry-filled ditch would not prove much of a barrier.
As General Bernard Rogers, the Sup- reme Allied Commander in Europe, points out, without other balanced and verifiable reductions, the zero option would 'put us in a hell of a position here in Western Europe'. Either the Russians have to reduce their short-range missile forces, or the Americans will have greatly to increase theirs.
And it would not be good enough merely to tack on to a medium-range missile treaty a clause agreeing to follow on with talks about the shorter-range weapons. The commitments must be entrenched in the same treaty, as Mrs Thatcher agreed with Mr Reagan at Camp David. It is scarcely reassuring that General Rogers is being more or less sacked.
Far from the USSR showing a peculiar willingness to allow her Moscow talks to result in a diplomatic triumph for Mrs Thatcher (which the Times says is the view of MPs of all parties), Mr Gorbachev has ingeniously placed her in an extremely tricky position. She must, it is said, in an election year continue to express enthu- siasm for the prospect of an arms-control agreement. Yet she must not appear to concede the European position and so encourage an agreement-hungry US administration to sign anything the Rus- sians push in front of them.
These stresses are likely to strain further the relationships between the Americans and the Europeans. Those Americans who see the looming dangers most clearly, like the 'Prince of Darkness', Mr Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defence, are also those who have been most contemp- tuous of the wimpishness of the Euro- peans. Their scorn eggs on those Congress- men who want to bring the GIs home and ' leave the ungrateful Europeans to defend themselves.
Mr Gorbachev has managed to whip up a nigh insatiable appetite for arms-control agreements on both sides of the Atlantic. His offer establishes him as the pacemaker and the peacemaker; as it stands, in isolation, it would re-establish overwhelm- ing Soviet military superiority in Central Europe, and hence appalling insecurity; and would intensify the fears of a de- coupling between the US and Western Europe. Not bad for a day's work.
Mrs Thatcher's only option is to con- tinue in her natural combative style. That is the way to help secure a deal which does not send Western Europe naked out of the conference chamber, and also to highlight Mr Kinnock's eagerness for a treaty with- out any preconditions — seen at its most pathetic in the Commons on Tuesday afternoon.
Any softening of the British Govern- ment's style might well be to Labour's advantage, and not just on defence issues either. Logically, of course, it is clear that any Soviet 'concessions' must have been won by strength, and the Greenham women must have been hopelessly discredited.
But Mrs Joan Ruddock's claim of a victory for CND is irritatingly difficult to get at, since Mr Gorbachev's 'initiative' appears; to them anyway, to confirm their belief that one can `take risks for peace'. This is not only untrue; it begins subtly to undermine the premises of Thatcherism, which are rooted in a sense of difficulty.
Mr Gorbachev is no doubt a man one can do business with. So is Mr Ernest Saunders. I think on this occasion a touch of what Pravda might call 'revanchist ironladyism' would not go amiss.
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