THE REVOLUTION IN TURKEY.
rr HE accounts of the frantic scenes and wild fraternisa- tions that have been going on of late in Turkey remind one of a delightful story of the experiences of Lear, the painter and nonsense-rhymer, in Southern Italy in 1848,- a period when little revolutions were constantly breaking out throughout the peninsula. Lear, who was stopping in a Sicilian town, had occasion to leave it for a few weeks, and he accordingly locked up his canvases and other belongings and entrusted the key to the innkeeper. When he returned he found the waiter brimming over with wine and patriotism. His request for the key of his room in order that he might get his property was met with the fervid exclamation :—" Oh, what key ! Oh, what property ! Oh, what room! There are no more keys ; there is no more property ; there are no more rooms ; there is no more anything ! All is love and liberty ! 0 che bella rivolu- zione ! " All is love and liberty and a beautiful revolution in Turkey just now ; but how long will it last ? Unfortu- nately, not only are keys and rooms and property things which sooner or later must be attended to, but there is also "a grim knave" standing at the door of every revolu- tion called Physical Force, who in one fashion or another made the revolution, and who is apt to demand attention in very peremptory tones.
In the present case the question of physical force is specially prominent and insistent, because that force is not supplied in the Turkish as in most revolutions, by the mob, but by the Regular Army. The more carefully the events of the last fortnight are studied, the more clear does it become that the force which has brought about the present astonishing situation is the Army. The Sultan made a complete surrender, not because he was converted to Constitutional ideas, or because he feared the Constitutionalists in the abstract, but because he suddenly awoke to the fact that the Constitu- tionalists had contrived to get their hands upon the one lever of power in his dominions,—the Army. He yielded because he had no choice. Had he refused he would have had to face civil war, and civil war under conditions which made his failure almost certain. But failure in such a case would have meant deposition, quickly followed by an ignominious death. The Sultan could not feel that if the worst came to the worst he would be allowed to retire with a million or two to Europe after the manner of Ismail Pasha. Such things may happen when Europe deposes, not when an Asiatic despot falls before his own troops.
In trying to forecast the future, as all who realise the immense importance of the Turkish situation to the peace of Europe must try to do, this fact that the revolution is a military revolution, and that it is the Army which is in power in Turkey, must never be forgotten. What does history teach us as to what happens when a far-rea.ching Constitutional change is brought about by an army ? Unquestionably it is that the army's first thought is to secure its own power, and to get itself properly paid and recognised. If even so patriotic and moral an army as that of the Puritans did this, we may be quite sure that an army like that of Turkey, which has for so many years been deprived of pay and just treatment, will not in the moment of success, and when feeling the intoxication of power, allow that power to slip from its hands and permit the civilian element to dictate to it. The Army may talk Oonatitutionalism and Young Turkism and what not, but it will act in what it believes to be its own interests.
No doubt, like other holders of power, it may become demoralised by selfish action, and may be distracted by rival claims, or by the weakening of authority and discipline within its own ranks, and thus may ultimately become intolerable to the people of the Turkish Empire as * whole. But many stages will have to be gone through before that stage is reached in which the people say the last word. For the present, we may expect that either the Army will throw up a military leader who will virtually exercise sovereign control over Turkey, or else a military Junta will select a civilian instrument to do its bidding. That instrument at the moment may be said to be the Sultan, and therefore, not unnaturally, some people have supposed that the Sultan, with his genius for diplomacy and intrigue, will manage in the end to persuade the Army that he is its best friend, and thus regain his old position of personal ascendency. We doubt the Army being so cajoled. Iu the first place, it has been too often deceived before ; and next, all accounts seem to show that the Sultan's health and spirit are too much broken to enable him to play so difficult and. perilous a part. He Aught have done it twenty years ago. but now he has not the nerve. It is far more likely that the Sultan will remain in his palace as a semi-prisoner, and that the Army will make as much use as it can of his claims over the faithful as Caliph. It will always be worth its while to keep him going for this purpose.
A very interesting interview with a Young Turk, Mr. Santo-senio, published in Thursday's Daily Chronicle, strongly supports what we have said as to the Army being tho essential factor in the situation. Mr. Santo-semo, after making it clear that the Army has no intention of relaxing its grasp upon any portion of the Turkish Empire, goes on to declare that there is no serious dread of reaction, "No doubt there will be reactionaries, but they can do nothing against the Army, and it is in the officers (if the Army, who are very well instructed, and much more intelligent than people in Europe generally imagine, that akir stavegth Mr. Santo-seino then drops a hint which carries one back to the days of the Roman Empire, aad pads like a passage out of Taeitus. One of the guarantees which the Army will apparently require "is the removal of the garrison of twenty thousand Albanians which the Sultan still maintains in the Yildiz Kiosk." In other words, the provincial legions do not mean to give way to the Pretorian Guard. Possibly the Pretorians will make terms; but if not, we may see two armies contending for the body of the sultan, each determined to use him for its own purposes. Ill such a case we should back the provincial legions. No doubt the Pretorians of Yildiz are very well armed and equipped; but we must not forget that they are surrounded by the population of the great city of Constantinople, and that this population is hostile to them, and eager for the liberating policy of the Salonika and Adrianople armies. The net point is a very interesting one, and shown what was again to be expected from the lessons of history,— namely, that the triumphant revolutionary Army is pretty sure to have a foreign policy, and a foreign policy which will not be of the kid-glove order. The Young Turks, we are told, mean to support the cause of the Persian Censtitutionalists. Under the old regime there was nothing but antagonism between Turkey and Persia, but just "as the Young Turks have secured peace and cooperiatien in Macedonia, so we shall stretch put the fraternal hand of sympathy to the Constitutionalists of Persia." We do not wonder that the Daily avant:de interviewer described this as a "rather startling development." Befor,w leove the subject of the Turkish ligvigutiim we should like to draw attention to a point which, though it has not yet been touched upon, cannot long escape public notice. It is by no means impossible that if the Army not only comes into power, but takes the extreme national view, which it seems inclined to take, a cry of the nature of "Turkey Irredental" may be heard, and, prove exceedingly embarrassing to the Powers chiefly concerned with the affairs of the Balkans and of South-Eastern Europe generally. Possibly it may appear at the moment absurd that the Turkish Army, which, though powerful locally, would. be a small force if confronted with a com- bination of European Powers, should really give trouble.. We must remember, however, that the wielders of the Turkish military power have had little or no experience of European diplomacy, and- are extremely likely to have a very good conceit of their own military capacity. They will also, no doubt, be tempted by the thought that their position will be made more secure with their countrymen by a spirited foreign policy. If we are right in suggesting that this will be the temper of the new rulers of Turkey during the next few months, the situation must obviously become one of no little gravity. At the present moment reports from Bosnia and Herzegovina, show that the local population. not only Mohammedan but Slav, are in a, state of ferment, and that they are ill satisfied -with their Austrian governors. Suppose—and stranger things have happened —that the Slays and Mohammedans in combination should appeal to the new regime in Constantinople, point out that they are still in theory and by the public law of Europe part of the Turkish Empire, and ask that they shall be given the Constitutional rights which the rest of Turkey is to enjoy, or else that the Turkish Government shall obtain from the Austrians a guarantee that they will receive a local Parliament and local popular and Censti- tutional institutions. Suppose, next, that such a demand were endorsed by the Turkish Government, and. that it were backed up by Servia, and even by Bulgaria. In that case, what would Austria do ? For ourselves, we trust that she would have the support of the rest of the Powers in preventing a breach of the peace ; but un- fortunately it is possible that the trouble would come in a way so sudden, so complicated, and so difficult that a scheme of common action to keep the peace might be ineffectual.
Another source of friction between Europe and the new regime may, we fear, be found in the question a finance. The Army under Young Turk inspiration will no doubt want to carry out many reforms in addition to the prime reform of paying the troops. But the maintenance of a well- paid Army and the carrying out of reforms are expensive matters, especially if they have to be done in a hurry. Therefore if more money is wanted, and wanted rapidly, Turkey will also want financial freedom. Such a demand is certain, however, to bring her into conflict with Europe, repre- senting the European bondholder. The Sultan hitherto has been very tolerant of the "man in possession," but we must not expect military chiefs flushed with success and possessed of revolutionary zeal to be as patient or as indolent. In pointing out these dangerous rocks ahead, we trust it will not be considered that we are in any way supporters of the old regime. None rejoice more than we do that a specially vile and cruel form of despotism has been got rid of. Anything was better than the rule of Yildiz such as the world has known it for the last twenty years. But though we are glad that the revolution has taken place, and in many ways sympathise with the organisers of that revolution, we are bound, as serious students of European politics, to point out what seem to us to be very grave and very real perils. Unquestionably the best way to avert those perils, both in the interests of Turkey and of Europe as a whole, is to look them fairly and squarely in the face.
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